Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy <p>JHAP aims to promote research in and discussion of the history of analytical philosophy. <a href="/jhap/about">Read more ...</a></p> en-US <p>The Public Knowledge Project recommends the use of the Creative Commons license. The Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy requires authors to agree to a <a href="">Creative Commons Attribution /Non-commercial license</a>. Authors who publish with the Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy agree to the following terms:</p> <ol> <li class="show">Authors retain copyright and grant the journal right of first publication with the work simultaneously licensed under a <a href="">Creative Commons BY-NC license</a>.</li> <li class="show">Authors are able to enter into separate, additional contractual arrangements for the non-exclusive distribution of the journal's published version of the work (e.g., post it to an institutional repository or publish it in a book), with an acknowledgement of its initial publication in this journal.</li> <li class="show">Authors are permitted and encouraged to post their work online (e.g., in institutional repositories or on their website) prior to and during the submission process, as it can lead to productive exchanges, as well as earlier and greater citation of published work (See The Effect of Open Access)</li> </ol> <p><a href="" rel="license"><img style="border-width: 0;" src="" alt="Creative Commons License"></a><br>This work is licensed under a <a href="" rel="license">Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 3.0 Unported License</a>.</p> (Audrey Yap) (Gabriela Mircea) Mon, 19 Apr 2021 18:52:58 +0000 OJS 60 Preface <p>~</p> Yi Jiang, Stefan Majetschak Copyright (c) 2021 Yi Jiang, Stefan Majetschak Mon, 19 Apr 2021 00:00:00 +0000 Wittgenstein on Understanding and Emotion: Grammar and Methods <p>Emotion is an important issue in Wittgenstein’s philosophy of psychology, yet the literature on this topic is quite small. Wittgenstein’s philosophical investigation is a grammatical one, and he tries to dissolve philosophical problems by using many philosophical methods. In this paper I examine the grammatical rules for some emotion words and the methods he employs in dealing with the philosophical problem of emotion. To facilitate this examination, I first analyze Wittgenstein’s treatment of the problem of sudden understanding, where the grammar and methods are easier to comprehend. I will then show that the grammar and methods used by Wittgenstein in the cases of sudden understanding and emotion are rather similar.</p> Francis Yunqing Lin Copyright (c) 2021 Francis Yunqing Lin Mon, 19 Apr 2021 00:00:00 +0000 “A misleading parallel”: Wittgenstein on Conceptual Confusion in Psychology and the Semantics of Psychological Concepts <p>After 1945, when the <em>Philosophical Investigations</em> were largely finished, Wittgenstein spent his final years undertaking an intensive study of the grammar of our psychological concepts and the philosophical misinterpretations we often assign to them.</p> <p>In the article at hand I do not claim to fathom the full range of Wittgenstein’s thoughts on the philosophy of psychology even in the most general way. Rather it is my intention to shed some light on a diagnosis which he made for the psychology of his time. In Section 2 of this paper I would like to provide a brief sketch of what Wittgenstein considered to be the conceptual confusion prevalent in psychology and to suggest why he did not expect the methods of an experimental (natural) science to be successful in solving the problems that concern us in psychology. In Section 3 I’ll attempt to analyze how psychological concepts, according to Wittgenstein, might be construed in order to avoid any type of conceptual confusion.</p> Stefan Majetschak Copyright (c) 2021 Stefan Majetschak Mon, 19 Apr 2021 00:00:00 +0000 Philosophical Concepts, the Ideal of Sublimation, and the “Unpredictability of Human Behaviour” <p>Wittgenstein famously criticizes the philosophical practice of analyzing the meaning of words outside their ordinary use in everyday language, whereby often self-made pseudo-problems arise. In order to shed further light on Wittgenstein’s critique, this article makes use of the <em>Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology</em>. First, starting from the remark in Vol. I, §52, his criticism of the philosophical method of selection and generalization is explained in detail. Next, I give a brief outline of Wittgenstein’s own way of philosophizing by reference to a selection of comments concerning the use of psychological words in everyday language, which will also further elucidate his critique. Finally, I enter into the question which (kind of) significance everyday language according to Wittgenstein has for philosophy.</p> Anja Weiberg Copyright (c) 2021 Anja Weiberg Mon, 19 Apr 2021 00:00:00 +0000 Wittgenstein and Folk Psychology <p>Various writings by the later Wittgenstein on the philosophy of psychology, published posthumously, express his basic critical attitude toward certain concepts and issues in the philosophy of psychology. His attitude towards folk psychology is negative in principle, leaving him opposed to the foundation of current psychological research. This critique of folk psychology and of the philosophy of psychology in general is in accord with the general method of his later philosophy, that is, dealing with philosophical problems by dissolving them. However, his critical attitude towards folk psychology has been less influential in the development of contemporary philosophy, and is in opposition to the philosophy of psychology and folk psychology as practiced today. In this paper I will analyze Wittgenstein's understanding of the concept of psychology, offering a different interpretation from that of other scholars, and explain why and how contemporary philosophers of psychology misunderstand Wittgenstein.</p> Yi Jiang Copyright (c) 2021 Yi Jiang Mon, 19 Apr 2021 00:00:00 +0000 A Critical Discussion of the “Memory-Challenge” to Interpretations of the Private Language Argument <div><span lang="EN-US">In a recent paper, Francis Y. Lin proposes a “memory-challenge” to two main interpretations of Wittgenstein’s private language argument: the “no-criterion-of-correctness” interpretation and the “no-stage-setting” interpretation. According to Lin, both camps of interpretation fail to explain why a private language is impossible within a short time period. To answer the “memory-challenge”, Lin motivates a grammatical interpretation of the private language argument. In this paper, I provide a critical discussion of Lin’s objection to these interpretations and argue that Lin’s objection fails. In the case of the “no-stage-setting” interpretation, Lin suggests that the private language user can establish a stage within a short time period. However, I show that this stage is insufficient for a private language to be used correctly. In the case of the “no-criterion-of-correctness” interpretation, Lin believes that since memory is reliable within a short period, no criterion is needed for the correct use of a private language. However, I argue that his objection attacks a strawman, since the interpretation concerns the structure of justification, rather than the weakness of memory itself. I conclude with a critical discussion on memory and primitive expressions, the latter of which are crucial to Wittgenstein’s approach to public language. This discussion will help to draw a sharp line between private language and public language, and cast some doubt on Lin’s grammatical interpretation.</span></div> Zhao Fan Copyright (c) 2021 Zhao Fan Mon, 19 Apr 2021 00:00:00 +0000