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Vol. 14 No. 2 (2025): Wittgenstein’s Case for the Fool: Existence in the Mind Is a Mentalist Assumption in Anselm’s Epistemological Argument in Proslogion, 2
Vol. 14 No. 2 (2025): Wittgenstein’s Case for the Fool: Existence in the Mind Is a Mentalist Assumption in Anselm’s Epistemological Argument in Proslogion, 2
Published:
2025-11-20
Articles
Wittgenstein’s Case for the Fool
Existence in the Mind Is a Mentalist Assumption in Anselm’s Epistemological Argument in Proslogion, 2
Andrey Pukhaev
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