https://jhaponline.org/jhap/issue/feedJournal for the History of Analytical Philosophy2022-03-30T23:57:53+00:00Audrey Yapayap@uvic.caOpen Journal Systems<p>JHAP aims to promote research in and discussion of the history of analytical philosophy. <a href="/jhap/about">Read more ...</a></p>https://jhaponline.org/jhap/article/view/5135Review of Sanford Shieh, Necessity Lost2022-03-29T19:45:55+00:00Roberta Ballarinroberta.ballarin@ubc.ca<p>~</p>2022-03-30T00:00:00+00:00Copyright (c) 2022 Roberta Ballarinhttps://jhaponline.org/jhap/article/view/4410Wittgenstein's Reductio2021-03-29T17:37:33+00:00Gilad Nirgilad.nir@yahoo.com<p>By means of a <em>reductio</em> argument, Wittgenstein’s <em>Tractatus</em> calls into question the very idea that we can represent logical form. My paper addresses three interrelated questions: first, what conception of logical form is at issue in this argument? Second, whose conception of logic is this argument intended to undermine? And third, what could count as an adequate response to it? I show that the argument construes logical form as the universal, underlying correlation of any representation and the reality it represents. I further show that the argument seeks to undermine core commitments of Frege’s and Russell’s. But the <em>reductio</em>, as I read it, is not intended to establish the falsity of any of their specific assumptions. Rather, its aim is to make manifest the indeterminacies that underlie the language in which these assumptions are framed, and establish the need for a transformation of that language. So understood, Wittgenstein’s argument exemplifies his idea that philosophy is not a theory, but an activity of elucidation. The interpretation I propose bears on one of the central debates in the literature, namely how we should understand Wittgenstein’s contention that his elucidations succeed despite being nonsensical.</p>2022-03-30T00:00:00+00:00Copyright (c) 2022 Gilad Nir