Truth, Meaning, and Interpretation: A Reconsideration of Davidson’s Program


  • Arpy Khatchirian University of California Berkeley



On a common reading of Davidson, the motivation for his proposal that a meaning theory is to take the form of a truth theory is at least partly guided by concern with the ends and means of interpretation. At the same time, the consensus seems to be that this proposal faces a particularly stubborn justificatory burden. The aim of this paper is twofold: first, to suggest that there is a promising route to discharging this burden, albeit one that is visible only once we shift our attention away from the so-called ‘problem of interpretation’; second, to make the case that, contrary to initial appearances, the line of justification offered here gives us a plausible interpretation of Davidson’s own goals. 

Author Biography

Arpy Khatchirian, University of California Berkeley

Lecturer, Department of Philosophy, UC Berkeley


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