Russell and Bradley: Rehabilitating the Creation Narrative of Analytic Philosophy

Samuel Lebens

Abstract


According to Stewart Candlish, Russell and Moore had misunderstood F. H. Bradley’s monism. According to Jonathan Schaffer, they had misunderstood monism more generally. A key thread of the creation narrative of analytic philosophy, according to which Russell and Moore successfully undermined monism to give rise to a new movement is, therefore, in doubt. In this paper, I defend the standard narrative against those who seek to revise it.

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References


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DOI: https://doi.org/10.15173/jhap.v5i7.3050


Samuel Lebens
University of Haifa
Israel

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