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After the intense quarrels over so-called ‘resolute’ readings in the 1990’s and early 2000’s, Tractatus scholarship has by now reached a stage at which all sides seem to agree on the need to step down from the heights of programmatic dispute and focus on detailed, step-by-step interpretation of the Tractarian dialectic. Sensible resolute readers have never denied the need for such detailed engagement with the text—indeed, most of the central resolute papers already involve plenty of such engagement, and it is a prejudice that such readers think they can just skip doing proper exegesis of the body of Wittgenstein’s work. What is true is that we are still waiting for this exegetical work to coalesce into a comprehensive account of how the Tractatus as a whole hangs together. Before such a comprehensive reading is at hand, it remains unclear what, exactly, we are asked to do when we are requested to take a stand on the issue whether the Tractatus is to be read resolutely or not.

José Zalabardo has put together a very fine collection of new papers on Wittgenstein’s early philosophy, which clearly manifests the contemporary striving for detailed exegesis among both resolute and non-resolute readers. Not that there are only trees visible and no forest: the volume has its origin in a 2007 conference in honour of Hidé Ishiguro, and, like with Ishiguro’s own work, it is a virtue of many of the contributions that they manage to combine an attention to detail with a wider, synthesizing effort. The contributors represent no common exegetical outlook, but approach Wittgenstein’s work from different viewpoints. And yet, the chapters connect with and illuminate one another by way of common themes and references, and the collection as a whole forms a very satisfying unity.

In his concise and informative introduction, Zalabardo points out the importance for contemporary Wittgenstein scholarship of the discovery of Russell’s 1913 book manuscript, published in 1984 as Theory of Knowledge. This was the manuscript Russell abandoned as a result of Wittgenstein’s criticisms, and it constitutes a crucial source for an appropriate grasp of Wittgenstein’s philosophical development. In particular, it makes clear the significance of Wittgenstein’s criticism of Russell’s multiple relation theory of judgement, and thereby provides important clues to his own (pre-Tractarian and Tractarian) conceptions of judgement, propositional unity, and representation. The first three chapters of the collection deal with issues that arise in direct connection with this tangle of problems, and similar themes reoccur in chapters 5 and 6. Another central topic, particularly in chapters 4 and 5, is the role and character of Tractarian objects. Finally, the issue of philosophical method is discussed in several of the contributions, and particularly in the three final chapters (number 7, 8 and 9).

In what remains of this review, I shall go through the nine contributions in their order of appearance, though without any aspiration to do full justice to their content or arguments. I shall sketch some of their main points as I understand them, and raise issues where I have found things importantly unclear or mistaken.

In chapter 1, ‘Russell, Wittgenstein, and Synthesis in Thought’, Colin Johnston tries to sort out the exact nature of and grounds for Wittgenstein’s criticism of Russell’s multiple relation theory of judgement. In Notes on Logic from 1913, Wittgenstein states that ‘[a] proper theory of judgement must make it impossible to judge nonsense’, and that ‘Russell’s theory does not satisfy this requirement’ (Wittgenstein 1979, 95, 103). Johnston argues that this criticism is based on a claim that Russell’s theory of judgement is in tension with a certain principle of substitutability, a principle im-
plicitly assumed in Russell’s general theory of complexes. According to this principle, if there are two logically possible complexes which contain two entities appearing in the same way or ‘mode’—as terms, say—then replacing one of those entities by the other in one of those complexes will create a new complex which is also logically possible. On Wittgenstein’s behalf, Johnston argues that this leads to a problem for Russell’s multiple relation theory of judgement in both its 1912 and 1913 versions. For both these versions treat S’s judging that aRb in terms of what might perhaps be called the ‘objectification’ of that which is doing the uniting work in the complex aRb—namely, the relation R (the term ‘objectification’ is mine, not Johnston’s). According to Russell, in aRb, considered by itself, R functions (not as a term but) as a relating relation—a relation which makes aRb form a genuine complex rather than a mere assemblage of unrelated objects. By contrast, in Russell’s analysis of what it is for S to judge that aRb, R is treated as a term. The relating relation in this latter case is instead taken to be that of judgement, so that S’s judging that aRb is conceived as a complex in which S, a, R and b are all terms which are related by the judgement relation. In the 1913 version of the theory, things are further complicated by the introduction of the logical form of aRb as one more term in the judgement complex (Johnston argues that the reason for this complication is to account for the possibility of false judgements). In both cases, Russell’s commitment to the principle of substitutability means that his analysis of judgement allows for the substitution of R (or of the logical form) by any other term, and thus allows for judgements whose content is not united into a genuine complex at all—i.e., judgements of nonsense.

Now, as Johnston notes, Russell’s alleged commitment to the principle of substitutability may be questioned, not least since Russell himself at various points seems to propose exceptions to the principle. However, drawing on various sources, including what Russell himself says about the issue in his Logical Atomism lectures in 1918, Johnston builds a compelling case for his interpretation. An attractive feature of Johnston’s reading is also that it makes Wittgenstein’s objection have that sort of fundamental, basic-level quality that is so characteristic of his mode of criticism—in contrast to other readings such as Nicholas Griffin’s, according to which Wittgenstein was pointing out a more technical inconsistency between Russell’s theory of judgement and the theory of types (Griffin 1992, 461; quoted by Johnston at pp. 24–5, n. 9).

Peter Hanks’ contribution, ‘Early Wittgenstein on Judgement’, presents a somewhat different interpretation of Wittgenstein’s conception and its development (it is difficult to judge the extent to which there is genuine disagreement between Johnston’s and Hanks’ interpretations, and I shall not try to sort out that issue here). According to Hanks, Wittgenstein offers two different analyses of ‘S judges that p’ in the *Notes on Logic* and in the *Tractatus*, but both accounts can be seen as responses to one and the same dilemma. This dilemma is as follows. On the one hand, Wittgenstein was convinced that ‘S judges that p’ resists straightforward truth-functional or function-argument analysis: it is not a truth-function of p, nor does p occur in it as an argument to a predicate ‘being judged by S’. On the other hand, Wittgenstein was also convinced that an adequate analysis of ‘S judges that p’ must contain the whole, unified and articulated proposition p, instead of merely mentioning p’s constituents, or mentioning p’s constituents and its form (as in Russell’s multiple relation theory of judgement).

Hanks gives a detailed account of how, in *Notes on Logic*, Wittgenstein deals with this dilemma in terms of the bipolarity of propositions. In outline, the idea Hanks finds in Wittgenstein is that in ‘S judges that p’, the role played by ‘p’ requires its being treated as bipolar—which means that it has to function as a
united, true-or-false proposition. For example, consider a case where \( p \) is a matter of simple one-place predication, of the form \( \text{‘} Fa \text{‘} \). Hanks’ 1913 Wittgenstein argues that such a proposition \( \text{‘} Fa \text{‘} \) is bipolar in virtue of its dividing the objects of the world into two groups—those objects which are \( F \), and those which are not \( F \)—and saying of the object \( a \) that it belongs to the former group. \( \text{‘} Fa \text{‘} \) thus associates truth with \( a \)’s belonging to that group and falsity with \( a \)’s belonging to the other group. And, allegedly, this is also how \( \text{‘} Fa \text{‘} \) functions in \( \text{‘} S \text{‘} \text{ judges that } Fa \text{‘} \). For what \( \text{‘} S \text{‘} \text{ judges that } Fa \text{‘} \) does is to specify a further division of objects by reference to the division made by \( \text{‘} Fa \text{‘} \): \( \text{‘} S \text{‘} \text{ judges that } Fa \text{‘} \) says of \( S \) that it belongs to that group of objects which judges that the object \( a \) belongs to the group of objects which are \( F \). This sort of analysis manages to avoid treating \( \text{‘} p \text{‘} \) in \( \text{‘} S \text{‘} \text{ judges that } p \text{‘} \) as an input to a truth-function or as an argument to a predicate, and instead treats it as a united, true-or-false proposition whose bipolarity is essential to its role in the larger construction of which it forms a part.

Hanks notes that, despite the elegance of this solution, it did not satisfy Wittgenstein for long. For he soon came to think that it depended on the mysterious idea that \( S \) is an object that can make a judgment. According to Hanks, Wittgenstein came to think that judging that \( p \) requires the same sort of complexity that \( p \) itself exhibits—the sort of complexity we find in a fact, not in an object. Hanks presents this insight as a relatively straightforward matter, but he actually leaves it somewhat obscure how Wittgenstein’s argument goes at this point. After all, one might well agree that a fact can only be represented by another fact of equal complexity, and yet try to argue that something may judge that \( p \) without itself being a representation of \( p \). Certainly, in order to judge that \( p \), one will have to make use of a representation of \( p \), but it remains unclear why \( \text{‘}[\text{the subject term in sentences about judgement [that is, ‘} S \text{‘ in ‘} S \text{ judges that } p \text{‘]}\text{’ must signify something with the logical complexity of a sentence’} \) (p. 50).

Hanks also argues, in a subtle and compelling manner, that the 1913 account of bipolarity in effect involves treating predicates as names—namely, as names of divisions of objects—and that Wittgenstein’s eventual dissatisfaction with the Notes on Logic account was also a dissatisfaction with this aspect of the view.

What eventually replaces the 1913 account is the Tractarian conception of propositions as pictures. As Hanks points out, a picture-proposition, as conceived by the author of the Tractatus, does not sort objects into groups, but instead shows how objects are related to each other if the proposition is true. This goes along with a construal of \( \text{‘} S \text{‘} \text{ judges that } p \text{‘} \) which is quite different from the 1913 analysis, but which is also designed to avoid the dilemma described above. Hanks renders the Tractarian conception of \( \text{‘} S \text{‘} \text{ judges that } p \text{‘} \) as follows. Wittgenstein says that \( \text{‘} S \text{‘} \text{ judges that } p \text{‘} \) has the same logical form as \( \text{‘} \text{‘} p \text{‘} \text{ judges that } p \text{‘} \) (5.542). According to Hanks, the first \( \text{‘} p \text{‘} \) in \( \text{‘} \text{‘} p \text{‘} \text{ judges that } p \text{‘} \) figures there as a picture of a sentence—namely, the sentence produced by \( S \) in judging that \( p \). The objects of that picture—roughly, the words of which \( \text{‘} p \text{‘} \) is built up—are presumed to be correlated with the objects of the depicted sentence, which might consist either of words (in case the sentence produced is public), or of psychical constituents of some sort (in case the sentence is a thought). The second occurrence of \( \text{‘} p \text{‘} \), without quotation marks, is also a picture—but a picture of the (usually non-linguistic) fact the obtaining of which would make the sentence pictured by the first occurrence of \( \text{‘} p \text{‘} \) true. By thus putting these two pictures on display, \( \text{‘} \text{‘} p \text{‘} \) says that \( p \) shows the relation between the sentence produced by the judging subject and the reality it depicts, and thus specifies the judgment made. This means treating \( \text{‘} p \text{‘} \) in \( \text{‘} S \text{‘} \text{ judges that } p \text{‘} \) as a unified, true-or-false proposition, and yet conceive of its role as different from that of an input to a truth-function or an argument to a predicate.
Hanks’ reading is very intriguing. Let me note, however, that it is difficult to see how it could be the whole story about the Tractarian conception of judgment, since it remains unclear how it is supposed to achieve the elimination of the notion of a judging subject that Wittgenstein seems to be after in 5.5421. It appears essential to the analysis ascribed to Wittgenstein by Hanks that the first occurrence of ‘p’ in “p” says that ‘p’ depicts a sentence as it is being produced on a specific occasion, and that this production is associated with a specific subject, S. The sentence depicted must be the sentence produced or thought by S—but then it seems as if reference to the judging subject is still required, after all.

The title and topic of Stewart Candlish’s and Nic Damnjanovic’s contribution is ‘The Tractatus and the Unity of the Proposition’. They begin by providing a highly useful inventory of the various problems involved in the complex issue of propositional unity. Then they make a survey of Frege’s treatment of these problems. As they point out, Frege’s context principle dissolves the question of what makes a proposition different from a mere list of its constituents, by defining such constituents in terms of how they hang together in propositional wholes. Candlish and Damnjanovic also identify various problems with Frege’s account, including the famous ‘horse’ problem. After that, they look at Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, and argue that Wittgenstein’s aim is to reach an even more radical dissolution of the problems surrounding the issue of propositional unity than Frege managed to achieve. That may be right as far as it goes, but I found Candlish’s and Damnjanovic’s account of how Wittgenstein wants to achieve this aim confused at crucial points.

Let me focus here on two of their central negative claims. They hold (1) that Tractarian propositions are not intrinsically significant, and (2) that Tractarian propositions are not facts. To start with the second: Candlish and Damnjanovic make the astounding proposal that whereas it is clear that Wittgenstein thinks propositional signs are facts, he does not think the same is true of propositions. ‘We should notice’, they argue, ‘that in the 3.14s, Wittgenstein repeatedly says that propositional signs are facts, without ever saying, despite ample opportunity to do so, that propositions are facts’ (p. 84). Well; but in 2.141 we have, ‘A picture is a fact’, and in 4.01, ‘A proposition is a picture of reality’—and it would not seem too much to demand of the reader to put two and two together. Also, in 3.12 (quoted by Candlish and Damnjanovic at p. 81), Wittgenstein says that ‘the proposition is the propositional sign in its projective relation to the world’ (emphasis added), which seems to entail that propositions are propositional signs (and thus facts) that are being employed to depict reality. If Candlish and Damnjanovic were right that propositions are not facts, it seems we would have to presume that propositions are distinct from propositional signs in a way that is hardly allowed by 3.12. However, they also observe, rightly, that ‘[t]he first thing to note about Tractarian propositions is that they are not further entities between propositional signs […] and worldly facts’ (p. 81). It is difficult to understand how this is supposed to cohere with their denial that Tractarian propositions are facts.

With regard to the claim that propositions are not intrinsically significant, they find support in 3.13, which says that ‘To the proposition belongs everything which belongs to the projection; but not what is projected’, and that ‘In the proposition […] its sense is not contained, but the possibility of expressing it’. This, they argue, ‘suggests that the proposition, not just the propositional sign, is not on its own significant, or at least not essentially significant’ (p. 81). The way they argue for this interpretation, however, seems confused. Here is the argument they ascribe to Wittgenstein, as I understand it (cf. p. 82): (1) the sense of a proposition is a possible situation; (2) however, if the proposition actually contained this situation it would be incomprehensible how the proposition could be false, since the very existence of the proposi-
tion would then by itself involve the actuality of the situation; (3) but a proposition can be false; (4) hence, the proposition cannot by itself be significant. This, however, cannot be Wittgenstein’s argument. After all, it is clear that he thinks of propositional significance as a matter of being true-or-false, and so he would never claim that intrinsic significance would be a matter of ‘containing the situation itself’ in Candlish’s and Damnjanovic’s sense. On the contrary, it is clearly a corollary of his conception that propositional significance, whether or not it is essential to propositions, cannot be a matter of the proposition’s ‘containing the situation itself’ in that sense. So, if one wants to argue that Tractarian propositions are not essentially significant, one would have to come up with some quite different motivation. (For such a more plausible motivation, see Johnston 2007—a paper which is discussed and criticized in Kremer’s contribution, at p. 213, n. 19, but is not mentioned by Candlish and Damnjanovic).

Hans Sluga’s contribution, ‘Simple Objects: Complex Questions’, takes issue with Ishiguro’s classic paper, ‘Use and Reference of Names’ (Ishiguro 1969). It is not clear to what extent Sluga is in substantial disagreement with Ishiguro. His suggestion seems to be that what he describes as her ‘formalistic’ conception of Tractarian simples gives a less than complete story of why Wittgenstein insisted that there must be such objects. Ishiguro famously argued that the existence of simples ‘was a logical requisite for the *Tractatus* theory, and followed from the combination of a basically correct theory about names, of a mistaken assimilation of complex things and facts, and of a wrong and unnecessary claim about the independence of elementary propositions’ (Ishiguro 1969, 50). If I understand him correctly, Sluga finds this account too intellectual and anemic, as it were; in what he takes to be the spirit of later Wittgenstein, he wants also to identify more primitive motives and pictures which keep early Wittgenstein’s demand for simples in place. Taking his departure from the *Notebooks*’ remarks where Wittgenstein says he tends to think of points of the visual field as examples of simples, Sluga argues that the idea of simple objects draws its allure from cruder sources than Ishiguro would allow—such as the sense that we can always imagine smaller and smaller parts of our visual field, and the picture that we can always break extended physical objects down into smaller parts. According to Sluga, even if such primitive notions were not parts of Wittgenstein’s conscious and official motivation for his doctrine, their continuing influence on him was nonetheless an important factor behind his requirement for simples. In fact, Sluga argues, Wittgenstein early on had the material needed to undermine and abandon the ‘official “mirror” account of meaning’ (p. 102), and Sluga thinks that Ishiguro’s account does not suffice to explain why he nonetheless did not do so.

Sluga’s general point is interesting, but I was not convinced by the details of his interpretation. Perhaps most disturbing was his rather simple-minded conception of Wittgenstein’s conception of meaning. Sluga seems to think that this conception left no room at all for useful linguistic constructions that do not function straightforwardly as pictures of determinate states of affairs, and he therefore argues that Wittgenstein’s own remarks on Newtonian mechanics, for example, directly contradicts his own official doctrine. A more charitable and plausible conclusion would instead be that Wittgenstein’s early conception of language—even the official doctrine—was more subtle and many-faced than Sluga’s story allows us to see.

In chapter 5, ‘Reference, Simplicity, and Necessary Existence in the *Tractatus*’, José Zalabardo also deals with the issue of simplicity, albeit with a much more painstaking attention to the details of the Tractarian dialectic. Zalabardo rejects a common interpretation of *Tractatus* 2.0211–2.0212, according to which these passages together advances a version of what Zalabardo calls the ‘Empty-Name Argument’. The Empty-Name Argument is famously dis-
cussed and criticized by later Wittgenstein, in connection with the Excalibur example in *Investigations* §39. Roughly, the argument is this: the name ‘Excalibur’ means Excalibur irrespectively of whether Excalibur actually exists or has been broken into pieces; but ‘Excalibur’ can be in this sense non-contingently meaningful only because sentences in which ‘Excalibur’ occurs are analysable into parts whose meanings are non-contingently guaranteed by the existence of what they mean; and such a guarantee seems to exist only if those objects cannot be broken into pieces and thus cease to exist; consequently, the meaningfulness of ‘Excalibur’ requires that there are simple objects that cannot be destroyed.

Zalabardo patiently makes his case that *Tractatus* 2.0211–2.0212 should not be seen as advancing any variety of this argument. His discussion is intriguing and difficult, and perhaps at some points unnecessarily long-winded. On the whole, however, his criticism of the common interpretation of the two paragraphs is impressive, and worth a careful analysis that I cannot even begin to give in a review like this.

In the second half of the paper, Zalabardo presents an alternative reading of 2.0211–2.0212, according to which Wittgenstein’s argument there is closely related to his criticism of Russell’s tendency to treat logical forms as constituents of representational states. As we saw Johnston pointing out, Russell was driven towards this sort of view because he needed to be able to account for the possibility of falsehood. Zalabardo gives an explanation of why Wittgenstein thought Russell’s solution to the problem of falsehood could not work. According to Zalabardo, Wittgenstein thought Russell’s solution would entail that in order to account for the meaningfulness of propositions of a certain logical form, we would have to assume the existence of that logical form. However, the existence of that logical form could be guaranteed only if we assumed that some proposition of that form—Gb, say—is true. Rejecting the Russellian conception of logical forms as constituents, Wittgenstein instead postulates a substance of simple objects that by themselves—by their very nature—determine all possible ways in which they can be combined with one another. Roughly, the point is that objects, as Wittgenstein conceives them, can do this job without the assistance of forms whose existence will depend on being instantiated by some actually existing combination of objects. Again, I cannot here even begin to do justice to the details of Zalabardo’s reading—suffice it to say that it is original and very intriguing.

One of the central questions discussed in Cora Diamond’s paper, ‘What Can You Do with the General Propositional Form?’, is how to understand the extensionalism of the *Tractatus*—an extensionalism expressed in 5.54, where Wittgenstein states that ‘[i]n the general propositional form propositions occur in other propositions only as bases of truth-operations’. Diamond distinguishes between a restrictive and a less restrictive conception of Tractarian extensionalism. According to the restrictive conception, Wittgenstein held that propositions occur in other propositions only as bases of truth-operations. As Diamond points out, there is an immediate problem with this reading. It seems to stand in conflict with the quite liberal attitude Wittgenstein expresses in 5.2–5.23 with regard to how propositions can be represented as having been generated from other propositions by means of operations. Diamond uses an example from Anscombe to illustrate the point: We can represent ‘A is the wife of B’ as being generated by the application of an operation ‘conversion’ or ‘Cnv’ to the proposition ‘A is the husband of B’. ‘A is the wife of B’ would then be written, in a Tractarian fashion, as ‘Cnv’(A is the husband of B). Given this mode of representation, ‘A is the husband of B’ is treated as occurring in ‘A is the wife of B’, even if ‘Cnv’ is not a truth-operation. And countless similar cases can be given. Diamond sees no reason
to think that Wittgenstein would have denied that such non-truth-operational ways of displaying internal relations between propositions can be useful, and frequently occur in meaningful, non-confused language use.

But then, how should the extensionalism of 5.54 be understood? According to the less restrictive reading defended by Diamond, Wittgenstein’s point is that the possibilities of non-truth-operational generation of propositions do not go beyond the possibilities for truth-operational generation. As Diamond understands it, this is a relatively weak claim. For example, it does not entail that for each non-truth-functional operation there is an equivalent truth-functional operation. What it does entail is that for any particular transformation achieved by applying a non-truth-functional operation to a proposition, it will be possible to achieve the same result by the successive application of truth-functional operations to elementary propositions.

Now, Diamond thinks opaque contexts are examples of what Wittgenstein would see as propositions written in such a way as to display internal relations between propositions in a non-truth-operational fashion. In line with her non-restrictive conception of Tractarian extensionalism, she argues that Wittgenstein does not want to deny that contextual opacity can be a meaningful and non-confused way of using language. All he is claiming, on her account, is that any particular opaquely expressed proposition can also be transparently expressed, as the result of the successive application of truth-operational operations to elementary propositions. Thus, opacity has to do with how a proposition is written, rather than with the sense of the proposition. According to Diamond’s Wittgenstein, a particular opaquely written proposition can always in principle be rewritten in a non-opaque fashion.

Thus, Diamond’s Wittgenstein is quite happy to acknowledge the meaningfulness of opaque constructions. Diamond uses this point to argue against a claim Peter Sullivan has made (Sullivan 2004), that there is nothing Wittgenstein can recognize as a meaningful, non-confused use of the variable for the general propositional form (the variable presented in Tractatus 6). Once we abandon the restrictive conception of Tractarian extensionalism, Diamond argues, we will see that this variable can be meaningfully employed. Her example of such a meaningful employment if ‘Every proposition asserted by Cheney is false’, and she shows in detail how the variable can be seen as figuring in this construction.

I cannot here go into the details of Diamond’s fascinating treatment of ‘Every proposition asserted by Cheney is false’. Naturally, it leads her into a discussion of 5.542, and of what Wittgenstein says about ‘A says p’. I was not entirely convinced by her discussion at this point. One central worry is that I cannot see how the reading she proposes allows Wittgenstein to account for the crucial fact that ‘A says p’, on a natural understanding, leaves it open what particular language A happens to be using. In any case, I highly recommend a careful study of Diamond’s argument, as it seems to me to offer a genuinely new and at many points illuminating reading of 5.542—a reading that also sheds much light on other parts of the Tractatus. A careful comparison between Diamond’s and Hanks’ interpretations of Wittgenstein on ‘A says p’ should also be very rewarding. My sense is that Hanks’ interpretation has the advantage of being able to account in a pretty straightforward manner for the fact that ‘A says p’ leaves it open which language A happens to be using. On the other hand, as I have already indicated, Diamond’s reading very nicely suggests how 5.542 can be seen as hanging together with many other central parts of the Tractatus.

The chapter by Michael Kremer, ‘Russell’s Merit’, discusses Wittgenstein’s claim in 4.0031 that ‘Russell’s merit is to have shown that the apparent logical form of the proposition need not be its real form’. Several interpreters have felt that Wittgenstein’s singling out Russell specifically for praise here is peculiar—for
have not many other thinkers, including Wittgenstein’s own favourite Frege, shown that there is an important distinction to be made between apparent and real logical form? Yet few readers have pursued the question if Wittgenstein’s singling out Russell might mean that he in fact had something more specific in mind here than what can with equal justice be ascribed to these other philosophers. Kremer thinks Wittgenstein indeed had something more specific in mind, and he argues that this becomes apparent if we take care to do justice also to two other features of 4.0031 which tend to be ignored: (1) that 4.0031 is appended as a comment to 4.003, which suggests that the insight ascribed to Russell has specifically to do with the issue of philosophical nonsense; and, (2) that 4.0031, right before mentioning Russell’s merit, says of all philosophy that it is a critique of language.

Kremer thus argues that an appropriate reading of 4.0031 requires going into some detail about Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophical problems and nonsense, and he does so via discussions of Frege and Hertz, and of their influence on Wittgenstein. He argues (as many resolute readers have done) that Wittgenstein saw philosophical nonsense as often arising due to a special sort equivocation, where we hover between two different uses without clearly recognizing it and thus fail to give any determinate meaning to the words we want to employ. This, Kremer argues, also provides the clue to what Wittgenstein saw as particularly important in Russell’s treatment of philosophical puzzles in ‘On Denoting’. For what Russell showed there was that philosophically pernicious equivocation is often not just a matter straightforward equivocation between two uses of one and the same word. An even more pernicious (because harder to reveal) sort of equivocation is where the equivocation is between two ways of conceiving the logical form of a whole sentence. Kremer uses Russell’s famous example as illustration: one might want to say that according to the law of the excluded middle, ‘The present king of France is bald’ must be either true or false, and then become puzzled by the fact that the present king of France is found neither among those who are bald nor among those who are not bald. What Russell then points out is that one is here equivocating between treating ‘The present king of France is not bald’ as having the form ‘(∃x)((y)(Ky≡x=y)&∼Bx)’ and treating it as having the form ‘∼(∃x)(y)(Ky=x=y)&Bx)). Kremer’s Wittgenstein thinks that this puzzle is a model for how philosophical problems can arise ‘from our failure to understand the logic of our language’ (4.003), and that Russell’s solution shows that the dissolution of such problems might require not just that the ambiguity of a certain word is identified, but that propositional structures are clarified by means of the resources of something like a conceptual notation.

Kremer’s paper is itself a model of lucidity and pedagogical presentation. Indeed, it has the rare virtue of being both a substantial contribution to Wittgenstein scholarship and of being very usable in teaching, even at (advanced) undergraduate level. Not that his presentation is uncontroversial—I have already mentioned his criticism of Johnston, where he is defending a rich conception of Tractarian propositions (and symbols generally) as essentially meaningful. But then, I suppose no really interesting reading of the Tractatus can be beyond controversy.

In chapter 8, ‘Naturalism and “Turning Our Examination Around”’, Marie McGinn asks what was wrong with Wittgenstein’s early philosophy from his later point of view. More precisely, she discusses later Wittgenstein’s notion that his early philosophy involved a tendency to ‘sublime’ the logic of our language (PI, §38). What, exactly, does Wittgenstein have in mind here?

McGinn brings up Oskari Kuusela’s proposal, that Wittgenstein’s criticism of his early self is a criticism of the tendency to overgeneralize, or to take one case as a model for all cases while dismissing actual varieties as peripheral don’t-cares (Kuusela 2008). According to McGinn, this is certainly one central aspect of
what Wittgenstein means by ‘subliming’. However, she continues, Kuusela’s focus on this aspect stops him from giving due prominence to another element which is just as important for Wittgenstein. To illustrate her point, McGinn considers Wittgenstein’s criticism, in PI §38, of the idea that ‘this’ is the only genuine name. In line with Kuusela’s interpretation, Wittgenstein points out the variety of what we call ‘name’ and ‘naming’. But then he adds that the kind of use ‘this’ has is not among what we call ‘naming’. So, McGinn argues, Wittgenstein’s objection is not just to say that this is a case of overgeneralization, but that it is a mistake to think of ‘this’ as a name at all. Similarly, she argues that Wittgenstein’s criticism of his earlier conception of the essence of a proposition is not just a matter of pointing out that a certain paradigm is not generally valid, but of associating this paradigm with view of thought and language which is fundamentally muddled.

Thus, McGinn claims that ‘turning the whole examination around’ is not only a matter of realizing that such paradigms are objects of comparison rather than patterns to which everything has to conform. In addition, she argues, the de-subliming Wittgenstein is after involves also a more positive move, namely, the introduction of a ‘highly distinctive’ form of naturalism (p. 254)—a naturalism that is not of the reductive, scientistic sort associated with Quine and his followers, but closer to McDowell’s non-reductive, neo-Aristotelian variety.

McGinn’s criticism of Kuusela is interesting, and she seems right that the subliming of logic that later Wittgenstein is criticizing is not just a matter of overgeneralization. However, her presentation of Wittgensteinian naturalism remains at a somewhat hand-waiving level, and it is difficult to understand what, exactly, is supposed to be so ‘highly distinctive’ about it. One problem here, of course, is that as soon as one gets more precise about what Wittgenstein’s alleged naturalism is supposed to involve, one makes oneself vulnerable to objections based on the observation that Wittgenstein himself seems quite determined not to defend any positive philosophical ‘isms’.

Brian McGuinness is the author of the last chapter of the book, ‘Two Cheers for the “New” Wittgenstein?’. The New Wittgenstein, of course, was the 2000 collection of resolute readings edited by Alice Crary and Rupert Read, which played an important role in making the quarrels over such readings more agitated than they had been before. McGuinness is right that the title of that book was unfortunate, as it suggested a sharp antagonistic discontinuity between contemporary resolute readings and all earlier interpretative efforts. It seems to me, however, that most resolute readers are much more willing to admit their indebtedness to earlier Wittgenstein scholarship than McGuinness is suggesting.

In his urge to show that the ‘new’ Wittgensteinians are not as new as they think, McGuinness seems close to wanting to defend the implausible anti-thesis that resolute readers have virtually nothing new to offer. But clearly, such readers started asking certain questions with a sharpness that they had not been asked before, and it is their merit that no serious Tractatus reader nowadays can get away with ascribing to early Wittgenstein a patently inconsistent conception to the effect that he manages to identify and talk about very many interesting things of which he thinks it is impossible to talk.

Still, McGuinness makes many good observations, one of which is that Wittgenstein’s employment, or employments, of the term ‘nonsense’ cannot carry theoretical weight, and does not refer to one homogeneous phenomenon. But then again, that is certainly a point that is also made by many resolute readers, despite McGuinness’s suggestions to the contrary.

I hope this review has made it clear that Zalabardo’s collection is essential reading to anyone interested in Wittgenstein’s philosophy. What is perhaps most striking is the interpretative originality and freshness of many of the contributions. Zalabardo’s collection
once again makes you astonished at the philosophical richness of the *Tractatus*, and at its seemingly inexhaustible capacity to give rise to new readings despite the huge amount of secondary literature that has already been produced.

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References


