Brentano's Mature Theory of Intentionality


  • Uriah Kriegel Jean Nicod Institute



The notion of intentionality is what Franz Brentano is best known for. But disagreements and misunderstandings still surround his account of its nature. In this paper, I argue that Brentano's mature account of the nature of intentionality construes it, not as a two-place relation between a subject and an object, nor as a three-place relation between a subject's act, its object, and a 'content,' but as an altogether non-relational, intrinsic property of subjects. I will argue that the view is more defensible than might initially appear.

Author Biography

Uriah Kriegel, Jean Nicod Institute

Research Director


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