https://jhaponline.org/jhap/issue/feed 2018-04-19T14:08:34-04:00 Kevin C. Klement klement@philos.umass.edu Open Journal Systems JHAP aims to promote research in and discussion of the history of analytical philosophy. <a href="/jhap/about">Read more ...</a> https://jhaponline.org/jhap/article/view/3351 2018-04-19T14:08:34-04:00 Oliver Thomas Spinney oliver.spinney@postgrad.manchester.ac.uk

<p>In the following article I intend to examine the problem of the unity of the proposition in Russell, Frege, and Wittgenstein. My chief aim will be to draw attention to the distinction between Russell’s conception of propositional constituents, on the one hand, with Frege and Wittgenstein’s on the other. My focus will be on Russell’s view of terms as independent, propositions being built up <em>out of</em> these building blocks, compared with Frege and Wittgenstein’s ‘top down’ approach. Furthermore, I will argue that, contra certain other commentators, Frege’s metaphor of saturation and unsaturation does not serve as a solution to the problem of unity, and that the extension of this metaphorical language to Wittgenstein is, therefore, inappropriate.</p>

2018-04-13T13:41:37-04:00 ##submission.copyrightStatement## https://jhaponline.org/jhap/article/view/3479 2018-04-19T14:08:33-04:00 Gary Hatfield hatfield@sas.upenn.edu

<p>Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014. 217 + viii pp. $103 Hardcover. ISBN 978-1-107-07386-9.</p> <p>Reviewed by Gary Hatfield, University of Pennsylvania.</p>

2018-04-13T13:43:33-04:00 ##submission.copyrightStatement##