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Reviewed by Anssi Korhonen

## **Review: *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Analytic Philosophy*, edited by Michael Beaney**

Anssi Korhonen

Is 'analytic philosophy' still a useful label with which to describe the contemporary philosophical scene? Many would answer 'yes', including the editor of *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Analytic Philosophy*, Michael Beaney, who opens his Introduction to the volume with the following words: "Analytic philosophy is now generally seen as the dominant philosophical tradition in the English-speaking world, and has been so from at least the middle of the last century. Over the last two decades its influence has also been steadily growing in the non-English-speaking world" (p. 3). Others are more hesitant, including at least two of the contributors to the present volume. According to John Skorupski, analytic philosophy is "thinning and widening thematically to a pluralism in which it is no longer very clear what the point of the word 'analytic' is" (p. 315). And P. M. S. Hacker argues that after the decline of linguistic philosophy in the mid-1970s and its gradual replacement of a multitude of philosophical programs of a generally scientific drift, so-called 'analytic philosophy' has largely lost its sense of direction and purpose; at its worst, it has degenerated into the worst kind of scholasticism, which has retained from past achievements nothing but empty forms—items from the analytic tool box that it wields to no purpose.

Whether *we* deserve to be called 'analytic', and if so, whether this is something to be rejoiced over or lamented, are questions for everyone's (self-)reflection. But luckily there is the *history* of our discipline. There, at least, 'analytic philosophy' and its cognate expressions can be put to a good use; and there, too, we can find many figures who offer exciting examples of what it can mean for a philosopher to have both a purpose *and* to have a clear concep-

tion—or as clear a conception as can be expected of a philosopher—of what that purpose is. So at least we have a great past behind us. Surveying it is often quite exciting but also quite demanding. *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Analytic Philosophy* is immensely useful in providing a detailed map of much of the territory.

This is a mighty volume. With 1161 pages and hardcovers, it weighs 2 kg (I used an ordinary bathroom scale to weigh it, so the figure isn't exact). Fortunately an ebook version is available as well. But the *Handbook* is impressive not just because of how it looks and feels to one's hands. It consists of an introduction plus 35 contributions, which together survey an immense amount of much of the best philosophy that was done in Europe and North-America between, approximately, 1810 and 1980. And it's done very ably by scholars who—most of them, anyway—take seriously the historical turn that has been taking place in analytic philosophy since the 1980s.

The volume divides into four parts. The Introduction is extensive, comprising no less than 224 pages. It is followed by Part 1 (10 chapters) on the origins of analytic philosophy, Part 2 (13 chapters) on the development of analytic philosophy, and Part 3 (12 chapters) dealing with selected themes from the history of analytic philosophy.

The contributed chapters divide into three categories. First, there are chapters that are mainly expository in character; second, there are contributions that are more argumentative-cum-critical, usually seeking to challenge a prevalent view regarding a particular theme in the history of analytic philosophy. Third, some contributions are less concerned with criticism and re-writing than with a direct engagement with and reflection on a chosen theme or figure from the analytical past. Together, these three approaches serve three purposes. The first two are what one would expect from a handbook, if the job is properly done (as it is here): it gives a fairly comprehensive overview of its subject-matter; and it offers an up-to-date picture of the sort of research that is currently being conducted in the field. But furthermore, the present *Handbook* is

itself an important contribution to the field, for there's no doubt that many of the chapters falling into the second and third categories are just that.

Much of the volume is about mainstream figures and developments. This is both understandable and inevitable in a handbook. But what we get is not Whiggish history (with, perhaps, one or two exceptions), nor is it monumental history or doxography, but something better than these. And there are some not so well-known figures and developments that get more than a passing mention. That is always salutary. For example, it's good to see Susan Stebbing receiving some of the attention that she amply deserves: she was seminal in forging connections between the Cambridge Analytic School and Continental positivism and was an important philosopher on her own—according to Beaney, she was also the first to publish a textbook on analytic philosophy, *A Modern Introduction to Logic* (1930); my candidate for that role would have been Carnap's *Abriss der Logistik*, which was published a year before and was used as a textbook, for instance in Helsinki, where Eino Kaila used it in his logic-classes. Another example is the emergence of the Oxford linguistic philosophy in the realisms of John Cook Wilson and H. A. Prichard; they probably don't qualify as analytic philosophers, but at least they lie in the background (and are not without contemporary relevance, either).

But it's time to move on. In what follows I'll give brief sketches of the contributions, inserting an occasional comment or criticism. The book itself is quite a mouthful, and that makes this review one, too.

The introduction by the editor Michael Beaney begins with a chapter entitled 'What is Analytic Philosophy?' It provides a preliminary survey of the landscape relating it to the individual chapters that follow. Next he turns to consider the question of whether there can be a definition or at least a characterization of analytic philosophy. He argues, as one might expect, that we should turn to the method of analysis as the most viable characterization of

what analytic philosophy is and what it has been. This is useful for several reasons. It explains why analytic philosophy looks and acts the way it does: why it is piecemeal, and why it has established itself so firmly and widely throughout the academic world, and why 'analytic' is being applied with greater and greater frequency: we have not only plain analytic philosophy, but also analytic Marxism, analytic Feminism, analytic Thomism, analytic phenomenology, and so on; one day, no doubt, we will have analytic Continental philosophy as well. This is a useful perspective, not least because it suggests that the current situation in analytic philosophy is not just a consequence of eclecticism, or of lost professional identity, or of altogether external and institutional factors in today's rather turbulent academic world; but that it is at least to some extent a consequence of what analytic philosophy intrinsically is. I find this perspective reassuring. At the same time, it provides one good reason to pursue the history of the tradition. The current scene may be too elusive for a synoptic view (and not just because it stands too close to us); we can then turn usefully to our history for a reflection on the identity of analytic philosophy.

As Beaney observes, recourse to method won't suffice to delineate the analytic tradition, or analytic philosophy as an historical movement. And yet, even here it is useful, for it was the multiplicity of analytic methods that provided the basis for the different philosophical projects that came to be recognized, in due course, to belong to the 'analytic' tradition or movement. So there is both an historical and conceptual connection between method and tradition.

In chapter 2, Beaney turns to the historiography of analytic philosophy, providing illuminating discussions of the analytic construction of the history of philosophy and the historical construction of analytic philosophy. Philosophers like Frege and, more influentially, Russell did recognize a 'historical mode of investigation' or 'historical approach', but even when they discussed a figure from the past, they drew a sharp divide between the historical approach and what they regarded their proper business.

Russell called it the ‘philosophical approach’ and we call it ‘rational reconstruction’, its aim being to examine a philosopher as ‘the advocate of what he holds to be a body of philosophic truth’, as Russell put it in his book on Leibniz. It was the exclusive application of this approach that was for long the recognized way for analytic philosophers to engage with history. The last thirty years or so have testified to a historical turn in analytic philosophy, whereby the analytic tradition itself has been subjected to philosophical analysis by means of more sophisticated tools of interpretation. But more than that, a good case can be made for the claim that philosophical inquiry itself has an intrinsically historical dimension to it. This is what Beaney argues for, and he offers four considerations to back up the claim. First, philosophical terminology is created and shaped by past use, and is inevitably contested; so clarification requires engagement with the past. Second, philosophical positions and problems are independent of articulation by particular philosophers, but only in local contexts fixed in part by shared presuppositions that can be relied upon in philosophical exchanges. Third, there’s the realization that large segments of contemporary philosophy involve engagement with colleagues from the past; there’s no such thing as breathing in a philosophical vacuum. Fourth, philosophizing always presupposes some sort of underlying narrative which is historical in character and with the help of which one puts oneself in the historical space of philosophical traditions. This narrative is typically, even inevitably, dictated by ‘shadow histories’. To the extent that analytic philosophers recognize traditional analytic values, such as truth and clarity, then they cannot but engage with their own history, and do so in a serious way.

Chapter 3 offers an 80-page chronology of analytic philosophy and its historiography, from 1781 till 2013. It offers an immense amount of useful information, with selected philosophers, publications and events not just from within analytic philosophy but also from other traditions relevant to its development. 150 philosophers are ‘selected for particular coverage’. Of these, 100 are gen-

erally recognized as being analytic or standing close to the tradition, while the rest are otherwise relevant. While 150 (or 100) is as good a number as any, there are at least a few names that would have deserved to be included, such as Alice Ambrose and Morris Lazerowitz in America, and Jørgen Jørgensen, Arne Naess and Eino Kaila in Scandinavia and Finland. Inclusion of these latter gentlemen would have served as a reminder that ‘analytic philosophy’ was from the very beginning an international phenomenon, which contributed often quite decisively to the growth and development of philosophy even outside the recognized centers. Both Kaila and Naess, though, are mentioned in the chronology as the philosophers who introduced logical positivism to their home countries. The chronology is followed by an 84-page bibliography of analytic philosophy and its historiography, which brings the introduction to the end.

Next come the individual contributions, divided into three parts. Part 1, ‘The Origins of Analytic Philosophy’, comprises 10 chapters and gives a nice, if somewhat eclectic picture of the scholarly work that is currently being done on the multiple backgrounds of the analytic tradition.

Mark Textor’s chapter discusses Bolzano’s anti-Kantianism. Kant, Bolzano argued, had drawn a number of important distinctions—between a priori and a posteriori judgments, between analytic and synthetic judgments, and between concepts and intuitions—but couldn’t explain them in a satisfactory manner. Bolzano seeks to remedy this by grounding the distinctions objectively, in the realm of objective propositions (*Sätze an sich*) and their constituents. The point behind this is ultimately that propositions that differ in these ways must be treated differently when it comes to the discovery and presentation of their objective grounds. Bolzano’s actual influence was limited to a number of Brentano’s students, such as Twardowski, Husserl and Benno Kerry. However, in his investigations into the conceptual tools that are needed for the objective presentation of scientific knowledge, Bolzano made a number of discoveries and inventions that re-emerged in analytic

philosophy. Textor's chapter would be more useful, I think, had he explained in some detail the enormous differences between 'Kant's program' (transcendental idealism) and 'Bolzano's program' (call it 'semantic realism'). After all, these differences came to play a pivotal role in the emergence of analytic philosophy.

David Hyder traces the path that leads from Kant's 'deductions' of space and time and of categories through some key developments in nineteenth-century German philosophy of science to a variety of approaches typical of analytic philosophy. Kant's spatio-temporal deduction, which establishes the a priori validity of space and time, is a 'structural deduction', because it grounds a priori cognition in the structure of representations (space and time as forms of human intuition), whereas the a priori applicability of such concepts as those of cause and substance is normative or regulative in character. As Kant puts it, they 'seek to bring the existence of appearances under rules a priori', and therefore yield only regulative principles. The justification of regulative principles lies, in the end, in a complete science of nature, an idea conceptualized in different ways by different authors. Hyder examines the role of the opposition in nineteenth-century philosophy of science, focusing on two developments: non-Euclidean geometry and its relationship to kinematics (as in Helmholtz's theory of geometry and its neo-Kantian critics) and the a priori justification of force-laws (as in Hertz's picture-theory, motivated by an elimination of distance forces in favour of concealed masses and concealed motions). Finally, he draws a number of parallels to analytic philosophy. These include the early Wittgenstein's semantic account of logic, which distinguishes logical necessity from accidental universality by reference to the peculiar, degenerate relation that the so-called propositions of logic bear to the space of all possible atomic states of affairs. Wittgenstein's case is of course more than just a parallel, as he was directly influenced by both Helmholtz and Hertz and their sign- and picture-theories of representation.) It differs sharply from Frege's and Russell's axiomatic set-up of logic, which draws on anti-psychologistic rhetoric—at least in Fre-

ge's case—in issuing a normative justification for the fundamental laws; I would add here that Frege didn't regard the normativity of the laws of logic as freestanding but sought to ground it in the descriptive laws of logic as 'laws of being true', and hence that he was quite acutely aware of the gap between the normative and the true. Another case is the evolution of conventionalism about the a priori in early analytic philosophy (Carnap and logical positivism more generally, then Quine and Goodman). More could have been said about these key developments in early analytic philosophy, though this might have extended the essay beyond reasonable length. I found Hyder's chapter fascinating, though the dialectic with numerous connections and ramifications was at times somewhat hard to follow.

Gottfried Gabriel examines the historical background to Frege's philosophy. This background, he argues, has been either misunderstood or ignored, and consequently, Frege's systematic insights have been misrepresented. Gabriel's aim is to 'bring Frege home', that is, to show that Frege was not the solitary thinker he is sometimes made out to be but had the roots of his analytic philosophy dug deep in the "Jena microcosm" (a word or two on that term would have been helpful to an average reader, like the present reviewer, I think; cf. Gabriel (2004), where he uses it to explain Carnap's background). Gabriel provides a number of instances: the influence Adolf Trendelenburg's and his 'organic conception of logic and concept-formation Frege's *Begriffsschrift*, the anti-psychologism of Herbart, the value-theoretic version of neo-Kantianism (Lotze, Windelband, and others), Herbart's influence on Frege's account of existential and number statements, plus others. Indeed, Frege's close association with the neo-Kantianism of his time shows itself in the many close textual parallels between Frege and neo-Kantian authors.

John Skorupski's contribution considers the relationship between the 'analytic school' and the British tradition in philosophy. By the former he doesn't mean analytic philosophy as such but the philosophical school distinctive of twentieth-century modernism

and defined by the idea that focus on language reveals traditional philosophical problems as pseudo-problems. Wittgenstein as well as Carnap and the Vienna Circle are central to it, and were followed in somewhat different ways by Oxford ordinary language philosophy and Quine. While Skorupski observes that the ideas characteristic of the analytic school—verificationism, conventionalism, logical realism, anti-psychologism—have a background that is essentially Austro-German and hence owe nothing to British philosophy, there is also a wider context to these ideas, which involves a number of British philosophers and characteristically British themes. Skorupski examines three key areas: (i) a priori knowledge; (ii) consciousness and science; (iii) moral and political philosophy. He notes that much of the dialectic in these areas is describable as the continuity, in ‘analytic philosophy’, of characteristically British preoccupations in the face of a rise and fall of analytic modernism. However, contemporary analytic philosophy, which is defined mainly by institutions and a certain stability of style, is far too heterogeneous and pluralistic to admit any such straightforward description, according to Skorupski.

Jamie Tappenden’s chapter surveys the mathematical and logical background of early analytic philosophy, which is defined here by a preoccupation with the foundations of mathematics and with mathematical logic. Tappenden’s story covers a wide range of topics from geometry, arithmetization, the analysis of the infinite, and early mathematical logic. Tappenden emphasizes how issues that philosophers recognize as characteristically philosophical-cum-logical in fact arose as mathematicians’ responses to problems created by mathematical context. He argues, furthermore, that for much of the twentieth-century, English-language philosophy lived under the impression that philosophical concern with mathematics is by nature uninformed by mathematical practice, a habit that doesn’t preclude philosophical illumination but provides at best meagre insight into mathematical research. The culprit here is ‘Russell’s filter’, affecting through his popular *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*, which uses and discusses a range of

mathematical ideas in isolation from their life in mathematics. While this may be true of Russell’s popular book, it gives a somewhat slanted view of Russell’s actual engagement with the mathematics of his time, as opposed to what he wrote in a popular essay; see, for example, Gandon (2012).

Tyler Burge addresses the different forms of influence that Frege’s logic and philosophy exerted on analytic philosophy, or the ‘mainstream tradition in twentieth-century philosophy’, as Burge prefers to call it. Although Burge gives, at times, the impression that the hardest core of the analytic tradition is just one long footnote to Frege’s philosophy, there’s no denying the deep and pervasive influence of recognizably Fregean themes on that mainstream tradition. As Burge sees it, moreover, Frege’s philosophy is not just for historical reflection but is of contemporary relevance as well.

Like any other great philosophical mind, Frege’s influence (i) often has to do with deep methodological undercurrents; (ii) is felt by philosophers of very different persuasions, and (iii) has dimensions that come to the fore only after an initial, and often prolonged neglect. I mention just three points here. The first is Frege’s propositionalist methodology, which he applied in the study of logic, thought, language and ontology. It puts emphasis on propositional structure and how parts of this structure figure in deductively valid inferences, on the one hand, and contribute to the determination of truth and falsehood, on the other. The influence of Frege’s idea is perceived in Russell, in logical positivism, in linguistic methodology as well as in much of analytic ontology (to say, though, as Burge does, that Frege’s methodology was ‘taken up’ by Russell suggests to me a somewhat one-sided picture of their relationship). The second point, closely connected with the first one, is Frege’s pragmatic emphasis on the language of science as the source of the relevant propositional structures and the evidential basis for philosophical insight. Here Frege’s attitude compares favorably to that of Quine’s, for instance, whose naturalism (Burge calls it empiricism) operates with and builds upon stand-

ards that remain poorly motivated, if considered from the standpoint of actual scientific practice.

Third, and this is a major topic for Burge, there is Frege's views on language and his notion of sense; here, too, there's much that is still useful, once a number of pervasive misconceptions regarding his views have been cleared up. As Burge reads him, Frege's theorizing regarding sense does not concern linguistic meaning but the role of thought in the use of language. Burge rejects Frege's general ontological Platonism about senses—'ways of thinking'—because a conception of thought contents that makes them completely independent for their existence and nature of anything in space and time and does not allow for contextual determination is just not credible. But the topic itself is very much alive; indeed, more so now than in the past when mentalistic explanations were shunned because they were incompatible with behaviorism and empiricism.

Nicholas Griffin explains in his characteristically lucid prose the evolution of Russell's and Moore's thought. Griffin shows what an extraordinary idealist Russell was. Russell wasn't just original in that he sought to tackle with the Absolute by starting from the special sciences and showing how one could proceed from them 'dialectically' towards the Absolute. Even more striking is how the idealist Russell exhibits many of the traits that we expect from analytic philosophers; his analytic tool kit wasn't particularly sophisticated at the time, but he did strive for clarity and precision, as is shown, for example, by his discussion of the 'contradiction of relativity', which he found to be present in all thinking that is grounded in abstraction. One only needs to compare this with the purple prose which Bradley used to argue that the 'relational way of thought' cannot be regarded as ultimate and hence cannot be seen as delivering the metaphysical truth about reality. Of course, clarity also implies risk; once Russell formulated to himself the contradiction of relativity, it didn't take him long to realize that the culprit was the neo-Hegelian doctrine that all relations, to be admissible, must be 'internal'. That created an impasse,

and the only way out was to develop an adequate theory of relations as 'external'. This development, which took place in 1898, is correctly seen by Griffin as one of the defining moments of analytic philosophy.

We know much less about how Moore became an analytic philosopher—although we may expect that lacuna to be filled in. Parts of the new philosophy that Russell and Moore articulated remain relatively obscure as well. As Griffin notes, the toughest nut to crack here is the view, propounded by Moore and Russell, that the constituents of propositions are 'concepts' or 'terms', which make up the world. I'm somewhat less optimistic than Griffin about how much light is thrown on that view by seeing what they call 'propositions' as something like possible states of affairs (comparable to Tractarian *Sachverhalten*); as Griffin notes, there remains a difficulty about the distinction between true and false propositions, but equally crucially, and equally mysteriously, there remains, I think, a difficulty about how there could be such propositions qua combinations of their constituents in the first place.

Next is a chapter by Bernard Linsky on Russell's theory of descriptions and the various uses to which Russell himself put it. Linsky also describes how some other authors, such as Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus*, Ryle, Stebbing and Wisdom understood it and the concomitant notion of 'logical construction' (Linsky, understandably, does not dwell on how Russell arrived at the theory propounded in 'On Denoting', although the issue is mentioned together with appropriate references to literature). It was the ideas of 'incomplete symbol' and 'contextual definition', which, once Russell gradually hit upon in 1903–05, set his philosophical imagination in motion. Linsky provides helpful discussions of their various applications—the multiple relation theory of judgment, the no-classes theory of classes, the definition of numbers as classes of classes as well as the construction of space, time, and matter. Russell himself liked to describe all of these as applications of one and the same 'logical technique'. But while the first three cases are

plausibly devices of getting rid of entities of a problematic kind, the logical construction of space, time, and matter, Linsky argues, is a 'new sort of analysis', with "features not common to what preceded" (p. 420). I found particularly helpful Linsky's discussion of Russell's 'structuralism', or the idea that the structural properties of our experience give us a clue as to the structural relationships within the material world that causes our experiences: as Linsky sees it, Russell's project here, though it sounds familiar, in fact makes use of notions of structure and of model that are essentially pre-Tarskian and are simply lost to us. Russell conceived many philosophical projects and programs; Linsky's chapter offers good illustration of how one often needs considerable scholarly ingenuity to figure out their true content.

Thomas Baldwin is concerned with G. E. Moore's uses of analysis and the Cambridge School of Analysis – the first philosophers, apparently, to whom the term 'analytic philosophers' was applied. Baldwin discusses a number of examples of Moore's analytical work, from philosophy of perception, ethical theory and philosophical logic, showing that unlike Russell, Moore 'never signed up to any powerful programs of philosophical analysis', an attitude he shares with contemporary analytic philosophers. Members of the Cambridge School of Analysis, on the other hand, were more self-conscious about method (rather like the members of the Vienna Circle and associated groups), but one can safely say, reading Baldwin's description, that they failed to clear up their notion of analysis, according to which the task of analysis is to display the structure of facts but which identifies the categories that it uses through reflection on linguistic usage.

In his contribution, Michael Kremer gives his own version of the resolute reading of the *Tractatus*. How can a book that is apparently about logical matters have a point that is ultimately ethical? One way or another, the connection between the logical and the ethical has to do with what can only be shown but cannot be said. Scholars used to explain this by saying that logic and ethics, according to the *Tractatus*, belong to the sphere of ineffable truths,

and that the book, by making a failed attempt to convey these truths in the form of factual propositions, nevertheless helps the reader to grasp or see these truths; and once the reader has seen it right, she discards these important but ultimately nonsensical sentences and 'appreciates them in silence'.

Being an advocate of the resolute reading, Kremer is sharply critical of the idea that the *Tractatus* acknowledges a sphere of important or substantial nonsense. What, then, comes of Wittgenstein's insight into the 'logic of our language'? Philosophical problems, typically, arise from misunderstandings of that logic, says Wittgenstein, and hence it seems that there must be something that we can get right or wrong (this is not how Kremer puts it, though). As far as I could determine, Kremer's reading stands close to what is known as 'weak resolutism', which puts emphasis on Wittgenstein's idea that philosophical confusions can be avoided by employing a symbolism that 'obeys the rules of logical grammar'. Frege's and Russell's logical notations were meant to be like this, but Wittgenstein famously held that they failed to live up to his own insight that 'logic must take care of itself'. Kremer explores these criticisms, including the superfluous notion of a rule of inference and a failure to draw a clear distinction between logical constants and the representational elements of language. (Incidentally, why use, as Kremer does in his discussion, a 'modernized form of Russell's notation', when the point revolves, precisely, around notation? It may well be that important things are mistaken or even lost this way.)

Both of these are symptoms of a 'desire to take care of logic', i.e., of anchoring logic to something that is external to it, or 'grounding logic' or justifying it. This, I'm inclined to think, only manages to open up a rather narrow perspective on the logical theories of Frege and Russell. They were by no means unconcerned with justification, but there were other concerns as well; hence, not every aspect of their logical theorizing can be chalked up to this illegitimate desire. Be that as it may, Kremer then draws up the connection, as he sees it, between logic and ethics. Logic

takes care of itself, as all justificatory prose or theorizing regarding logic would be just idle talk. Similarly, 'it's good because God commands it'—a phrase that Wittgenstein would use later for this purpose—is a way of saying that ethics, too, takes care of itself; just as logic does not have its ground in the nature of reality, there's nothing higher that we could cite, or have insight into, in the case of ethics. It's this dual recognition that constitutes the ultimate ethical point of the book, according to Kremer.

When Moore and Russell rejected idealism at Cambridge, a similar turn was taken, at roughly the same time, at Oxford by John Cook Wilson and his student H. A. Prichard. They were 'Oxford realists'. There were others, but it's Cook Wilson's and Prichard's views on language, knowledge and perception that is in focus in the chapter by Charles Travis and Mark Kalderon, which opens Part 2, 'The Development of Analytic Philosophy'.

'Knowledge makes no difference to what is known'. This was the central theme struck by realists at both Oxford and Cambridge. But there were deep differences as well. Russell was a champion of mathematical logic, while Moore was not only capable of following Russell at least in the more philosophical parts of his logic but also contributed himself to 'philosophical logic' (as Baldwin points out in his contribution). The Oxonians, on the other hand, were relentlessly hostile towards formal logic, anchoring their views on ordinary language and 'popular distinctions', rather than formal-logical structures (Moore had this, too, of course). This theme became recurrent in Oxford in the later decades.

Oxford and Cambridge differed markedly over perception and knowledge as well. Oxford realists were rather more hostile towards sense-data and appearance talk, while their views on knowledge were highly original; it survives in present-day disjunctivism in its various forms. As Travis and Kalderon show, much of this was taken up by Austin, who supplied crucial elements that were either missing or existed only in germ in his predecessors: maintaining perceptual realism presupposes disarming the argument from illusion (a theme that Travis and Kalderon

unfortunately mention only in passing), while the distinctively Austinian views on language is arguably necessary to keep the realist stance on perception and knowledge. This theme carries on into present-day disjunctivism.

Next is Thomas Uebel's chapter on early logical empiricism and the Vienna Circle—'early' here means, roughly, pre-Second World War, before the members of the Circle went into exile, mostly to the United States. Uebel shows that early logical empiricism possessed considerable heterogeneity and pursued lines of philosophical criticism which are a far cry from the caricature of reductionism and foundationalism that is still prevalent today. Apart from the usual pedagogical and propagandistic reasons, Uebel describes two further sources of this misperception. The first of these is the reception of logical empiricism in the English-speaking world, which was to a considerable extent dictated by A. J. Ayer's hugely influential exposition of 'logical positivism' in *Language, Truth and Logic*. As Uebel shows, Ayer's verificationist bashing of metaphysics, which makes 'observability' turn on his version of phenomenalism—material objects are logical constructions of 'sense-contents'—as well as his account of the analyticity of mathematics and logic—analytic propositions 'record our determination to use words in a certain fashion'—bore but little similarity to what was going on at the time in the Central Europe. Put succinctly—and this formulation is one that Uebel himself uses elsewhere—for Ayer, logical empiricism was just British empiricism topped up by formal logic or Hume plus *Tractatus*. Ayer thus incorporated remarkably traditional conceptions of experience and of reason, while the Viennese ethos was one that sought replacement, rather than incorporation. There is thus a deep metaphilosophical difference between Ayer and his Viennese colleagues.

The second source discussed by Uebel is similar, to wit, Reichenbach's influential distinction between Viennese positivism—described, again, as phenomenalist and foundationalist—and his own 'logical empiricism', which represented probabilistic realism.

Like Ayer, Reichenbach retained traditional philosophical problems. Carnap, on the other hand, was a 'deflationist', who sought to replace philosophy in the old sense with a metatheory of science, a project that took different forms at different times, such as the constitution theory of the *Aufbau*, the logic of science of *Logical Syntax* and the later notion of explication. To elaborate on this, Uebel reviews the issue of objectivity, as it presented itself to the Vienna Circle. Rather than anchoring objectivity, one way or another, to something that lies outside (by means of a correspondence notion of truth or transcendental arguments, say), logical empiricists sought a grounding in intersubjective scientific discourse. Seen from this perspective, there's much in early logical empiricism that continues to exert its influence even today.

The rise of large sections of analytic philosophy was intimately connected with the birth of modern, mathematical logic. This state of things continued throughout the 1920s and 1930s, the 'Golden age of logic', and even after the Second World War, although there was then a sharper differentiation between mathematical logic (logic as practiced in mathematics departments) and more philosophical uses of logic. Erich H. Reck reviews the major developments in mathematical logic, focusing on Gödel, Tarski and Carnap, with a view to establishing their role in the development of analytic philosophy. Reck's contribution is particularly useful in weaving Carnap into the story. While Carnap's seminal work on such areas as philosophical semantics, inductive and modal logic is well-known, he also played a non-negligible role in an earlier phase in the development of analytic philosophy; he wasn't a logician in the sense of Tarski or Gödel and couldn't take pride in any major logical discoveries, but he was extremely well-informed on cutting-edge research and perceived, most of the time, very clearly the implications of Tarski's and Gödel's results for his own work and more widely.

Hans-Johann Glock is concerned with Wittgenstein's later philosophy. The later Wittgenstein's achievement consists in, among other things, a sustained criticism of the ideas underlying the *Trac-*

*tatus*. That work presented an elaborate metaphysics of symbolism, which its author claimed to have uncovered by reflection on the nature of logic as the most general conditions on the representative function of thought-cum-language. This reflection was underwritten by an "obscure mentalist conception of linguistic understanding" (p. 580), inherited from Frege and dismissed by the later Wittgenstein in favor of a more 'anthropological' conception, where the focus is on our ability to understand, rather than on mysterious accompanying processes or mechanisms that take place in our minds or central-nervous systems. This horizon is broadened, in *Philosophical Investigations*, into a more general inquiry into, or reflection on, mental concepts in general and even the mind in general, with a similar view to dismissing age-old philosophical mythologies. Glock shows that in comparison to the *Tractatus*, the later Wittgenstein opens up, not just a new perspective, but an entirely new landscape, when it comes to the substance of a range of philosophical issues. And yet there's also a deep continuity in metaphilosophy in general and philosophical methodology in particular: philosophy is 'not a cognitive discipline', there's no philosophical knowledge, unlike science philosophy is not concerned with truth, but with meaning or concepts, and so on.

I confess I have difficulties in seeing how this conception of philosophy can be made compatible with the substance of the later Wittgenstein's achievement, as described by Glock; there are no philosophical theses, we are told, and if there were, they would be just reminders of grammatical rules and hence mere truisms. But be that as it may, Glock does emphasize, and rightly so, the critical potential of Wittgenstein's work; and as he also points out, even the later Wittgenstein appears to have been less averse to argumentation than he's often made out to be.

As Glock notes, Wittgenstein's influence has been on the decline since the 1970s, due to a number of familiar factors. Interesting, though, is his speculation that the twenty-first century will turn out to be the century of philosophical anthropology and that

the perspectives opened up by the later Wittgenstein will have an important role to play here. This is quite plausible, but I also suspect that the need for such philosophical anthropology will mostly arise from sources which are rather distant from Wittgenstein's immediate concerns. With this theme, however, we are getting beyond the purview of the present review.

Maria Baghramian and Andrew Jorgensen contribute a chapter on Quine, Kripke and Putnam, that is, on the emergence of semantic externalism. From the contemporary point of view, Quine's animadversion concerning the entire non-extensional family—analyticity, intension, meaning, modality and so on—looks much less damaging than it once did. This is not because post-Quinean philosophy has found viable replies to Quine and his criticisms of what he perceived to be the key ideas of logical positivism. Rather, it is because our framework for thinking about the relevant metaphysical, semantic and methodological issues is arguably superior to what is found in logical positivists or Quine. The climate change to which Kripke and Putnam contributed so decisively is well-known. What has received less attention, Baghramian and Jorgensen point out, is the accompanying methodological or metaphilosophical shift in which our so-called 'intuitions' backed up by thought experiments play a decisive role. The authors consider recent work in 'experimental philosophy' which casts doubt on the current use of intuitions in philosophy and which, when applied to issues in the philosophy of language, may eventually suggest empirically informed conceptions of meaning and the a priori, thus signaling a return to a more 'naturalist' and to that extent more Quinean attitude.

Sean Crawford's topic is the 'sea-change' that occurred in analytical philosophy of mind in the 1950s and 1960s, when logical behaviourism, advocated by logical empiricists like Carnap and Hempel, as well as Ryle at Oxford, gave way to the mind-brain identity theory (Feigl, Place, Smart). According to Crawford, the standard story regarding this change is a piece of what Richard Watson has dubbed 'shadow-history'. As such, it is made use of

everywhere: in textbooks, introductory classes but also when philosophers provide motivations for alternative and what they take to be more reasonable views. A logical behaviourist is supposedly a physicalist who holds the strongly reductionistic view that the very meaning of our mental concepts is given in terms of descriptions of overt behavior or behavioral dispositions. The connection between the mental and the physical is thus logical or semantic and hence knowable a priori; and at least in the case of logical positivists, the doctrine has a straightforward motivation, namely verificationism about meaning (most of this doesn't apply to Ryle, so even shadow-history has to supply a different story about him). But as Crawford shows, this gets logical positivists just wrong, largely, he argues, because it misconstrues the content and point of their highly technical vocabulary. Logical positivists were concerned with the translation of mind talk into physical talk but that was just the view that in order to be intersubjectively testable, psychology has to be couched in a physicalistic language. And, crucially, their notions of 'translation', 'synonymy', 'definition', 'reduction' and so on just don't have the strong modal implications that we attach to them. So, the logical positivist physicalism is a linguistic doctrine, which is about the language of science, calculated to replace metaphysical pseudo-problems with something feasible, whereas the physicalism of the identity theorists is an instance of the ontological turn.

Crawford has another fascinating story to tell, one that concerns the origins and the general character of the identity theory. There's the Austrian variant, which he traces back to the pre-positivist Schlick, who was a decisive influence on Feigl, and there's the Australian variant. The two differ over which of the two sides of the identification they regard as the problematic one. While the Australian style is to apply a variety of strategies to deflate the mind-side, the Austrian side puts the blame on our mistaken conceptions of the physical.

Alexander Miller's chapter is ostensibly concerned with the development of theories of meaning from Frege, through Davidson, to Dummett and MacDowell and beyond. In fact, though, the chapter is tightly focused on the issue of how semantic creativity is to be dealt with in the context of formal theories of meaning. This perspective is viable, of course. And one may try to put it in a wider context by citing Dummett's view, first, that a theory of meaning occupies a foundational role in philosophy and, second, that 'analytic philosophy' is precisely the recognition that 'the goal of philosophy is the analysis of the structure of thought' and that such an analysis is only possible through a reflection of what is involved in the construction of a formal theory of meaning. But as the chapter by Tyler Burge suggests (see above), Frege can be weaved into the story of analytic philosophy, and made relevant to contemporary concerns, through less extreme interpretative and more plausible moves than those found in Dummett. Hence, I'm inclined to think, the chapter by Miller would have been more useful—more useful, that is, in the present Handbook—had the author cast his net somewhat more widely.

Stewart Candlish and Nic Damnjanovic's chapter is one of those that engage critically with our current understanding of a theme in the history of analytic philosophy; the authors argue for a more nuanced picture of the causalist turn in the philosophy of action. The notion that reasons for actions are causes had fallen into disrepute due to criticisms leveled against it by Wittgenstein, Ryle and Anscombe and others (often misleadingly described as 'logical behaviorists'). When Davidson revived the idea in the early 1960s, he gave effective rejoinders to many criticisms of causalism. However, he ignored two of their strongest arguments. One is Ryle's dilemma (or trilemma): as long as a voluntary action is brought about by an event of any kind, we may ask of that event whether it was voluntary or involuntary (or neither). The other is Wittgenstein's and Anscombe's warning against the idea of primitive action, which they found hopeless. Davidson and other causalists would later tackle with these problems. Whether or not the

difficulties can be resolved in a satisfactory manner, they at least suggest, historically speaking, that Davidson vs. anti-causalism was a less clear-cut victory for the former than it's often made out to be.

Peter Simons provides an overview of a century and a quarter of analytic metaphysics. Early analytic philosophers had no qualms about engaging in metaphysics, witness such themes as Frege on the objectivity of logic, Russell's and Moore's anti-idealism, Russell and Wittgenstein on the metaphysics of logical atomism, and so on. Admittedly, in Frege's and Wittgenstein's cases there's room for well-known 'anti-metaphysical readings' of their work, but that doesn't change the general picture. The clash between analytic philosophy and metaphysics came to the fore only with the rise of linguistic philosophy (logical positivism and ordinary language philosophy). And yet, when the effects of the ontological turn began to be felt from the 1950s on, most of the first steps were metaphysics in light-touch form only, including Quine on ontological commitment and Strawson on descriptive metaphysics; heavier-duty work was done in a few pockets only, such as Iowa and Australia. Important impetus came from logical semantics and the interpretation of modal logics, and a full revival of serious metaphysics was seen in the 1980s, with David Lewis' *On the Plurality of Worlds* doing more than any other work to enable analytic philosophers to engage in metaphysics with good conscience. Today the problems and methods of metaphysics are a legion. I sense a certain amount of pessimism in Simons' assessment of the future of the discipline; but systematization and application, he appears to think, are two possible ways forward.

Jonathan Dancy discusses meta-ethics in the twentieth-century, starting with intuitionism, the dominating trend in the first forty years, then switching to Moore and the Open Question Argument—Moore had a great deal in common with the intuitionists and the Open Question argument was the one that he used for the claim that ethical facts are non-natural; tools from philosophical semantics could be wielded against Moore's argument, but

whether they apply or not is a moot point. Intuitionism was then replaced by emotivism, which is usually associated with logical positivism but which in fact has a somewhat more complicated origin (here the name of Russell could have been added, as Charles Pigden has shown). Two criticisms of intuitionism by emotivists stand out, namely that normative facts are metaphysically obscurantists and that intuitionists' construal of ethical facts fails to connect them in the right way to action. Emotivism was then superseded by R. M. Hare's Universal Prescriptivism, where the ambition is to show how moral questions can be answered rationally—a point where Hare thought emotivism to have failed—and to achieve this without an intuitionist's appeal to certain moral truths or principles grasped by intuition and thus also validated. Hare's position suffered a sudden eclipse in the 70s and was replaced not by a new paradigm but by a plurality of approaches, such as new intuitionism, naturalism, expressivism and Kantian constructivism.

Julia Driver is concerned with normative ethical theory. At the beginning of the century, the stage was dominated by Utilitarianism, which was challenged from within as well as from without, notably by Anscombe. Later developments include virtue ethics and the Kantian approach. A notable trend has been an interest in moral psychology, presenting impartialist approaches with the challenge of incorporating into ethical theory such features as special obligations and emotions. Driver further discusses ethical intuitionism, which raises key issues in moral methodology. An interesting recent development here is the challenge to an intuition based methodology coming from empirical moral psychology.

Jonathan Wolff examines analytic political philosophy, another discipline of which there is little trace in early analytic philosophy. Many of the major figures in early analytic philosophy were politically active, typically on the progressive side; some were even political activists (like Russell and Neurath); and some wrote extensively on broadly political topics (Russell again). As Wolff notes, some logical positivists (namely their left wing) held that

there was an intrinsic connection with their philosophy and their progressive political views. Yet, he argues, the features that most characterize early analytic philosophy were rather inimical to the cultivation of political philosophy, namely the rejection of idealism, the invention of modern logic and the emphasis on conceptual analysis. The latter two features had no influence on political philosophy; or if they did, that was to put large chunks of traditional political philosophy outside the purview of philosophy strictly considered. Idealism had produced influential political philosophy (Green, Bosanquet, Bradley), but when idealism was rejected, that did not produce an alternative program of political philosophy but left a void. So, the revival of political philosophy didn't occur until the mid-1950s. In the later decades, analytic philosophy has typically been identified through its opposition to 'continental philosophy'. While the features that people have used to set up the opposition – analytic political philosophy aims at conceptual clarification rather than political engagement, or turns to mathematics and empirical science for its methodological model, whereas continental philosophy finds its source of inspiration in literary studies – scarcely suffice as criteria, there is nevertheless a 'broad grouping of political philosophers' (Thomson, Rawls, Nozick, Cohen, Dworkin, and so on) who share a common respect for a particular discipline of thought and seek to position their own views in relation to the views expressed by others in the same broad group. Two features stand out. The first is the elaborate use of fictional examples. The second is the ambition to develop a concise and powerful, rigorously worked out theory, as in analytic Marxism, which deploys a broadly analytic methodology in conscious opposition to the defective methodology of the dialectical school.

Part 3 of the *Handbook* consists of a series of chapters that pick up various themes from the history and development of analytic philosophy. Why just these themes were chosen, we are not told, but at least this Part of the book serves the useful function of giving the reader a lively picture of the sort of work that is currently

being carried out on the history of analytic philosophy. Most of the essays here fall into the third category; they are more 'personal' in character than the essays in the first two categories; it's as if the editor had asked a colleague to pick up a topic that is close to his or her research interests, reflect on that and write an essay for the *Handbook*.

This part begins with a chapter by Richard G. Heck, Jr. and Robert May, who explain Frege's doctrine that 'the function is unsaturated'. As they see it, the distinction emerges from Frege's confrontation with Boole's logic. From Frege's point of view, the dispute was over a fundamental point in logical theory: which propositional kind is fundamental? Frege argued that Boolean logic was thoroughly confused on this point, as was shown, among other things, by its failure clearly to distinguish between the subordination of concepts under concepts and the subsumption of objects under concepts. To treat this distinction properly is to treat atomic propositions as fundamental and intrinsically predicative; hence a predicate can never occur on its own but must always come with at least an indication of how it is to be filled. Frege captured this by talking about the 'unsaturatedness' of concepts, but the point can be formulated in a way that is more helpful to us, namely, as the semantic thesis that the meaning of a predicate is given by stating the meaning of an arbitrary atomic sentence in which the predicate occurs. What needs to be clearly understood is the semantics of predication, and this gives pride of place to the distinction between objects and concepts or, in other words, to the notion that 'the function is unsaturated'.

Next comes Richard Gaskin's chapter which addresses questions raised by Ryle's claim that some of Plato's late dialogues (*Parmenides* and *Theaetetus* in particular) raise issues in philosophical logic and semantics that are similar to those that exercised early analytic philosophers. Reflection on this leads Gaskin to a further consideration of the extent to which the 'object and designation' model is applicable to sentences and to Ryle's take on that issue, including the problem of propositional unity and the con-

text principle. Gaskin defends three theses: (i) that sentences can be characterized as (complex) names; (ii) that the context principle gives us a good reason to think of all words as names; and (iii) that regarding sentences as names will not compromise the unity of the proposition. Gaskin's discussion goes against much that became established wisdom in early analytic philosophy, and it would have been nice to see more discussion of at least some of the crucial points. For one thing, the reader might have benefited from some more discussion of what is involved in something's being a name; in particular, how do names figure in the semantics of predication? For another, Gaskin's discussion shows nicely how (i) leads to the prima facie conclusion that there are or exist non-factual or non-obtaining situations or states of affairs. For the likes of Russell, this was a major reason to drive a wedge between names and sentences, but this conclusion doesn't seem to bother Gaskin in the least (and you don't have to be very much like Russell to be bothered by that; see, for example, Read (2005)).

Cora Diamond's essay is concerned with Anscombe's influential reading of the *Tractatus*. Writing in the late 1950s, Anscombe argued that most of what had been written about the book was 'wildly irrelevant', being a consequence of ignoring Frege and reading the book in tandem with Russell's lectures on logical atomism. Diamond argues, first, that while practically everything in Anscombe's account of the contrast is problematic, there is nevertheless a Fregean lead which, if followed out, gets us to the heart of Wittgenstein's thinking about the method of philosophy; and second, that Anscombe ought to be acknowledged for helping us see this.

On the negative side, Diamond argues, there's a fundamentally Russellian way of reading the *Tractatus*, which presupposes an 'object-based conception of language and thought' and which is found in the readings criticized by Anscombe as well as many more recent readings. This contrasts with a Fregean or 'judgment-based' view on meaning. More exciting, perhaps, is how Diamond puts the Fregean conception to work in her reading of Frege, Witt-

genstein and Anscombe. Frege, when drawing the distinction between 'concept' and 'object', say, isn't reporting the result of a discovery; rather, he enjoins us to see something operating in our thought, something that clarifies our thought (and something that we put into use when we operate with Frege's notation). Similarly for Wittgenstein and 'proposition', on Anscombe's reading. Anscombe rejects the view that Tractarian semantics is just a juxtaposition of two separate ideas: the 'picture theory' for elementary propositions and truth-functionality (and holds that when they are correctly understood, the latter is seen to be a consequence of the former). While Diamond doesn't explain how the connection is supposed to emerge, she at least explains how, for Anscombe, it's by appreciating the pictorial character of propositions that we can come to see how the possibility of representing how things are goes hand in hand with representing how things are not. This in turn makes the logical character of ordinary propositions 'extremely intelligible', instead of regarding it as an ultimate logical fact, something that we must refer to, to make sense of propositionhood. In other words, Anscombe's Wittgenstein is involved in the logical 'clarification of thoughts'; or more precisely, in thinking through the 'picture theory', Anscombe herself is involved in the practice of clarifying thoughts. This practice doesn't yield philosophical theories or rely on pre-given conceptions of thought or language. Hence, also, it doesn't even convey something 'ineffable'. On top of everything else, Diamond suggests, we should see Anscombe as an important inaugurator of the anti-metaphysical readings of the *Tractatus*.

There's a theme that runs through much of the history of analytic philosophy, to wit, the opposition between metaphysics and anti-metaphysics. Modern, or Fregean, logic played a decisive role here. Some proponents of that logic argued that logic reveals, or contributes to revealing, the true nature of reality. This is a metaphysical use of logic. The anti-metaphysical stance could be formulated as the view that logic somehow shows that there's no such nature. But since such a claim looks like just another piece of

metaphysics, the anti-metaphysical stance was usually formulated as the view that modern logic shows that questions regarding the ultimate nature of reality can be put aside; or more strongly, that questions regarding that nature are illegitimate or senseless. In his chapter, Peter Hylton discusses the metaphysical use of modern logic, or more precisely, the metaphysical consequences, or consequences for metaphysics of the idea of a logically perfect language (LPL).

Hylton first discusses Russell's views. He is concerned with the Russell, roughly, of 1903–19, during which period Russell held that an LPL is the language of *Principia* with a vocabulary added to it; since 'meaningfulness' is tied to acquaintance, taking extra-logical meaning into account implies that such a language would be largely private to a single person. The metaphysical implications of a Russellian LPL arise from (i) what we can be acquainted with, because acquaintance with  $x$  implies that  $x$  exists; and (ii) logical forms as forms of facts. Here I would have added a third source, namely (iii) what we can have evidence for. Russell, at one time, was inclined to equate (iii) with (i), as in the essay *The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics*. This led him to endorse his supreme maxim of scientific philosophizing, which enjoins us to replace inferred entities by logical constructions (I don't mean to suggest that Hylton is unaware of this part of the story; he discusses it at length in Hylton (2007), but it could have been profitably mentioned here as well). This doesn't vitiate metaphysics *in toto*, but it does have implications for large chunks of the discipline, as traditionally conceived.

Next in Hylton's story come Carnap and Quine. Carnap's conception of logic was antithetical to LPL. The Principle of Tolerance dictates that correctness doesn't apply to the choice of logic, or form of language. LPL in general presupposes that there is such a thing as the nature of reality, and that logic somehow reflects it; but if, barring pragmatic considerations, one logic is as good as another, then these ideas simply drop out of the picture. For Quine, by contrast, the notion of 'best language' does make sense,

because there's no strict separation of language and theory (choice of language and justification of theory); what we have is the idea of our best overall theory, judged by 'efficacy in communication and in prediction. And this does have ontological consequences, given that to be is to be the value of a bound variable.

Finally, Hylton discusses post-Quinean metaphysics. Some of it—notably David Lewis—makes use of ideas analogous to LPL, but here, Hylton suggests, a clear justification is lacking. The general question is: What reason do we have for thinking that reality is constrained by our best conceptual scheme? Or, to put the point more methodologically, what lends justification to the idea that a given candidate for a LPL is, indeed, such a language; or to the idea that a philosophical analysis of this or that idiom has metaphysical significance?

In Russell's case, Hylton argues, the answer is provided, again, by acquaintance, which is supposed to provide a "direct and unmediated access to reality as it is in itself" (p. 921; I'm somewhat suspicious of this diagnosis, and would suggest different sorts of considerations, but I'll let that pass). In Quine's case, again according to Hylton, the answer is quite different and depends crucially on his naturalism. The idea of the best theory, couched in Quinean terms, gives all there is to our grasp on the idea of reality; the regimented theory is constructed with a view to capturing "our most objective kinds of knowledge" (p. 922). This provides Quine with a criterion of what does and does not have metaphysical or ontological significance. Even an idiom that is humanly indispensable doesn't necessarily qualify to be included in the regimented theory, if its truth is tied to factors whose objectivity is too dubious. But post-Quinean metaphysics lacks such justifications; the Russellian, or putatively Russellian, idea of direct and unmediated access won't bear scrutiny; and post-Quinean metaphysics lacks any clear vantage point from which it could draw a distinction between 'convenient or otherwise interesting reformulation of our ordinary knowledge' (*ibid.*) and one that has metaphysical significance.

P. M. S. Hacker explores the linguistic turn in analytic philosophy. The term 'linguistic turn' itself was introduced by Gustav Bergmann in 1960, but his use of it is too closely tied to the peculiarities of his own views. As Hacker goes on to show, the term does have an application, namely to a 'distinctive movement in philosophy' (and phases in that movement): the *Tractatus* as the originating point of the linguistic turn; logical empiricism; Cambridge Analysis; the later Wittgenstein and his pupils; Oxford analytic philosophy (Hacker distinguishes further strands). According to Hacker, the linguistic turn overlaps but doesn't coincide with analytic philosophy, which includes Russell and Moore, and was preceded by the 'logistic turn' in philosophy (which includes Frege). What emerges from an examination of the historical setting spanning the decades from the 1920s until the 1970s is a description of an "important shift in meta-philosophical reflection and in philosophical methodology" (p. 944) that was accepted by philosophers who held i) that philosophy is not a science; ii) that philosophical investigation concerns concepts and conceptual structures; iii) that the result of such investigation is a clarification of our thought or improvement in our understanding through dismantling a conceptual confusion. I found particularly useful Hacker's description of the methodology of Oxford analytic philosophy, which puts right a number of prevalent misconceptions about their work. Hacker makes no secret of his own preferences, and includes, in the final section, some rather harsh comments on the current state of 'analytic philosophy' (I mentioned some of them at the beginning of the present review).

Gary Hatfield discusses theories of perception in analytic philosophy, with a special—and welcome—emphasis on Moore's and Russell's theories which combined sense-data and realism. Hatfield brings out nicely the contrast between the two philosophers, Moore trying to find out an 'analysis' of perceptual propositions that would comply with the beliefs warranted by common sense, and Russell being occupied by ambitious research programs that brought logic and modern science to bear on the analytical and

constructive issues. 'The rest of the story' includes a variety of realisms (in Oxford, America and elsewhere), Austin's frontal attack on sense-data, which was less conclusive, according to Hatfield, than is often suggested, and other trends that continued the turn away from representationalism.

Annalisa Coliva examines one of the great classics of analytic philosophy, G. E. Moore's 'Proof of an External World'. As with many classics, the very point of the paper remains disputed. Was Moore's aim the refutation of skepticism, or was he merely concerned with philosophers who deny that there's an external world? Coliva first criticizes some classical interpretations (Malcolm, Clarke and Stroud) and then engages with contemporary views of Moore's proof (Wright, Pryor). Coliva's own view is that the historical Moore endorses a "somewhat externalist conception of knowledge" (p. 993)—because his achievement was essentially that of suggesting a typical externalist maneuver, namely when he argued that one's inability to prove that one knows that  $p$  in no way impairs one's knowledge that  $p$ . Moore 'never proposed anything which would suggest his leaning towards' a position that we would now recognize a typically externalist (*ibid.*). Moore's take on skepticism, furthermore, seems to be somewhat different from typical externalism. Yet, despite all this, Coliva suggests, "Moore somehow anticipated, in many respects, the kind of approach that epistemic externalist have developed after him" (p. 995). Moore, it would seem, falls somewhere between epistemic internalism and epistemic externalism, and that may explain why he was typically dismissed by his contemporaries and is today seen as somewhat unconvincing. Coliva concludes by considering, through a reflection on Wittgenstein on certainty, how even philosophers of internalist persuasion might still find some value in Moore's proof.

Juliet Floyd explores the varieties of rigor and pursuit of rigor that were a key-element in the self-image of early analytic philosophy and mathematical philosophy in the century spanning from Dedekind's *Habilitationschrift* of 1854 to Turing's 'Solvable and Unsolvable Problems' of 1954. She is concerned with how the

equation of rigor with a family of formal techniques brought about a heightened awareness of the status of 'residue', or those aspects of theories and arguments that fall outside the purview of 'formalization'. Inevitably, the pursuit of rigor invited philosophers and mathematicians to be rigorous about rigour itself, understood as a question about *us*, about what it is to be rigorous.

Sanford Shieh examines the ups and downs of modality in analytic philosophy. The beginning was somewhat inauspicious, with Frege, Moore and Russell arguing, in different ways, that modal notions are not logically or metaphysically fundamental and are to be explained away. C. I. Lewis was the first significant dissenter, and his criticisms of *Principia Mathematica* and 'material implication' inaugurated modern modal logic.

According to Shieh, the most significant of Lewis' criticisms was the claim that a system of material implication, such as the 'theory of deduction' of *Principia*, cannot provide a method of demonstrating the truth of its axioms, and it is this fact that undermines the system's claim to be a system of *logic*: for logic—and Russell would agree with this—is 'maximally general in application', and must therefore supply whatever is needed to demonstrate its own correctness. Shieh's reading of Lewis is compelling, but Lewis' criticism seems to me to be somewhat unfair to Russell, partly for the reason that Russell did not think that 'we reason in accordance with material implication'. But whether this criticism is valid or not, consideration of Lewis' views would provide an excellent entry point for considering the intricacies of the 'universalist conception of logic'. Next in the story of modality comes a lucid section on Tractarian necessity and an even more lucid account of Carnap's extreme pragmatism, which applies to modalities as well. Shieh then turns to consider Quine's various critiques of modality, including crucially his doubts about essentialism, and the different responses to it, culminating in the post-Marcusian and post-Kripkean consensus that the sorting of properties into essential and inessential is not a metaphysician's fabrication but has a solid pre-philosophical 'intuition' to back it up.

Jaroslav Peregrin discusses inferentialism, which is a distinctive approach to meaning and meaningfulness in general, associated with the names of Wilfrid Sellars and, more recently, with Robert Brandom. While much of twentieth-century thought about meaning was dominated by 'representationalism', at least traces of inferentialism can be found in the early work of Frege and the syntactic Carnap. A more articulated—and restricted—form is met in Gerhard Gentzen's system of natural deduction, in the 1930s. The idea that the usual logical constants come with inferential patterns that are constitutive of them is best known to philosophers through Dummett's adoption of that idea. Peregrin discusses in some detail inferentialism as a general philosophical project. Here, though, I experienced some difficulties, partly because the discussion appears to slide from inferentialism in some more specific sense to the apparently more general idea that meaning is suffused with normativity.

Cheryl Misak discusses a century and a quarter of 'analytic pragmatism', inaugurated by Chauncey Wright and C. S. Peirce in the 1860s, and continued in the work of C. I. Lewis, Dewey, Quine, and a host of more recent philosophers. Misak is particularly concerned to displace the standard fable about the relationship between American pragmatism and analytic philosophy, a story that has been told by Louis Menand and, in the form better known to European philosophers, by Richard Rorty. According to this story, the rise of pragmatism in the aftermath of American Civil War in the 1860s and its fall at the break-out of the Cold War in the 1940s and 50s as well as its new revival in the 1980s and 90s in the post-Cold War world were due to changes in general intellectual climate in the United States that close-tracked changes in the world of politics. The common (mis)perception of pragmatism, which is almost entirely due to Rorty, is dominated by the figure of William James. James wasn't and didn't want to be a 'technical' philosopher, and his somewhat sweeping take on such issues as truth and objectivity is what many would still regard as a characteristically pragmatist attitude towards these issues; Russell and Moore

wrote harsh words on James's conception of truth, and I imagine that many analytic philosophers of today harbor similar feelings towards Rorty's praise of solidarity and agreement with our peers; the trouble, of course, is not with solidarity and agreement but with Rorty's use of the ideas. However, as Misak emphasizes, there's also the naturalist trend in pragmatism, which was originated by Wright and Peirce and which "focuses on the practices on inquiry and tries to capture our cognitive aspirations to objectivity" (pp. 1105–1106). It has a great deal in common with logical empiricism—a fact that was clearly perceived at the time—and the two came even closer in the philosophy of Quine. That takes us to the 1970s, when Rorty's influence began to be felt; people then learned to identify pragmatism with James-peppered-with-Rorty and it 'stepped out of the mainstream'. This is an intriguing piece of intellectual history. Seen from the European perspective, Rorty's influence on the common image of pragmatism may appear somewhat less dominant; also, Misak could have said a few words about Putnam's influence on analytic philosophers' conception of pragmatism.

David Woodruff Smith discusses the role of phenomenology—the movement as well as the discipline—in analytic philosophy. Keeping in mind the cleavage between 'analytic philosophy' and 'continental philosophy', it's surprising to see how many deep connections there were between early analytic philosophy and phenomenology: Frege and Husserl, Russell and Meinong, Moore and Brentano, Carnap and Heidegger, Carnap and Husserl, Ryle and Husserl, to name some of the salient ones. But as Smith points out, the cleavage did not exist at all in the early decades of the twentieth century. Of course, this can be traced back, partly, to the geographical fact that analytic philosophy was born as much in Central Europe as it was in England. As Smith shows, however, there's a more exciting factor in play here, namely a shared concern with *meaning*, broadly construed. Indeed, from a sufficiently general point of view, both analytic philosophy and phenomenology (the movement) can be said to have their common origin in a

concern, precisely, with ‘meaning’ (J. Alberto Coffa dubbed it the ‘semantic tradition’ in his by now classical study (1991)). Now, one could maintain – and there are at least traces of such a view in Smith’s contribution – that there’s an important difference between the phenomenological and analytical studies of meaning; analytic philosophers were particularly interested in *linguistic* meaning, whereas for phenomenology the focus was on lived experience and its formal structure. But the fact is that early analytic philosophy (roughly, the pre-*Tractarian* era) gave no pride of place to language, and that insofar there was discussion of meaning (content, etc.), it was about ‘mental phenomena’, approached in a spirit very similar to what one finds in the phenomenologists of the time. So, the connection really is quite deep.

Smith discusses some of the connections between analytic philosophy and phenomenology. The case of Frege and Husserl, studied as early as the 1950s by Dagfinn Føllesdal, is well-known. Another connection which Smith discusses and which is less well-known but even more striking, because it comes from the hardest core of analytical modernism, is Carnap’s *Aufbau*. Recent scholarship has shown that the work is a formal explication of the phenomenological theory of knowledge that Husserl propounded in his *Ideen I* (1913); the ‘logical structure of the world’, it turns out, is in fact a ‘constitution theory of the objects of cognition’, with linguistic expression standing proxy for Husserlian noematic meanings. Smith discusses, or at least mentions, other connections as well: Tarski’s philosophical background in the Brentano school (studied in detail in Rojszczak (2005)); possible worlds semantics of intentional attitudes (‘intentionality as intensionality’, as Jaakko Hintikka dubbed it); recent analytic philosophy of mind, with its growing awareness of the problems relating to self-consciousness.

So that’s the overview, with a few critical remarks scattered here and there. Even after 1161 pages, you might ask: Are there any (serious) gaps in the *Handbook*? I’m sure many readers have their favorite topics that they would like to see included. I mention two. The first is theories or, more broadly, conceptions of

truth in the analytic tradition, considered either from an expository or a more restricted perspective. I see, though, that there is an *Oxford Handbook on Truth* forthcoming; so instead of just one chapter we’re going to have an entire volume, which is nice. The second topic is the rise of naturalism in the analytic tradition, which would have added an important dimension to Part 2. But these are just ‘could have beens’. One topic that should have been included, I think, is philosophy of science, of which there’s surprisingly little in the present volume. True, the chapter by David Hyder is mainly on that, but it’s mostly about nineteenth century developments. Apart from logic and the foundations of mathematics, philosophy of science was certainly the third focal point in early analytic philosophy, at least if your perspective includes the centres of Continental analytic philosophy (Vienna, Berlin, Prague, Warsaw) and is not restricted to what went on in Cambridge or Oxford. Logical positivists were then sharply criticized by Kuhn and others; that’s certainly a key development in the analytic tradition and would have deserved a chapter of its own.

I have raised a few issues here and there, mostly about details. This really is a wonderful, and wonderfully rich book. If you’re at all attracted by the idea of getting a sharper picture of our recent philosophical past (and who wouldn’t), then a warning should be issued: I, for one, found myself spending way too much time on the *Handbook*, constantly following out the intricacies of a claim, or argument or interpretation advanced in it. That, of course, is meant as a praise.

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