Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy <p>JHAP aims to promote research in and discussion of the history of analytical philosophy. <a href="/jhap/about">Read more ...</a></p> McMaster University en-US Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 2159-0303 <p>The Public Knowledge Project recommends the use of the Creative Commons license. The Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy requires authors to agree to a <a href="">Creative Commons Attribution /Non-commercial license</a>. Authors who publish with the Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy agree to the following terms:</p> <ol> <li class="show">Authors retain copyright and grant the journal right of first publication with the work simultaneously licensed under a <a href="">Creative Commons BY-NC license</a>.</li> <li class="show">Authors are able to enter into separate, additional contractual arrangements for the non-exclusive distribution of the journal's published version of the work (e.g., post it to an institutional repository or publish it in a book), with an acknowledgement of its initial publication in this journal.</li> <li class="show">Authors are permitted and encouraged to post their work online (e.g., in institutional repositories or on their website) prior to and during the submission process, as it can lead to productive exchanges, as well as earlier and greater citation of published work (See The Effect of Open Access)</li> </ol> <p><a href="" rel="license"><img style="border-width: 0;" src="" alt="Creative Commons License"></a><br>This work is licensed under a <a href="" rel="license">Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 3.0 Unported License</a>.</p> Bertrand Russell’s Doxastic Sentimentalism (and Neutral Monism) <p>This paper reinterprets doxastic sentimentalism and neutral monism, as these doctrines appear in Bertrand Russell’s “On Propositions” (1919) and The Analysis of Mind (1921). It argues that Russell’s theory of belief, in this particular period, posited at least seven distinct types of feeling, but only one type of entity. The paper’s principal thesis is that Russell treated believing as feelings, but it also draws the conclusions that monism and sentimentalism are logically independent of one another, and that sentimentalism and (at least one type of) behaviorism are inconsistent, qua theories of belief.</p> Ryan Hickerson Copyright (c) 2024 Ryan Hickerson 2024-06-14 2024-06-14 12 6 10.15173/jhap.v12i6.5468