Goodman’s Many Worlds
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15173/jhap.v7i6.3827Abstract
In this paper, I examine Nelson Goodman’s pluriworldism, understood as the claim that there exists a plurality of actual worlds. This proposal has generally been quickly dismissed in the philosophical literature. I argue that we ought to take it more seriously. As I show, many of the prima facie objections to pluriworldism may receive straightforward answers. I also examine in detail Goodman’s argument for the conclusion that there are many worlds and attempt to show how it might be supported. Eventually, I discuss some underexplored challenges to pluriworldism.
References
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Carnap, Rudolf, 1950. “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology.” Revue internationale de philosophie 4: 20–40.
Chokr, Nader N., 1993. “Nelson Goodman on Truth, Relativism, and Criteria of Rightness Or Why We Should Dispense with Truth and Adopt Rightness?” Dialectica 47: 55–73.
Cohnitz, Daniel and Marcus Rossberg, 2006. Nelson Goodman. Chesham: Acumen.
Davidson, Donald, 1973–74. “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme.” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 47: 5–20.
de Donato Rodríguez, Xavier, 2009. “Construction and Worldmaking: the Significance of Nelson Goodman’s Pluralism.” Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science 24: 213–25.
Devitt, Michael, 1997. Realism and Truth. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Dudau, Radu, 2002. The Realism/Anti-Realism Debate in the Philosophy of Science. Berlin: Logos.
Dutra, Bruce, 1999. The Problem of Conflicting Truths and Nelson Goodman’s Ontological Pluralism. PhD thesis, Purdue University.
Eklund, Matti, 2013. “Carnap’s Metaontology.” Noûs 47: 229–49.
Elgin, Catherine Z., 1996. Considered Judgment. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
———, 2000. “Worldmaker: Nelson Goodman.” Journal for General Philosophy of Science 31: 1–18.
———, 2009. “Construction and Cognition.” Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science 24: 135–46.
Goodman, Nelson, [1941] 1990. A Study of Qualities. New York & London: Garland.
———, [1951] 1977. The Structure of Appearance, 3rd ed. Dordrecht: Springer.
———, 1960. “The Way the World Is.” The Review of Metaphysics 14: 48–56.
———, 1983. Fact, Fiction and Forecast, 4th ed. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
———, 1984. Of Mind and Other Matters. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
———, 1985. Ways of Worldmaking, 2nd ed. Indianapolis: Hackett.
Goodman, Nelson and Catherine Z. Elgin, 1988. Reconceptions in Philosophy and other Arts and Sciences. Indianapolis: Hackett.
Hacking, Ian, 1999. The Social Construction of What? Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Harris, James F., 1992. Against Relativism: A Philosophical Defence of Method. LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court.
Hirsch, Eli, 2011. Quantifier Variance and Realism: Essays in Metaontology. New York: Oxford University Press.
Huschle, Brian J., 2000. From Conflicting Versions to Many Worlds: An Examination of Goodman’s Irrealism. PhD thesis, University of Nebraska–Lincoln.
Küng, Guido, 1993. “Ontology and the Construction of Systems.” Synthese 95: 29–53.
Kuhn, Thomas S., 1970. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Kukla, André, 2000. Social Constructivism and the Philosophy of Science. London: Routledge.
Lamarque, Peter and Stein Haugom Olsen, 1994. Truth, Fiction, and Literature: A Philosophical Perspective. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Lewis, David K., 1973. Counterfactuals. Oxford: Blackwell.
———, 1978. “Truth in Fiction.” American Philosophical Quarterly 15: 37–46.
———, 1986. On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Blackwell.
Lynch, Michael P., 1998. Truth in Context: An Essay on Objectivity and Pluralism. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
McCormick, Peter J., ed., 1996. Starmaking: Realism, Anti-Realism, and Irrealism. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
O’Grady, Paul, 2002. Relativism. Montreal: McGill–Queen’s University Press.
Putnam, Hilary, 1985. Philosophical Papers, vol. 3, Realism and Reasons. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Scheffler, Israel, 1996. “The Wonderful Worlds of Goodman.” In McCormick (1996), pp. 133–41.
———, 2000. “A Plea for Plurealism.” Erkenntnis 52: 161–73.
Schwartz, Robert, 2000. “Starting from Scratch: Making Worlds.” Erkenntnis 52: 151–59.
Searle, John, 1997. The Construction of Social Reality. New York: Free Press.
Siegel, Harvey, 1984. “Goodmanian Relativism.” The Monist 67: 359–75.
van Fraassen, Bas C., 1995. “ ‘World’ is not a Count Noun.” Noûs 29: 139–57.
Walton, Kendall L., 1990. Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the Foundations of the Representational Arts. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Wolterstorff, Nicholas, 1987. “Are Concept-Users World-Makers?” Philosophical Perspectives 1: 233–67.
Carnap, Rudolf, 1950. “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology.” Revue internationale de philosophie 4: 20–40.
Chokr, Nader N., 1993. “Nelson Goodman on Truth, Relativism, and Criteria of Rightness Or Why We Should Dispense with Truth and Adopt Rightness?” Dialectica 47: 55–73.
Cohnitz, Daniel and Marcus Rossberg, 2006. Nelson Goodman. Chesham: Acumen.
Davidson, Donald, 1973–74. “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme.” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 47: 5–20.
de Donato Rodríguez, Xavier, 2009. “Construction and Worldmaking: the Significance of Nelson Goodman’s Pluralism.” Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science 24: 213–25.
Devitt, Michael, 1997. Realism and Truth. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Dudau, Radu, 2002. The Realism/Anti-Realism Debate in the Philosophy of Science. Berlin: Logos.
Dutra, Bruce, 1999. The Problem of Conflicting Truths and Nelson Goodman’s Ontological Pluralism. PhD thesis, Purdue University.
Eklund, Matti, 2013. “Carnap’s Metaontology.” Noûs 47: 229–49.
Elgin, Catherine Z., 1996. Considered Judgment. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
———, 2000. “Worldmaker: Nelson Goodman.” Journal for General Philosophy of Science 31: 1–18.
———, 2009. “Construction and Cognition.” Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science 24: 135–46.
Goodman, Nelson, [1941] 1990. A Study of Qualities. New York & London: Garland.
———, [1951] 1977. The Structure of Appearance, 3rd ed. Dordrecht: Springer.
———, 1960. “The Way the World Is.” The Review of Metaphysics 14: 48–56.
———, 1983. Fact, Fiction and Forecast, 4th ed. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
———, 1984. Of Mind and Other Matters. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
———, 1985. Ways of Worldmaking, 2nd ed. Indianapolis: Hackett.
Goodman, Nelson and Catherine Z. Elgin, 1988. Reconceptions in Philosophy and other Arts and Sciences. Indianapolis: Hackett.
Hacking, Ian, 1999. The Social Construction of What? Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Harris, James F., 1992. Against Relativism: A Philosophical Defence of Method. LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court.
Hirsch, Eli, 2011. Quantifier Variance and Realism: Essays in Metaontology. New York: Oxford University Press.
Huschle, Brian J., 2000. From Conflicting Versions to Many Worlds: An Examination of Goodman’s Irrealism. PhD thesis, University of Nebraska–Lincoln.
Küng, Guido, 1993. “Ontology and the Construction of Systems.” Synthese 95: 29–53.
Kuhn, Thomas S., 1970. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Kukla, André, 2000. Social Constructivism and the Philosophy of Science. London: Routledge.
Lamarque, Peter and Stein Haugom Olsen, 1994. Truth, Fiction, and Literature: A Philosophical Perspective. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Lewis, David K., 1973. Counterfactuals. Oxford: Blackwell.
———, 1978. “Truth in Fiction.” American Philosophical Quarterly 15: 37–46.
———, 1986. On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Blackwell.
Lynch, Michael P., 1998. Truth in Context: An Essay on Objectivity and Pluralism. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
McCormick, Peter J., ed., 1996. Starmaking: Realism, Anti-Realism, and Irrealism. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
O’Grady, Paul, 2002. Relativism. Montreal: McGill–Queen’s University Press.
Putnam, Hilary, 1985. Philosophical Papers, vol. 3, Realism and Reasons. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Scheffler, Israel, 1996. “The Wonderful Worlds of Goodman.” In McCormick (1996), pp. 133–41.
———, 2000. “A Plea for Plurealism.” Erkenntnis 52: 161–73.
Schwartz, Robert, 2000. “Starting from Scratch: Making Worlds.” Erkenntnis 52: 151–59.
Searle, John, 1997. The Construction of Social Reality. New York: Free Press.
Siegel, Harvey, 1984. “Goodmanian Relativism.” The Monist 67: 359–75.
van Fraassen, Bas C., 1995. “ ‘World’ is not a Count Noun.” Noûs 29: 139–57.
Walton, Kendall L., 1990. Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the Foundations of the Representational Arts. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Wolterstorff, Nicholas, 1987. “Are Concept-Users World-Makers?” Philosophical Perspectives 1: 233–67.
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2019-10-21
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