Russell and Bradley: Rehabilitating the Creation Narrative of Analytic Philosophy

Authors

  • Samuel Lebens University of Haifa

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.15173/jhap.v5i7.3050

Abstract

According to Stewart Candlish, Russell and Moore had misunderstood F. H. Bradley’s monism. According to Jonathan Schaffer, they had misunderstood monism more generally. A key thread of the creation narrative of analytic philosophy, according to which Russell and Moore successfully undermined monism to give rise to a new movement is, therefore, in doubt. In this paper, I defend the standard narrative against those who seek to revise it.

Author Biography

Samuel Lebens, University of Haifa

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Published

2017-07-17