Equal Warrant, Equal Truth? Quine's Deliberative Dilemmas
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15173/jhap.v16i2.5716Abstract
Suppose we were to encounter an overall scientific theory as equally warranted as the overall theory we believe is true. W. V. Quine thinks that there is a dilemma about whether to believe this additional theory. Whether there is a dilemma in any case, I argue, depends upon how we understand equivalence of warrant in the first-personal context of deliberating about what to believe. On one understanding, equal warrant of two theories implies that I have enough reason to believe one theory if and only if I have enough reason to believe the other. But here, there is no dilemma: I ought to believe both theories given I should believe one. There is more plausibly a dilemma if equal warrant implies that, if I have enough reason to believe one theory, I lack enough reason to reject the other, and vice versa. But I argue that Quine’s views have some awkward consequences if equal warrant is understood in this latter sense. My paper draws on the transcript of a colloquium at Stanford University in 1986 with Quine, Donald Davidson, Burton Dreben, and Dagfinn Føllesdal.
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