https://jhaponline.org/jhap/issue/feed 2019-03-20T14:51:34-04:00 Marcus Rossberg marcus.rossberg@uconn.edu Open Journal Systems <p>JHAP aims to promote research in and discussion of the history of analytical philosophy. <a href="/jhap/about">Read more ...</a></p> https://jhaponline.org/jhap/article/view/3399 2019-03-20T14:51:34-04:00 David Landy landy@sfsu.edu

<p>Scholars have rejected Wilfrid Sellars’s argument for an ontology of absolute processes on the grounds that it relies on a dubious and dogmatic appeal to the homogeneity of color. Borrowing from Rosenthal’s recent defense, but ultimate rejection of homogeneity, I defend this claim on Sellarsian/Kantian transcendental grounds, and reconstruct the remainder of his argument. I argue that Sellars has good reason to suppose that homogeneity is a necessary condition of any possible experience, including indirect experience of theoretical-explanatory posits, and therefore good reason to hold that Reductive Materialism, as he conceives it, is an untenable account of color. The remainder of his argument aims to answer the question of what the metaphysical relation is between the state of an experiencing subject that we take color to be and the colorless microphysical particles that we take to constitute that subject. After rejecting Substance Dualism, Epiphenomenalism, and Wholistic or Emergent Materialism as explanatorily inadequate, Sellars proposes that both color-states and micro-physical particles should be understood as manifestations of an underlying ontology on absolute processes.</p>

2019-03-11T23:31:02-04:00 ##submission.copyrightStatement## https://jhaponline.org/jhap/article/view/3874 2019-03-20T14:51:34-04:00 Rosalind Carey ROSALIND.CAREY@lehman.cuny.ed

<p>Reviewed by Rosalind Carey.</p>

2019-03-11T23:35:06-04:00 ##submission.copyrightStatement##