On the Very Idea of the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15173/jhap.v16i1.6666Abstract
Is relativism a coherent thesis? Donald Davidson’s classic ‘On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme’, gives a negative answer. Davidson sought to undermine the coherence of the thesis of relativism, which he takes to be the thesis that different or alternative conceptual schemes are possible. I argue against Davidson and for the view that relativism is a coherent thesis, as follows. [1] Davidson’s master argument against relativism is invalid but can be patched to be valid. [2] Formulating the thesis of relativism requires care on issues about alternative conceptual schemes and their attribution. Conceptual relativism should not be understood as the thesis that alternative conceptual schemes are possible, but instead should be understood as a thesis about how certain attributions are possible, attributions according to which thinkers interpret other thinkers as saying and thinking things that make use of alternative conceptual schemes. [3] The patched argument is criticized based on a consideration of different kinds of semantics for attributing nonsensical saying and thinking. [4] The overall result is that relativism could be a coherent thesis even if the “very idea” of an alternative conceptual scheme is not.
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