Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy JHAP aims to promote research in and discussion of the history of analytical philosophy. <a href="/jhap/about">Read more ...</a> McMaster University en-US Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 2159-0303 <p>The Public Knowledge Project recommends the use of the Creative Commons license. The Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy requires authors to agree to a <a href="">Creative Commons Attribution /Non-commercial license</a>. Authors who publish with the Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy agree to the following terms:</p><ol><li>Authors retain copyright and grant the journal right of first publication with the work simultaneously licensed under a <a href="">Creative Commons BY-NC license</a>.</li><li>Authors are able to enter into separate, additional contractual arrangements for the non-exclusive distribution of the journal's published version of the work (e.g., post it to an institutional repository or publish it in a book), with an acknowledgement of its initial publication in this journal.</li><li>Authors are permitted and encouraged to post their work online (e.g., in institutional repositories or on their website) prior to and during the submission process, as it can lead to productive exchanges, as well as earlier and greater citation of published work (See The Effect of Open Access)</li></ol><p><a href="" rel="license"><img style="border-width: 0;" src="" alt="Creative Commons License" /></a><br />This work is licensed under a <a href="" rel="license">Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 3.0 Unported License</a>.</p> Priority and Unity in Frege and Wittgenstein <p>In the following article I intend to examine the problem of the unity of the proposition in Russell, Frege, and Wittgenstein. My chief aim will be to draw attention to the distinction between Russell’s conception of propositional constituents, on the one hand, with Frege and Wittgenstein’s on the other. My focus will be on Russell’s view of terms as independent, propositions being built up <em>out of</em> these building blocks, compared with Frege and Wittgenstein’s ‘top down’ approach. Furthermore, I will argue that, contra certain other commentators, Frege’s metaphor of saturation and unsaturation does not serve as a solution to the problem of unity, and that the extension of this metaphorical language to Wittgenstein is, therefore, inappropriate.</p> Oliver Thomas Spinney ##submission.copyrightStatement## 2018-04-13 2018-04-13 6 5 10.15173/jhap.v6i5.3351 Erik C. Banks, The Realistic Empiricism of Mach, James, and Russell: Neutral Monism Reconceived <p>Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014. 217 + viii pp. $103 Hardcover. ISBN 978-1-107-07386-9.</p> <p>Reviewed by Gary Hatfield, University of Pennsylvania.</p> Gary Hatfield ##submission.copyrightStatement## 2018-04-13 2018-04-13 6 5 10.15173/jhap.v6i5.3479