Pushing Wittgenstein and Quine Closer Together
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15173/jhap.v2i10.2424Abstract
As against the view represented here by Peter Hacker and John Canfield, I urge that the philosophies of Quine and Wittgenstein can be reconciled. Both replace the orthodox view of language as resting on reference: Quine with the notion of linguistic disposition, Wittgenstein with the notions of grammar and forms of life. I argue that Wittgenstein's insistence, in the rule-following discussion, that at bottom these are matters of practice, of ‘what we do’, is not only compatible in a rough sort of way with Quine's outlook, but is very close to Quine's naturalistic view of language. And I argue that the likely objections to this can on the one hand be explained away as Quine's having been interested in a very narrow slice of language in comparison with Wittgenstein, and on the other by a failure to take into account later developments in Quine’s views.
References
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Blackburn, S. (1984) Spreading the Word: Groundings in the Philosophy of Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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Diamond, C. (1991) The Realistic Spirit: Wittgenstein, Philosophy, and the Mind. Cambridge, Mass.: Bradford Books.
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Hookway, C. (1996) ‘Perspicuous Representations’, in R. Arrington and H Glock. (eds), Wittgenstein and Quine, London: Routledge, pp. 62-79.
Hylton, P. (2007) Quine. London: Routledge.
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Kemp, G. (2012) Quine versus Davidson: Truth, Reference.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kripke, S. (1982) Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Long, R. (2010) ‘Wittgenstein on rule-following’, in K. Jolley (ed.), Wittgenstein: Key Concepts. Durham: Acumen.
Loomis, E. (2010) ‘Criteria’, in K. Jolley (ed.) Wittgenstein: Key Concepts. Durham: Acumen.
Marconi, D. (2012) ‘Quine and Wittgenstein on the Science/Philosophy Divide’. Humanamente 21 pp. 173-89.
McDowell, J. (1984) ‘Wittgenstein on Following a Rule’, Synthese 58 pp. 325-63.
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Quine, W. V. (1961 [1953]) From a Logical Point of View, second edition (noted in the text as FLPV). Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
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Quine, W.V. (1981) Theories and Things (noted in the text as TT). Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Quine, W. V. (1982) Methods of Logic, fourth edition. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Quine, W. V. (1986) Philosophy of Logic, second edition (noted in the text as PL). Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Quine, W. V. (1992) Pursuit of Truth, second edition (noted in the text as PT). Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Quine, W. V. (1995a) From Stimulus to Science (noted in the text as SS). Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Quine, W. V. (1995b) Selected Logic Papers (noted in the text as SLP). Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Quine, W. V. (2000) 'Reply to George', in Orenstein, A. and Kotatko, P., Knowledge, language, and logic: questions for Quine. Boston, Mass. and London: Kluwer.
Quine, W. V. (2008a) Confessions of a Confirmed Extensionalist and Other Essays (noted in the text as CCE), ed. by D. Føllesdal and D. Quine. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Quine, W. V. (2008b Quine in Dialogue, (noted in the text as QD), ed. by D. Føllesdal and D. Quine. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press
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Wittgenstein, L. (1969) On Certainty (noted in the text as OC), ed. by E. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright; tr. by D. Paul and E. Anscombe. Oxford: Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, L. (1980) Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology (noted in the text as RPP), Volume I, ed. by G. Anscombe and G. von Wright; tr. by G. Anscombe. Oxford: Blackwell.
Blackburn, S. (1984) Spreading the Word: Groundings in the Philosophy of Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Canfield, J. (1996) ‘Wittgenstein versus Quine’, in R. Arrington and H. Glock (eds), Wittgenstein and Quine, London: Routledge.
Diamond, C. (1991) The Realistic Spirit: Wittgenstein, Philosophy, and the Mind. Cambridge, Mass.: Bradford Books.
Dreben, B. (1996) ‘Quine and Wittgenstein: The Odd Couple’, in R. Arrington and H Glock. (eds), Wittgenstein and Quine, London: Routledge, pp. 39-61.
Fogelin, R. (2009) Taking Wittgenstein at His Word: A Textual Study. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Gibson, R. (1996) ‘Wittgenstein, Quine and Holism’, in R. Arrington and H. Glock (eds), Wittgenstein and Quine, London: Routledge. pp. 80-96.
Glock, H. (2003) Quine and Davidson on Language, Thought and Reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hacker, P. (1996a) ‘Wittgenstein and Quine: Proximity at a Great Distance’, in R. Arrington and H Glock. (eds), Wittgenstein and Quine, London: Routledge.
Hacker, P. (1996b) Wittgenstein’s Place in Twentieth Century Analytic Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell.
Hookway, C. (1996) ‘Perspicuous Representations’, in R. Arrington and H Glock. (eds), Wittgenstein and Quine, London: Routledge, pp. 62-79.
Hylton, P. (2007) Quine. London: Routledge.
Jónsson, Ó, (2000) ‘Quine and Kripke’s Wittgenstein’, in The Linguistics Philosophy Interface: MIT Working Papers in Philosophy and Linguistics. Cambridge, MA: Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, MIT Press, pp. 261-74.
Kemp, G. (2010) ‘Quine: The Challenge of Naturalism’, in The European Journal of Philosophy 18/2, pp. 283-95.
Kemp, G. (2012) Quine versus Davidson: Truth, Reference.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kripke, S. (1982) Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Long, R. (2010) ‘Wittgenstein on rule-following’, in K. Jolley (ed.), Wittgenstein: Key Concepts. Durham: Acumen.
Loomis, E. (2010) ‘Criteria’, in K. Jolley (ed.) Wittgenstein: Key Concepts. Durham: Acumen.
Marconi, D. (2012) ‘Quine and Wittgenstein on the Science/Philosophy Divide’. Humanamente 21 pp. 173-89.
McDowell, J. (1984) ‘Wittgenstein on Following a Rule’, Synthese 58 pp. 325-63.
McGinn, M. (1997) Wittgenstein and the Philosophical Investigations. London: Routledge.
Peacocke, C. (1981). ‘Rule-Following: The Nature of Wittgenstein’s Arguments’, in Holtzman, Steven H., Wittgenstein: to follow a rule. Oxford: Routledge, pp. 72-95.
Quine, W. V. (1961 [1953]) From a Logical Point of View, second edition (noted in the text as FLPV). Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Quine, W. V. (1960) Word and Object (noted in the text as WO). Cambridge, Mass.: M. I. T. Press.
Quine, W. V. (1969) Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (noted in the text as OR). New York: Columbia University Press.
Quine, W. V. (1974) The Roots of Reference (noted in the text as RR). La Salle, Ill.: Open Court.
Quine, W. V. (1976) Ways of Paradox, revised edition (noted in the text as WP). Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Quine, W.V. (1981) Theories and Things (noted in the text as TT). Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Quine, W. V. (1982) Methods of Logic, fourth edition. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Quine, W. V. (1986) Philosophy of Logic, second edition (noted in the text as PL). Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Quine, W. V. (1992) Pursuit of Truth, second edition (noted in the text as PT). Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Quine, W. V. (1995a) From Stimulus to Science (noted in the text as SS). Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Quine, W. V. (1995b) Selected Logic Papers (noted in the text as SLP). Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Quine, W. V. (2000) 'Reply to George', in Orenstein, A. and Kotatko, P., Knowledge, language, and logic: questions for Quine. Boston, Mass. and London: Kluwer.
Quine, W. V. (2008a) Confessions of a Confirmed Extensionalist and Other Essays (noted in the text as CCE), ed. by D. Føllesdal and D. Quine. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Quine, W. V. (2008b Quine in Dialogue, (noted in the text as QD), ed. by D. Føllesdal and D. Quine. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press
Wittgenstein, L. (1953) Philosophical Investigations, (noted in the text as PI) ed. by E. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright; tr. by E. Anscombe. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, L. (1958) The Blue and Brown Books (noted in the text as BB), ed. and tr. by R. Rhees. Oxford: Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, L. (1967) Zettel (noted in the text as Z), ed. by E. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright; tr. by E. Anscombe. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, L. (1969) On Certainty (noted in the text as OC), ed. by E. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright; tr. by D. Paul and E. Anscombe. Oxford: Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, L. (1980) Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology (noted in the text as RPP), Volume I, ed. by G. Anscombe and G. von Wright; tr. by G. Anscombe. Oxford: Blackwell.
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