https://jhaponline.org/jhap/issue/feedJournal for the History of Analytical Philosophy2021-08-25T20:15:41+00:00Audrey Yapayap@uvic.caOpen Journal Systems<p>JHAP aims to promote research in and discussion of the history of analytical philosophy. <a href="/jhap/about">Read more ...</a></p>https://jhaponline.org/jhap/article/view/4861Review of Gottfried Gabriel & Sven Schlotter, Frege und die kontinentalen Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie2021-07-27T20:11:59+00:00Günther Ederguenther.eder@univie.ac.at<p>~</p>2021-08-25T00:00:00+00:00Copyright (c) 2021 Günther Ederhttps://jhaponline.org/jhap/article/view/4439An Argument for Completely General Facts2020-08-21T11:04:23+00:00Landon D. C. Elkindlandon.elkind@wku.edu<p>In his 1918 logical atomism lectures, Russell argued that there are no molecular facts. But he posed a problem for anyone wanting to avoid molecular facts: we need truth-makers for generalizations of molecular formulas, but such truth-makers seem to be both unavoidable and to have an abominably molecular character. Call this the <em>problem of generalized molecular formulas</em>. I clarify the problem here by distinguishing two kinds of generalized molecular formula: <em>incompletely generalized</em> molecular formulas and <em>completely generalized</em> molecular formulas. I next argue that, if empty worlds are logically possible, then the model-theoretic and truth-functional considerations that are usually given address the problem posed by the first kind of formula, but not the problem posed by the second kind. I then show that Russell’s commitments in 1918 provide an answer to the problem of completely generalized molecular formulas: some truth-makers will be non-atomic facts that have no constituents. This shows that the neo-logical atomist goal of defending the <em>principle of atomicity</em>—the principle that only atomic facts are truth-makers—is not realizable.</p>2021-08-25T00:00:00+00:00Copyright (c) 2021 Landon D. C. Elkind