
Reviewed by Steven Horst
Some areas of philosophy are deeply engaged with their histories. Introductory courses in ethical theory, for example, are often in large measure courses in the history of Western ethics, with philosophers like Plato, Aristotle, Mill, Hume, and Kant presented as worthy interlocutors; and many of the best contemporary ethicists made their mark either drawing upon or arguing against the giants of past centuries. In philosophy of mind, both teaching and research tend to fall at the other end of the spectrum. Apart from the obligatory (and often brusque and dismissive) nod to Descartes with which they customarily begin, courses in philosophy of mind quickly jump to movements dating from the second half of the twentieth century: behaviorism, mind-brain identity, even classic computationalism; and even these movements are increasingly regarded as “historical” movements of the past. And, while there has been some notable work in philosophy of mind done in dialog with the great minds of past centuries, it has been the exception rather than the rule.

Even for someone like myself who cares deeply about the history of the field, this is entirely sensible and indeed almost unavoidable. The conversations of the past half-century in philosophy of mind are extensive and relatively self-contained, and even by themselves present difficult trade-offs between depth and breadth when one is trying to craft a good syllabus. And resources for teaching the history of either philosophy of mind or philosophy of psychology in an efficient way have been difficult to come by. (At the beginning of my career, I resorted to using copies of Sahakian’s (1968, 1975) typewriter manuscripts of source materials and synopses when I felt it necessary to discuss older figures in history of psychology and philosophy of mind.)

As a result, for people like me, Rebecca Copenhaver and Christopher Shields’s six-volume The History of the Philosophy of Mind (Routledge, 2018) is something we had wanted our entire careers but never expected to actually find. It is an impressive collection, with divisions into volumes about where one would expect (1: Antiquity, 2: Early and High Middle Ages, 3: Late Middle Ages and Renaissance, 4: “Early Modern and Modern” (seventeenth and eighteenth centuries), 5: nineteenth century, and 6: twentieth and twenty-first centuries), with eighty-two separate articles over six volumes, plus introductions to each volume and a general introduction by the series editors reprinted in the individual volumes. It is an impressive and monumental collection.

The general introduction is itself worth reading, even for those purchasing only a single volume, for its thoughtful reflections on the problems involved in how to think historically about the study of the mind. Philosophers have in some sense thought about “the mind” for as long as philosophy has been in business, but the terms and contexts in which they did so were so different—both from contemporary philosophy of mind and from one another—and their methodologies so disparate that it is difficult or impossible to weave them into a master narrative. The editors’ approach, therefore, has been to present essays on many individual figures that allow readers to glean what they may from them. The series editors are well aware that this might initially be met with a degree of skepticism, and address the concern head-on:

One might… think it prima facie unlikely that thinkers as diverse as these in their disparate times and places would share very many preoccupations either with each other or with us. Any such immediate inference would be unduly hasty and also potentially mis-
leading. It would be misleading not least because it relies on an unrealistically unified conception of what we find engaging this area: philosophy of mind comprises today a wide range of interests, orientations, and methodologies, some almost purely \textit{a priori} and others almost exclusively empirical. It is potentially misleading in another way as well, heading in the opposite direction. If we presume that the only thinkers who have something useful to say to us are those engaging the questions of mind we find salient, using idioms we find congenial, then we will likely overlook some surprising continuities as well as instructive discontinuities across these figures and periods.

A study of the history of philosophy of mind turns up, in sum, some surprising continuities, some instructive partial overlaps, and some illuminating discontinuities across the ages. When we reflect on this history of the discipline, we bring into sharper relief some of the questions we find most pressing, and we inevitably come to ask new and different questions, even as we retire questions which we earlier took to be of moment.

This approach is perhaps nowhere more appropriate than with the figures of the nineteenth century, the subject of the volume that is being reviewed here: \textit{Philosophy of Mind in the Nineteenth Century}, edited by Sandra Lapointe. Before opening the book, I admit I had difficulty thinking of many nineteenth-century philosophers who might plausibly count as “philosophers of mind”. This was, of course, the period in which psychology, psychophysics, and neurology began to take shape, as well as the first articulations of the psychology of the unconscious; and the pioneers of these scientific movements were deeply concerned with methodological questions, which might fit into a broad conception of “philosophy of mind”. But, even as someone who does not draw sharp boundaries between the philosophies of mind, psychology, and the cognitive sciences, I went into the book curious and even a bit skeptical about just what I would find. The book did not disappoint: not only did I learn about some nineteenth century philosophers, previously unknown to me, who had indeed been engaged with ideas relevant to several areas of contemporary philosophy of mind, I also discovered that nineteenth century scientists (like Mach, Helmholtz, and Freud) were even more philosophically literate and astute than I had previously realized, and along the way found some very interesting proposals about cognitive faculties, intentionality, the status of first-person evidence, the mind-body relation, and the possibility of a scientific study of the mind.

\section{1. Overview}

The book begins with a remarkably compact and lucid overview of “representation, consciousness, and mind in German idealism” (encompassing Kant, Reinhold, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel), followed by chapters on Bolzano, Herbart, Mach, Helmholtz, Nietzsche, James, Freud, Brentano, Meinong, Stumpf, von Ehrenfels, Husserl, and Natorp. The notion of “the nineteenth century” is clearly taken loosely, and appropriately so. Some of these writers, after all, straddle century divides, and it would be unrealistic to treat German idealism without first discussing Kant (who receives a chapter of his own in Volume 4) as a point of departure, or to leave off with Brentano without seeing how his influence came to fruition in very different ways in his students, who included not only Husserl and Meinong but also Stumpf, von Ehrenfels, and Freud.

I suspect this list might initially leave many philosophers of mind scratching their heads. And editor Sandra Lapointe notes the “iconoclastic” nature of their approach in her introduction to the volume:

\[\text{[T]he table of contents reflects editorial choices not unlikely to thwart most readers’ expectations. This is not accidental. The editorial approach of this volume follows two somewhat iconoclastic lines. (i) It seeks to emphasize the cross- or inter-disciplinary nature of the topic under study and of the resulting theories, most of which belong neither entirely to philosophy nor to psychology as we conceive of these disciplines today. (ii) It encourages de-}\]
liberate critical distance vis-à-vis what is usually taken to be the philosophical canon.

The emphasis upon inter-disciplinary connections between philosophy and the sciences of the mind is of course something that many contemporary philosophers of mind will applaud, and be pleased to find front and center in a history of the field. But even (and in some cases especially) for empirically-minded philosophers of mind, the full array of figures included in the volume may prove surprising.

Some of the connections are clear enough: Kant’s transcendental philosophy is based in what we would now call a cognitive psychology, James was the first person to serve as President of both APAs (philosophical and psychological), Brentano reintroduced the notion of intentionality, which became the central focus of Husserl and the Continental phenomenological tradition he began, Mach and Helmholtz were pioneers in the physiological psychology and psychophysics that were arguably the first flowers of the cognitive sciences, and perhaps Freud and Nietzsche deserve a nod for introducing the idea of unconscious mental processes, which has figured (albeit in very different forms) in contemporary philosophy of mind. But beyond that, the connections are harder for those who cut their teeth on contemporary philosophy of mind (whether their own approach be a priori or empirically-engaged, Analytic or Continental) to recognize. Nietzsche, Hegel, and Meinong are well-known philosophers, but they are seldom thought of as philosophers of mind; and while the German idealists famously put mind and Geist at the center of their philosophies, surely (one might think) it was less in the spirit of what we now call philosophy of mind than some weird sort of metaphysics, one more esoteric but no less foreign to contemporary philosophy of mind than Meinong’s ontology of non-existent objects. I suspect that most philosophers of mind have scarcely even heard of Reinhold, Bolzano, Herbart, Stumpf, or von Ehrenfels. (Indeed, I was only vaguely aware of Bolzano as someone who had had an indirect influence upon Husserl, though he emerged along with Brentano as a pivotal figure in the history of the field.) So I suspect that the table of contents of this volume may initially make it a hard sell for one of the book’s main target audiences: philosophers who work in contemporary philosophy of mind or teach courses about it.

These misgivings are not totally without merit: if your idea of the philosophy of mind is framed primarily in terms of a debate between metaphysical theories like materialism, dualism, neutral monism, and panpsychism, the nineteenth century is not the right place to look, unless perhaps you are willing to countenance some variation upon German idealism as an alternative player in the game. (Though I did find myself surprised to find how many nineteenth century thinkers were concerned about such things as the soul, free will, and immortality, even when Cartesianism was not even on their radar. Indeed, it was striking to note how little Cartesianism seemed to figure in the discussions at all—in stark contrast to the picture we might get from contemporary textbooks.) But, as the series editors point out, this kind of metaphysical debate is hardly the only important topic for a class in philosophy of mind, and certainly not for professional research. Indeed, for many of us, the far more interesting and important questions are about things like mental representation, the basic elements of a cognitive psychology, intentionality, the relationship between philosophy of mind and the cognitive and biological sciences, the status of psychology as a science, the role of first-person experience as evidence about the mind, and the reality of psychological and psychophysical laws. And what this book brings out, in ways that far surpassed what I could anticipate, is the extent to which these were lively issues in the nineteenth century as well. And this is not merely done in a fashion that tells a kind of historical backstory (the kind that is of interest principally to the historians of philosophy) about how we got from Descartes or Kant to where we are today, and certainly not a story about how a moribund philosophical tradition
mired in a superstitious metaphysics was gradually displaced
by an “enlightened” scientific approach.

One of the things that emerges piecemeal from the articles
is how much these thinkers were aware of one another’s work
and engaged with it. But, beyond that, I think that almost any
astute reader will come away from one or more of the chapters
inspired by seeds of ideas that may have been forgotten over the
intervening century but perhaps should be explored afresh. It
is a cliché that those who do not study history are condemned
to repeat its mistakes. But there is also a different moral for
scholars: sometimes, we think we have hit upon a novel and
ground-breaking idea, only to have an historian point out that
someone in the past explored the same idea, perhaps better and
more thoroughly. This was my own experience in reading the
chapter on William James, which caused me to realize that he
had in fact written a great deal about issues that I am now think-
ing about. And I suspect that graduate students casting about for
a “novel” idea might indeed find something in various chapters
that could profitably be explored today—not necessarily by reori-
enting themselves towards history of philosophy, but by taking
up a long-forgotten proposal about the basic cognitive faculties,
mental representation, or the relationship between philosophy
and the cognitive sciences and developing it in contemporary
terms.

The volume is presented as a collection of articles about par-
ticular figures and particular themes within their work—and
indeed not necessarily the themes that one might anticipate.
(To take a striking example, the chapter on Freud is far more
about his early work in physiological psychology than about the
psychology of the unconscious.) Some of the chapters are well-
crafted to make explicit connections with contemporary strands
of philosophy of mind, while others are framed more as the-
matic historical pieces (some of them stressing the connections
and disagreements between nineteenth-century thinkers) which
the reader must work harder to relate to her own interests or

those that have some currency in the field today. Rather than
summarizing and evaluating the chapters individually, I wish to
try to draw out some of the larger themes in a way that might per-
suade other philosophers of mind that this material is, indeed,
worth studying.

2. Representation, Intentionality, and Cognitive
Psychology

Through much of my career, it has been a commonplace (1) that
thoughts are “representations”, and likewise (2) that these are
“intentional” in Brentano’s twofold sense of (a) having a con-
tent and (b) being directed towards a (possibly non-existent)
object, and that (3) intentional states come in more than one
“modality”—at very least, beliefs and desires both have inten-
tional content. (A number of the articles present alternative ty-
pologies of mental states whose merits might fruitfully be com-
pared with those of belief/desire psychology. This is one of
many themes that I think presents important “food for thought”:
in my opinion, the belief/desire taxonomy has been accepted far
too uncritically in recent philosophy of mind.) There has, of
course, been much discussion of whether or in what sense the
mind literally has “representations”, how these correspond to
the phenomena described in the language of neuroscience, and
of whether intentional states are real, or the posits of a bad the-
ory that should be “eliminated”, or phenomena that appear only
under a particular interpretive “stance”. We tend to assume that
this general problematic was either something (re-)discovered
by Brentano and only explored critically a century later, or else
so much a part of our maturationally-normal “folk psychology”
that it has been a universal assumption.

Against these prejudices, it is quite interesting to see that is-
issues in these general areas were hotly debated in the nineteen-
teenth century. “Mental representation” was of course an important
idea in Kant’s philosophy. It was also centrally important to the
nineteenth century German idealists, who debated and developed it in various ways described with admirable clarity and concision in Chapter 1 of the volume. While these writers were also engaged in a kind of critical ontological project that might be foreign to many contemporary philosophers of mind, the chapter brings out issues that can also be cast solely in terms of cognitive psychology and its philosophical interpretation. The project of cataloguing the mind’s basic types of cognitive states turns out to be an old one, and Clinton Tolley presents the idealists’ struggles with the issues in a way that brings them to life for readers more interested in cognitive psychology than in Idealist metaphysics.

One of the more interesting strands running through the book is the subsequent history of nineteenth century ideas about the nature of mental representation and its relationships to content, sense (*Sinn*), and the objects and states of affairs represented. Brentano, of course, is a key figure here, both because of his rediscovery of the Medieval notion of intentionality and because of his subsequent influence on both Analytic and Continental philosophy. Brentano himself arguably believed (as had some of the idealists) that “mental phenomena” have *immanent* objects—one of the more controversial and problematic parts of his philosophy, and a view that his students Twardowski and Husserl both rejected. But, in Chapter 3, Sandra Lapointe points out that in so doing, they were to no small extent re-exploring variations upon ideas that had already been developed half a century earlier by Bolzano, who had also discovered something strikingly similar to Frege’s abstract notion of *Sinn*. Peter Simons’s chapter on Meinong—another of Brentano’s students—also extends the story in a different, and very illuminating direction. Meinong is known today chiefly for his rather dubious views on the ontology of non-existent objects. What Simons’s chapter brings out is how Meinong reached this conclusion by working out the metaphysical consequences of his own variant on a Brentanian psychology. I suspect that I am not the only philosopher who has had a hard time seeing how anyone (even Meinong himself) could have found Meinong’s metaphysics plausible as an independent thesis; but I found it much more intelligible once I saw it presented as the outcome of working out the consequences of a theory of mind and its objects—an aspect of Meinong’s philosophy that was, I confess, totally new to me. For me, this was quite a revelation—on a par with someone first knowing about the (equally implausible) bundle-theoretic metaphysics of Hume’s *Treatise* and only later seeing how it was arrived at as the consequence of his assumptions about human psychology.

3. The Methodology and Status of Psychology as a Science

Questions about the methodology of science famously emerged in tandem with the very birth of modern science in the seventeenth century. Nineteenth century philosophers like Dilthey raised questions about whether the human sciences could be accorded the same kind of status, leading to the Continental distinction between sciences of nature and of spirit/culture; and kindred issues arose in the twentieth century in Analytic philosophy—for example, whether psychology (or even psychophysics) has laws, and whether it is distinguished from the natural sciences by having only *ceteris paribus* laws.

Important issues, to be sure—and ones that, as it turns out, have older roots. Kant had declared that there could never be a “Newton of the mind” because the operations of the mind cannot (or so he believed) be mathematized. This pronouncement came to be challenged by figures like Mach and Helmholtz (and also by Weber and Fechner, who are not given chapters of their own). I have written several articles about philosophy of psychophysics and its relationship with first-person experience—more about Fechner than Mach, Helmholtz, or Stumpf—and I had known that Mach was also, philosophically, an important exponent of a form of Positivism and Helmholtz of naturalism. What I had not appreciated is how philosophically sensitive their treatments
were, or the relationship between these and the status of such debates in their political-institutional contexts. These will be of interest to scholars in both history of psychology and science studies, but they will also contain some interesting material for philosophers of mind, particularly with respect to the question of how to regard the nature and role of first-person experiences such as sensations. Mach, for example, not only treated the measurement of sensation as essential to his project, but was also one of the first to suggest that, in addition to having intensities, sensations also have \( \text{Gestalt) forms} \), an idea that would be developed later by von Ehrenfels (and the Graz school) and Stumpf (and the Berlin school). As Carlo Ierna points out in Chapter 12, von Ehrenfels emphatically rejected Kant’s pessimistic appraisal of the prospects for mathematizing psychology, claiming that “the concept of \( \text{Gestalt} \) ‘would yield the possibility of comprehending the whole of the known world under a single mathematical formula’ (Ehrenfels 1890, 116).” (222). Clearly this ambition was not fulfilled, and Ehrenfels’s metaphysical views (a chaos/cosmos duality) are at least as foreign to contemporary analytic metaphysics as those of Meinong or Hegel. This is one of the several ways this volume draws out relations between philosophy of mind and other areas of philosophy (including metaphysics), to which I shall return. And these peculiar metaphysical implications are probably among the reasons contemporary philosophers are hesitant to explore such figures further.

But with the Gestaltists, as with the German Idealists, I think that the volume brings out things that we ignore at our peril. Whatever you think of von Ehrenfels’s metaphysics, the ideas (1) that Gestalt phenomena are an important part of our mental operations and (2) that these can be explicated in some sort of formal terms, are really of great importance to philosophy of mind, because this is one important variation on the more general claim that experience has an internal structure, and perhaps one that can be made formally explicit. Kant had pioneered this idea in the claims that Sensibility has spatial and temporal Forms and that the sensible manifold is structured by the application of the Categories. Gestalt theorists, in effect, claimed that there are structures of sensible experience beyond the basic spatio-temporal layout of the Kantian sensory manifold. I think it would be difficult to find a contemporary psychologist or neuroscientist of perception who would disagree, even if their theories might diverge significantly from those of the Graz or Berlin schools.

I actually think this is eminently relevant to contemporary philosophy of mind, not because Gestalt phenomena are a popular topic today, but indeed precisely because they are not. Contemporary discussions of “conscious experience”, at least of the sort stemming from the influential works of Levine, Nagel, and Jackson, tend to view conscious experience almost exclusively as consisting of \( \text{qualia} \), understood as more or less a collection of brute sensations or at most a spatially and temporally ordered manifold of such sensations, following Kant. In this respect, there are important elements of nineteenth century philosophy of mind that engage issues that are under-represented in at least the most prominent parts of contemporary philosophy of mind dealing with conscious experience, and are worthy of engagement. If consciousness is not merely a matter of “brute feels”, but how these are \( \text{structured} \) and \( \text{related} \) to one another (regardless of one’s particular theory of the relations or their relata), this makes a tremendous difference in how one will regard the study of consciousness.

One might make the same observation, even more pointedly, with respect to Husserl’s philosophy, which is the topic of Chapter 13. I often point out to my students that the notion of “phenomenology” found in Husserl and his students is far “thicker” than what many contemporary analytic philosophers mean by the term—which is to say, it embraces more than \( \text{qualia} \) like hues or tones and pitches. Husserl was well aware of what we now call \( \text{qualia} \), and he called them the \( \text{hule} \) (matter/stuff) of experience. But, for Husserl, experience also has \( \text{morphe} \)—form. This might include things like the ways various types of figures are
constituted against a background, as explored by the Gestaltists. But Husserl was also concerned with something more: with the explication—and the proper methodology for such explication—of perceptions, judgments, imagination, and reasoning. And his preferred way of addressing them was not in terms of mathematics (in the sense of arithmetic, algebra, or geometry), but of logic. But Husserl’s notion of logic (or notions, in the plural, as he eventually distinguished what he called “formal” and “transcendental” logic) are not exactly what we think of today when we speak of “logic”—they were not confined to something like an abstract sentential calculus, but explored the way thoughts could be formed and combined, and how this did and did not involve existential import. Husserl’s “logic” was not (a) simply a technical inferential tool, nor (b) an appeal to an independently-existing Fregean abstract realm of normative truths, nor (c) something that was simultaneously a metaphysical theory, as in the German Idealists or Meinong. The project of Husserlian logic was first and foremost one of explicating the structures of intentionally-laden experience, and his phenomenology was intended to be a method for doing this which would then serve as the foundation for everything else in philosophy and the sciences. For Husserl, the structure of thought is to be explicated in logical rather than mathematical terms, but doing so requires something more than a logic of propositional and inferential forms.

Paul M. Livingston’s article on Husserl traces the development of this project from Husserl’s early psychologism, which arguably would have reduced logic to a psychological theory about how we in fact think (thereby depriving it of both metaphysical and normative implications), through the careful work of the middle-period Logical Investigations, and into the beginnings of his Transcendental Idealism in the Ideas. (HIs late, posthumously published works, which reflect his engagement with Heidegger, are not treated in this volume. This is understandable in itself, especially as the Phenomenological tradition is taken up in the first chapter of the next volume of the series. However, as the next and final chapter, on Natorp, takes up some of the same issues, and indeed in some of the same language used by Husserl in his last writings, there is something here I found myself wanting to see explored further).

I am not sure whether someone not already familiar with Husserl’s thought will find this chapter approachable; but as someone whose early career was deeply informed by Husserl’s Logical Investigations and Ideas, I found the presentation of how his thought developed quite instructive and engaging—not least in Livingston’s careful assessment of the ways in which Husserl did and did not reject his early “psychologism” after his famous correspondence with Frege. There have, of course, been important analytic philosophers (perhaps most notably Dagfinn Føllesdal) who have regarded Husserl as an important figure—if not exactly within the analytic tradition, at least one with whom it should be deeply engaged—but his philosophy is seldom mentioned more than in passing within philosophy of mind. I believe that a careful reading of Livingston’s chapter should persuade the reader that Husserl is rightly to be regarded as one of the great figures in this history of the philosophy of the mind (equaled among the figures treated in this volume only by Kant, and perhaps Hegel and James), and one whose work could be richly mined for ideas that could be fruitfully explored anew, whether as transcendental philosophy or in conjunction with contemporary cognitive science.

It was more of a surprise to me that something similar could be said for Natorp, with whom the volume concludes. Natorp is included in the volume as an eminent exponent of late nineteenth-century Neo-Kantianism, and is of particular importance for his views on science and the mind. I shall not attempt to summarize Alan Kim’s engrossing (if somewhat dense) account of these here. But there are parts of the article on Natorp that I might have wished to have occurred earlier in the volume, and which provide an important critical perspective upon the presentation of such a variety of views of “mind”. Of particular interest are
the reflections on pages 249–50 on the difficulties of mapping the various German terms that might be translated as “mind” in nineteenth century writings (Geist, Seele, Bewusstsein, Psyche) onto English-language terms. This is one of the most important things an historical volume can contribute: a discussion of the difficulties of bringing conversations from different periods, languages, and traditions into contact with one another. But, in Natorp’s case, this is only the beginning of the story, as a central part of his project was to make new and further distinctions. As Kim reflects

[Natorp’s] theory of the mental revolves around what he takes to be two dimensions of thinking: consciousness and knowledge. “Consciousness” (Bewusstsein) corresponds to what we usually call “mind”, and names thinking as a psychological process. I therefore refer to it as \( \Psi \) (read: “Thorn-sub-Psi”). “Knowledge” or “knowing” (Erkenntnis, Erkennen) is for Natorp a special kind of thinking, epitomized by science; I abbreviate it as \( \Sigma \) (read: “Thorn-sub-Sigma”).

On the one hand, this is an important fundamental distinction between two types of thinking and two ways of regarding the mind. On the other hand, the discussion of Erkenntnis involves methodological proposals for the scientific study of the mind as well as scientific knowledge in general.

4. Mind and Brain

The science of the brain as we understand it today began only around the beginning of the twentieth century, and the exponential increase of our understanding of neuroscience only much more recently. Of course, with important exceptions like Aristotle, almost every important Western thinker since Hippocrates had identified the brain as the seat of cognition. Even Descartes saw the brain as the locus of many of the faculties we would now call “psychological”, and indeed went beyond the brain to the whole nervous system, being widely credited for the discovery of the reflex arc. But neither Descartes, nor any other theorists of the seventeenth or eighteenth centuries, really understood much of anything about the brain. Indeed, even nineteenth century theorists knew almost nothing about its principles, though some of them placed far more emphasis upon the study of the brain as a focus for future research.

Mach, Helmholtz, and Fechner clearly fall into this category. Indeed, if there is one figure whom I would have added to this collection for a chapter-length treatment, it is Fechner, though he is addressed in the chapters on Herbart and Mach. His distinction between “outer psychophysics” (relations between stimuli and percepts) and “inner psychophysics” (relations between brain states and experienced percepts) is, to my mind a fundamental division in how to explore at least certain classes of mind-brain relations. These themselves bring up the important issue of how to think about “mental” or “psychological” processing that is beneath the level of conscious awareness. (Are they, for example, to be understood on the model of conscious mental reasoning, as Helmholtz proposed, or in more mechanistic, biological, or informational terms?) They also bring up crucial questions about the relations between phenomena described at different “levels”—say, as neural and experiential states. In broad terms, this has been a familiar issue in philosophy of mind for over half a century. But it is too-seldom addressed in ways that relate to the science of the day, and its historical roots have been almost entirely neglected. We are easily tempted to make the assumption that the early physiological psychologists and psychophysicists were exploring the beginnings of a new science that was totally disconnected from previous or then-contemporary philosophical discussions of the mind. These chapters help the reader to see what Mach and Helmholtz really understood about the philosophical as well as the empirical context in which they were writing, and how the positioned themselves with respect to it.

Freud, of course, is also well known for his contributions to the idea that there are subconscious, unconscious, or infraconscious
mental operations. Some of these he viewed on the model of conscious states: there are repressed beliefs and desires. Others, like the id, ego, and superego, were his own contributions, and work upon different principles. The chapter on Freud in this volume, however, concentrates not upon his better-known psychoanalytic work, but upon his early physiological psychology, which stemmed from his early career as a neurologist and an assistant and pupil to Breuer and Charcot. Freud is, of course, a complex figure, with several stages in his development, and the relationship between those stages is hotly debated. Bettina Bergo’s chapter on Freud greatly impressed me in drawing out just how knowledgeable, sensitive, and attentive Freud was to the various disciplines related to the ideas he was exploring: not only his own groundbreaking contributions to psychiatry, but also to neurology, psychology, and philosophy. You won’t get any new insights into Freud’s later psychotherapy from it, but you will come out of it with an appreciation of Freud as a multi-faceted intellectual giant, while also gaining a new perspective on how some of his earlier discoveries were forgotten or rejected in his later work. You will get an important new perspective on (early) Freud here: as someone who was not only a cutting-edge neurologist, but also impressively aware of issues in philosophy of psychology.

5. The Mind and Biology

When I started out in philosophy of mind, the prevailing view was that the mind was a computer. Before that, it was either that the mind is an association engine (behaviorism) or the operation of the brain (mind-brain identity). None of those positions—even mind-brain identity theory—really took serious stock of the role of biology in cognition. Even most classic versions of what was called “evolutionary psychology” did so largely in abstract theoretical terms. Biology has come back into philosophy of mind through various paths—a more sophisticated evolutionary biology (involving things like niche selection), embodied cognition, approaches to the neuroscience of perception, cognition, and motor control more rooted in actual neuroscience, engagements with neuropathology and psychopharmacology. For those who are “woke” to such developments, it feels like a very new thing, cutting against the grain of the history of the field.

What a surprise, then, to find that many nineteenth century philosophers found notions like “life” quite crucial to an understanding of the mind! And all the more so if one assumed that, prior to some recent awakening, philosophical understanding of the mind was couched in either dualist or mechanistic terms. One thing this book helped drive home to me—a realization that had been coming together from other sources as well—is that seventeenth-century mechanism (the kind of thing one finds in Descartes apart from the immaterial soul: a mind that works on the kinds of principles that can be explicited by mechanics) was in fact a fairly short-lived phenomenon. Stock introductions to philosophy of mind tend to present Cartesianism—the ghost and the machine—as the common assumption before behaviorism, mind-brain identity, and computationalism. At least with the figures presented in this volume, the nineteenth century was much more inclined to biological than mechanical metaphors, and even “the soul” was often understood more in biological than in Cartesian terms. While we might think first here of the Darwinian revolution and its applications to psychology (one topic on which this volume is lamentably silent), the great surprise is how more Aristotelian, teleologically-oriented approaches to mind, life, and soul lived on after the Cartesian revolution, in philosophers like Kant and the German Idealists.

Those of us who regularly read and teach Kant’s first Critique too easily forget that his third Critique insists upon the need for very different and teleological principles in biology. And one of the most fascinating revelations of the first chapter is that, while Kant dismissed knowledge of the soul as a dialectical illusion in
the first Critique, he not only believed in the soul as a necessary posit of practical Reason, but thought it very important on other grounds as well. Indeed, he believed that not only humans, but animals and even plants have souls. In short, the Kantian notion of “soul” was more Aristotelian than Cartesian: The life and development of organisms needs to be understood in teleological terms, and the Kantian notion of soul has more to do with biological life and development than with consciousness or cognition. This is a theme that recurs in the German Idealists, but also seems to be in the background in other nineteenth century figures surveyed in the book. The reader will have to look for herself to try to connect the dots, and this is one topic on which I would most have appreciated an interpretive overview; but it is an important theme, and not least of all because of recent suggestions that Darwinism has not exorcized the need for teleology once and for all. But, perhaps most importantly, it exposes the naivety of the assumption that philosophy of mind was largely Cartesian from Early Modernity until some time in the mid-twentieth century.

6. Implications of Views of the Mind for Other Areas of Philosophy

It is, perhaps, a commonplace that the Early Modern philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries worked from theories of the mind—and perhaps more narrowly what we would now call theories of cognitive psychology—to conclusions about epistemology, metaphysics, semantics, and logic. Meaning, inference, knowledge, and metaphysics shape up differently depending on whether you believe our thoughts are all constructed out of sensations or images (Empiricism) or there is an additional faculty of Reason (Rationalism). If you accept Kant’s psychology, certain things turn out to be synthetic a priori truths and others are dialectical illusions. More generally, assumptions about how the mind operates and what its basic elements and operations are arguably have implications for what we can know—indeed, for what kinds of thoughts we can even think—and hence raise questions about the relationship between theories of mind and metaphysics, semantics, epistemology, and logic.

This is an issue near and dear to my own heart, however unfashionable it might be in my field. One of the final things this book draws out is how it was explored by nineteenth century thinkers—certainly by Kant, the German Idealists, and Husserl, but also by Meinong, James, and Natorp, and perhaps more circuitously by Nietzsche. This is, of course, a fundamental way in which Transcendental Idealism (Kant, Husserl), Absolute Idealism (Hegel), and Pragmatism (James) are very different from mainstream analytic metaphysics, and the implications for metaphysics (as well as epistemology, semantics, and logic) vary with the philosophical theory. Several chapters in this volume—on the Idealists, Meinong, von Ehrenfels, Husserl, and Natorp among others—explore ways that views of the mind led to surprising and subversive conclusions about knowledge and reality, and in ways that are far more sophisticated than we find through engagement with the early modern Rationalists and Empiricists with whom we are more regularly in dialog.

But it is Henry Jackman’s chapter on William James that does so most directly, addressing how James’s views about pragmatism, idealization, and conceptual pluralism led him in his later work to a “rejection of logic”. I single this out as a personally-relevant example of how the kind of historical explorations contained in this volume might be profitable to a contemporary philosopher of mind. Like James, I have been exploring a combination of pragmatism, idealization, and pluralism, and believe these potentially have implications for epistemology, semantics, metaphysics, and perhaps even logic. What I did not appreciate was the extent to which James had been led to exactly the same issues and explored them in great depth. I do not yet know whether I will reach the same conclusions he did, but this chapter has led me to recognize the importance of reading a
distinguished “fellow traveler” whose views I need to consider. While I doubt that many other philosophers of mind are focused upon these particular issues, I suspect that other readers may have a similar experience with respect to different issues: that their thinking about representation, intentionality, the status and methodology of the cognitive sciences, or the relationship between mind and brain will be expanded and enriched through acquaintance with some of the great minds of the nineteenth century.

7. Audience for the Book

This book is a useful and impressive volume in a series that was a prodigious undertaking. It is without a rival in its genre. I think the editors are quite correct in their guiding assumption that such a history of philosophy of mind might give contemporary readers any number of intriguing insights into the history of their field, and that some old writings might in fact provide “new” perspectives on contemporary issues in a number of corners of the field. I should, in fact, very much like to see graduate students who are preparing to work in philosophy of mind use such a resource to study the history of their field before writing their dissertations. Some of what I regard as the best work in philosophy of mind has been undertaken in critical dialog with the works of philosophers of past centuries, and the volumes in this series introduce a much wider array of thinkers whose work might inspire fruitful engagement. And, while the primary audience of the series is professional philosophers and graduate students working in philosophy of mind, this volume in particular may well have additional audiences in history of psychology and science studies.

I wish that I could predict that the publication of the series would lead to a wave of new courses in the history of the study of the mind. Such courses are quite rare; and while this series may help to address some of the reasons for this (the relative ignorance and insouciance of philosophers of mind about the history of their field and the lack of suitably compiled resources), it also indirectly demonstrates another reason: the fact that the range of issues, approaches, and background assumptions is so dauntingly diverse. The very reasons that led the editors not to supply an overarching narrative also make it very difficult to design a course in the history of the philosophy of mind. The price of the six-volume set also puts it beyond what could reasonably be assigned as a classroom textbook, though individual volumes would, in combination with primary source texts, make an excellent launching point for more focused graduate seminars on particular periods. In short, this volume, and the series of which it is a part, offer resources for a much wider engagement with the philosophical study of the mind, and I fervently believe that this would greatly enrich the field, but I am unsure of how to make the best next steps towards this goal.

I highly recommend both this volume and the entire series to anyone interested in how philosophers have understood the mind. It is eye-opening, perspective-broadening, and a potential treasure trove of inspirations for new work, both historical and contemporary. While it is certainly “historical” in its subject-matter, the material within it is of interest not only to historians of philosophy (or psychology), but to anyone who desires a more comprehensive understanding of philosophical perspectives on the mind. I particularly recommend it to professors and graduate students who have a sense, whether vague or focused, that recent discussions have neglected something important and fundamental. Sometimes, this calls for truly novel and ground-breaking ideas. But, as often as not, it can be well-served by re-connecting with the best ideas of past generations that have, unfortunately, been forgotten.

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References
