Quine's Platonism
From Grudging to Relaxed
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15173/jhap.v16i2.5710Abstract
Quine’s stance towards mathematical entities is usually divided into two phases. Until 1948 he sympathised with nominalism and the rejection of abstract objects, but then concluded that they are indispensable and accepted mathematical Platonism. It has rarely been noticed, however, that Quine’s Platonist phase can itself be divided into two stages: a grudging phase that lasts until the mid-1980s, during which Quine still regards nominalism as desirable, and a relaxed phase in which he has stopped regretting the acceptance of mathematical objects. Why did Quine make the latter switch? Archival evidence suggests that the 1986 Stanford discussion led Quine to reflect anew on his own philosophy of mathematics. I will reconstruct this development by focussing on Quine’s own remark that the indeterminacy of reference reconciled him with Platonism. Special attention will be paid to Burton Dreben’s influence.
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