1 Introduction

In the past few years, the global recognition of Russell’s logic and philosophical concepts seems to have regained traction within Western historiography of analytic philosophy.¹ Simultaneously, the significance of Russell’s ideas in the Chinese context is gradually increasing.² During the 1920s, when Russell’s philosophy and logic were first introduced to China, his ideas held a prominent position in European socio-political and philosophical thought. As will be briefly demonstrated below, Chinese interest in Russell’s philosophy primarily centered around its deeply scientific and logic-driven nature. This paper aims to explore the establishment and early evolution of this conception of Russell’s philosophy. I will outline key milestones and provide a general intellectual context for these developments during the Republican Era in China, spanning from the May Fourth events of 1919 to the early 1930s.

Russell’s scientific philosophy, much like other Western scientific and philosophical ideas, made its way to China during a pivotal phase of its intellectual modernization. In this formative stage of modern Chinese philosophy, spanning approximately three decades, dominant trends oscillated between two extremes. One extreme encompassed a Sinicized materialist scientism, while the other embraced a traditional-style humanistic “philosophy of life” rooted in Western Neo-Kantian and neo-vitalist foundations (e.g., Driesch, Bergson and others).³ In the Chinese context, various well-established Western philosophical schools and theories, ranging from Dewey’s pragmatism, social Darwinism, dialectical materialism, to Russell’s neutral monism and New Realism, experienced shifts closer to or further away from these poles at different points in time.

When Russell’s philosophy was initially introduced to China around 1919, it was portrayed as a paragon of “scientific philosophy.” This portrayed it as a philosophy that integrated recent scientific advancements and mathematical logic, while also embodying an objective form of liberal or socialist theories concerning human life. Over time, however, the claims of objectivity put forth by Chinese adherents of Russell faced challenges from a newly emerging current of “philosophy of life.” This movement critically questioned the universal objectiveness of science and aimed to confine its discourse to the material world, emphasizing the independence or primacy of the subjectivity in relation to human understanding of the external world.

By the mid-1920s, bolstered by a growing wave of cultural relativism and a shift toward Chinese traditional philosophy, the overall presence of Russell’s ideas in the public discourse seemed to have temporarily decreased. Yet, in the confines of certain Chinese universities, by the late 1920s, they would soon resurface in the form of a new style of modern philosophy within, signaling a transition in the status of Russell’s philosophy from a broader intellectual discourse into the domain of academic philosophy. Concurrently, this shift was marked by its transition from a cluster of concepts of categories down to a significantly narrower grounds of a specialised philosophical discourse, particularly within the framework of the Tsinghua School of philosophy. Navigating these developments allows us to examine the interplay between the paradigmatic conception of “scientific philosophy” and the internal theoretical (inclusion of modern Western philosophy into native Chinese philosophy) and disciplinary shifts (codification of the shift in theoretical trends into the classification of the formal study of philosophy) within Chinese academic philosophy.

In this paper, I aim to give a general overview of those developments within Chinese public intellectual and academic discourses in the period between 1919 and 1930s that directly involved the notion of Russell’s philosophy primarily as a “scientific philosophy”. In my historical overview, I will describe the following historical touchstones of this evolution: (1) the paradigmatic introduction of Russell’s thought in the May Fourth period; (2) the introduction of Russell’s philosophy into the curriculum at the Peking University; (3) its impact on the Chinese intellectual discourse as revealed by the debate on “Science and the View on Life” of 1923; (4) the formation of the “New Realist” current in Beijing; and (5) the establishment of early analytic philosophy and mathematical logic at Yenching and Tsinghua Universities in the late 1920s and early 1930s. By so doing, we shall trace Russell’s ideas from its early introductions in the May Fourth period (1916–1921) at Peking University, to their discursive concentration in the so-called “New Realist” current,⁴ down to the formation of first schools of academic philosophy—institutionalisation and curricular standardisation—at the aforementioned two universities. One of the main aims of this kind of three-staged historical discussion will be to cast more light on a wider spectrum of contextual dimensions and possible intellectual motivations behind the introduction and the gradual adoption of Russell’s ideas in China.

2 The Russellian “Paradigm” and the May Fourth Movement

Bertrand Russell’s scientific and humanistic ideas exerted significant influence on Chinese intellectual discourse during the May Fourth period. While there were initial mentions and brief introductions to his philosophy as early as in 1917,⁵ coinciding with the emergence of major modernist movements in the Chinese intellectual world,⁶ the most notable introductions to his thought and persona occurred around 1919. In their pursuit of novel approaches to modernize Chinese society, politics, and education, the country’s leading intellectuals united in a mass movement that erupted on 4 May 1919, in Beijing and swiftly spread throughout the nation. Between 1917 and 1919, the names of three Western scholars—Bergson, Dewey, and Russell—were consistently referenced in the numerous newly established progressive periodicals. While Bergson and Dewey were particularly popular among Chinese philosophers who had completed their foundational studies at Japanese and American universities, Russell’s popularity was highest among leftist intellectuals and philosophers. They recognized the key to Chinese modernization lying within Western socialism and the natural sciences. The epicentre of these intellectual currents, and consequently of the May Fourth movement, was the renowned Peking University, the first Western-style university in China.

Among the “three great [Western] thinkers (da sixiangzhe 大思想者),” Dewey was the first to arrive in China. The primary reason behind his visit was the strong presence of American pragmatism within the philosophy department at Peking University, which also hosted Dewey’s two-year stay in the country. Although initially it seemed that Chinese philosophers were generally receptive to Dewey’s philosophical system and his concept of science, it soon became evident that admiration for Dewey’s ideas, particularly among the younger intellectuals, was much scarcer than anticipated. Nonetheless, from the public criticism of his lectures we can still discern the existence of a shared ideal of a modern scientific philosophy among Chinese intellectuals, which Dewey ultimately failed to fully satisfy. Generally speaking, Dewey’s pragmatism seems to have failed to address the Chinese intellectual’s search for a “revolutionary” (geming 革命) transformation of China, and align the main idea of democratic society, with their profound infatuation with Western logic and modern natural sciences.

Simultaneously, a closer examination of the structure and content of his lectures at Chinese universities reveals certain aspects of what the Chinese intellectuals were aspiring to learn from the eminent Western scholars. Above all, their pursuit of knowledge from the West seemed to revolve around the development of a comprehensive or universal system of thought, encompassing all facets of nature and human existence. This system would be grounded in a nearly “omnipotent” scientific method, reflecting the “objectiveness” of their philosophical theories. To demonstrate such “objectiveness” of his philosophical theories, Dewey had to impart his “experimental logic” to his Chinese audience, along with other connections between his pragmatist epistemological standpoint on the one side and biological sciences or Darwinian evolution on the other. Shortly after the initial series of lectures were translated and published in Chinese periodicals, it became evident that Dewey was not the type of instructor that most progressive intellectuals were actually seeking. By mid-1919, Russell’s name began to appear in the titles of journal and magazine articles. In these works, authors aimed to provide a more “scientific” (kexue 科學), “liberal” (ziyou 自由) or “revolutionary” (geming 革命) perspective,⁷ as compared to Dewey’s philosophy.⁸

What exactly did Chinese philosophers consider to be Russell’s main forte in the intellectual contention between different currents of Western philosophy? Aside from being a historical question relating to the grounds for the eventual establishment of his ideas in China, by extension, this is also a question crucial for our understanding of why his ideas eventually became synonymous with modern Chinese academic philosophy.

Chinese interpretations of Russell’s thought and life from the period are reflective of a very specific pattern. While this pattern was generally followed by “progressive” intellectuals who spoke in favor of a so-called scientization of modern philosophy, their recognition of Russell’s “logico-analytical”⁹ method as superior to Dewey’s “experimental” pragmatism was related to a paradigmatic constellation of his thought. As early as 1919, Zhang Shenfu’s writings show that Russell was thought of as an author of an almost universal or “comprehensive” (tong 通, also chedi 徹底 “thorough”) system of philosophy. What was meant by “comprehensiveness” pertained principally to the consistency and rigor in establishing connections between his “methodological foundations” and the rest of his philosophical ideas. Aside from the fact that already in the last century of the Qing Dynasty (reigned until 1911) the Chinese intellectuals had greatly admired the general as well as the Western idea of “logic” (compare Kurtz 2011), Zhang and other Chinese admirers were particularly swayed by Russell’s seemingly omnipotent mathematical logic. In a short biographical introduction to Russell from 1920, Zhang wrote as follows:

Russell is currently the world’s leading mathematical philosopher, who has greatly contributed to the founding of a most splendid new science (i.e., mathematical logic (shuli luoji 數理邏輯), also called symbolic logic (jihao luoji 記號邏輯) or logistic (luojisitike 邏輯斯諦科)), which inaugurated a new period in the development of modern scientific thought. Based on his critical survey of mathematics, he also established a new kind of philosophical method (in terms of spirit, it is the scientific method in philosophy, with regard to the manner it is the “logical and analytical method” (luojide he jiexide fangfa 邏輯的和解析的方法), which may also be translated as “mingli-jiexifa” 名理· 解析法 [logico-analytical method]). His philosophy (called “logical atomism” or “absolute pluralism”), which presupposes the existence of various kinds of individual [entities] and relations and does not rest on the cosmological foundations that presuppose an existence of one all-encompassing entity. In plain words: it is a new form of research that sets out from the idea of “relations” and rests on the “theory of external relations,” and counts as the most influential in the contemporary philosophical and intellectual circles. Recently, he has also taken this “logico-analytical method”, which already had such a great effect on mathematics and philosophy, and conducted new research in psychology, having obtained results that correspond in great part to the newest psychological teaching of behaviourism (xingdong zhuyi 行動主義), which emerged in America, as well as to “neutral monism” (i.e., the American school of New Realism). He believes that the distinction between mind and matter is not substantial, but it is rather the case that they do not share the same status in the law of cause and effect that they adhere to. This matter could be extremely important for the academic world in the coming years. (Zhang 1920b, 1)

On the one hand, Zhang and his colleagues interpreted Russell’s social ideas, such as “liberty” and “freedom of marriage,” as rational constructs or logical entailments of his “revolutionary” mathematical logic (see Zhang 1920b). In China at the time, these views aligned with the broader May Fourth intellectual movement, which sought to dismantle Confucian social norms grounded in filial piety, arranged marriage, and the rigid hierarchies of subservience between rulers and subjects. On the other hand, Zhang and his contemporaries discerned an even deeper paradigm underpinning the epistemological and ontological foundations of Russell’s thought. In subsequent years, critics of Russell’s scientific philosophy, including Zhang Dongsun, came to label ideas and theories attributed to Russell’s philosophy “scientism” (kexue zhuyi 科學主義).¹⁰

When Russell arrived in China in October 1920, he was welcomed as a modern sage by the less progressive intellectuals, as a great scientist and philosopher by the progressive intellectuals, and as a potential paragon of socialist revolution by the leftist reformers. However, soon after he started lecturing in Beijing it became clear that the Western reality was more distant from Chinese ideals than expected. Russell’s lectures at Changsha—one of the unofficial centers of the Chinese Communist movement—left the fervent Chinese revolutionaries in minor disappointment, mostly due to his criticism of Soviet Bolshevism and his apparent lack of “Marxist” or, more precisely, anti-bourgeois revolutionary fervor (see further Vrhovski and Rošker 2021).

At the current seat of the Chinese intellectual world, Peking University, the reception and impact of Russell’s idea was more complex. While his ideas were enthusiastically spread by the circle of his supporters, their reception amongst a wider public told a different story (see Vrhovski 2021a; compare Lin 2012). The wider community of scholars and students at the university was interested in Russell’s mathematical logic and scientific ontology over all other topics. To their ultimate disappointment, Russell took a somewhat different path in lecturing. Aside from questions related to China’s social reconstruction, at his lectures at Peking University, he decided to focus on topics related to his recent interests in psychology and theory of human mind, putting mathematical logic last. After his arrival at the university, apart from major public lecture series on “Analysis of Mind”, “Problems of Philosophy”, and “Analysis of Matter”, Russell also delivered a few courses in the framework of the Russell Study Society at the university,¹¹ which were intended exclusively for the students and lecturers at the host university. In addition to the contemporary Chinese articles engaging with the nature of his thought and his personality, the responses to his lectures testify most clearly about what the Chinese intellectuals were really expecting to receive. As pointed out above, it turned out that both the students and the professors were most eager to learn about those aspects of Russell’s philosophy that were most directly derived from physical science and in the most “formal” aspects of his methodology, namely mathematical logic. In other words, they were interested in his ontology and logic, deeming his new results relating the nature of human mind less pertinent due to their relatedness to the allegedly less scientific “psychological sciences”. A report from the third session of the English section of the Russell Study Society thus reads:

[O]nly three people attended. … [T]he second and third sessions were not attended by many scholars, because the theories studied at the last two sessions belonged to the domain of psychology. … [T]he rest of those who are able to conduct a direct conversation about these matters do not have a deep interest in psychology. For this reason, in the future when you lecture about ‘The Analysis of Matter’, the number of those who will come to study problems will be much higher … (Vrhovski and Rošker 2021, 82)

Concurrently, the Chinese section of the society conducted discussions which were aimed mostly at the, so to say, ontological aspects of Russell’s thought. That the laws of “matter” were more popular than the workings of “mind” became very much apparent also from the attendance at Russell’s lectures on mathematical logic, which, however, came to an abrupt end due to his sudden illness. Harboring a strong belief in the omnipotence of modern logic and scientific method,¹² Chinese scientists and other intellectuals overcrowded the auditorium. Aside from science enthusiasts of all types, the lectures were also attended by a group of Beijing-based Chinese mathematicians. Amongst them, Fu Zhongsun 傅種孫 and Zhang Bangming 張邦銘 became also the first Chinese mathematicians to have concretely engaged themselves into the study of Russell’s mathematical philosophy. Eventually, their engagement with Russell’s work resulted in the first Chinese translation of his Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy (1921) (see further Xu 2003, 2005). It is this very setting, which later in Chinese intellectual history came to serve as the central paradigm for philosophical contention and on which the emergence of Russellian type of philosophical discipline was ultimately based.

3 Scientific Philosophy Enters Chinese Academic Philosophy—Peking University, 1920–1923

When Russell left China in July 1921 the world of Chinese academic philosophy was vastly different than before his arrival in the Autumn of 1920. Although it might be exceedingly difficult to ascertain whether the message of his lectures in China had really reached the extraordinarily diverse audience attending his lectures, what can be ascertained with greater certainty is the paradigmatic impact both his lectures as well as his personal encounters with his Chinese adherents left on the outlook of modern Chinese philosophy as an academic discipline.

A closer look at the curricular changes, appointments, and scholarly activities at the department of philosophy at Peking University can reveal that, since Russell’s arrival in China, an extensive “scientization” of the basic curricula was set into motion (see Vrhovski 2021a). Essentially, the curricular changes which took place at the department between the years 1920 and 1924 were all more or less in line with the above-described paradigm, which a certain group of Chinese philosophers and scientists seemed to have had recognized in Russell’s scientific philosophy (see further Vrhovski 2021a). This major change, which involved much more than a mere mobilization of few already established members of the university’s philosophical department, was a direct result of Russell’s presence at the university in 1921. In fact, his presence not only catalyzed these developments but created a “political atmosphere” which enabled curricular change and even resulted in hiring new members of the department.

At least for a few years, the anti-pragmatist current at Peking University had come to fruition. When it came to the structure of the curriculum, the steep rise of the presence of Russell’s philosophy at the department manifested itself in a profound remodeling in the following aspects: (1) instead of courses in logic and psychology, both at the level of the department and university, a course in pure logic was established, which now included chapters from modern formal logic; (2) subjects relating to history of Western philosophy included now more recent periods as well—in the new curriculum more emphasis was given to British empiricism and realism; (3) a wide variety of selective introductory courses in natural sciences (chemistry, physiology, physics) were now offered in the context of undergraduate and graduate studies in philosophy; and finally, (4) a special elementary course in scientific methodology was introduced into the curriculum (Vrhovski 2021a).

This sudden turn towards a more scientific variety of philosophy taught at Peking University was spearheaded by the same scholars, who were elementary in organizing and carrying out Russell’s visit and lectures in 1920 and 1921, including Fu Tong, Wang Xinggong 王星拱 (1887–1949), Qu Shiying 瞿世英 (1900–1976) and others. All these scholars invested a great deal of their work into translating and explaining Russell’s thought to the broader Chinese readership. They were also the leading figures of the Russell Study Society with its Russell journal, and Fu Tong’s Philosophical Society (zhexueshe 哲學社) which also published a same-named journal Philosophia (Zhexue 哲學). In the years following his visit, scholars like Wang and Fu were also the ones to have taken over the teaching of novel subjects at the department. Wang for one also composed a variety of textbooks, including The Scientific Method (Kexue fangfalun 科學方法論; Wang 1921), which were used at the aforementioned classes on science and logic.¹³

Although this scientific turn resembled a short-lasting yet towering wave that lost its momentum around the year 1924, it still served as a harbinger of a broader intellectual tide that would sweep Chinese universities by the late 1920s. In the brief period from 1920 to 1924, the wave of “scientization” of philosophy prompted by Russell’s visit to China coalesced with other ongoing intellectual movements, such as the atheist movement of 1922 (see Vrhovski 2022a). Within this movement, which had one of its epicentres at Peking University, Fu Tong played a significant role in introducing Russell’s scientific secularism to China. Following the philosophical opposition between Bergson and the pragmatists on one side and Russell on the other, the rise of scientific philosophy among philosophers in Beijing established the main trajectories and divisions underpinning the development of Chinese academic philosophy in the ensuing decade.

However, instead of focusing on the points of departure between, for example, Russell’s realism and Dewey’s pragmatism, the discursive antagonism that determined the development of modern Chinese philosophy was exemplified within these paradigms. Consequently, the core opposition within Chinese philosophical discourse became that between “material” science and “biological” life, between objective knowledge and subjective intuition. If this entire process is understood as a simple “emulation” of the philosophical landscape in the West, the Chinese reenactment of Western polemics was more total and comprehensive in nature, as Chinese philosophers aimed to reduce the entirety of Western philosophical development to a handful of conceptual oppositions or indeed only two main currents of contending “world philosophies.”¹⁴

As one would rightly suspect, the reality was much more complex. The numerous nuances of the issue in the eyes of Chinese philosophers would soon be revealed in the extremely important controversy known as “Science and Metaphysics” (kexue yu xuanxue 科學與玄學) and “Science and the View on Life” (kexue yu rensheng guan 科學與人生觀), which broke out in 1923. How the trajectory of Russell’s scientific philosophy in China was involved in this complex, broad, and multifaceted debate will be discussed in the following section.

4 “Science and the View on Life”—Old Antagonisms in a New Setting

From its introduction to China, Russell’s philosophy naturally found its most enthusiastic proponents among proponents of scientific thought and materialism. But it was a philosopher who ultimately became one of Russell’s earliest critics in China, Zhang Dongsun 張東蓀 (1886–1973), who initiated the first profound criticism of its theoretical underpinnings. Zhang Dongsun was a prominent member of the circle of scholars educated in Japan, led by the highly influential senior intellectual Liang Qichao. Much like his contemporaries, Zhang’s initial encounter with Russell’s ideas was motivated by his personal quest for a form of socialism that could be adopted by the Chinese people to propel their society towards greater advancement and equality. Zhang Dongsun’s journey into Russell’s philosophy, spurred by his engagement with socialist ideals, eventually led him to delve deeply into its theoretical foundations. Despite being situated within a milieu that was largely receptive to Russellian thought, Zhang’s exploration of Russell’s ideas prompted him to critically assess its principles and implications. This critical engagement would lay the groundwork for his subsequent divergence from the Russellian paradigm and his emergence as a key figure among Russell’s early critics in China. In a broader sense, Zhang Dongsun’s trajectory exemplifies the intricate interplay between philosophical ideas, personal ideologies, and sociopolitical contexts. His exploration of Russell’s philosophy within the framework of his socialist aspirations demonstrates the complex dynamics that shaped the reception and interpretation of Western philosophical thought in China during that period.

Zhang’s encounter with Russell sparked not only a sudden shift in his political stance toward socialism but also ignited a profound fascination with the epistemological underpinnings of Russell’s logicism, a strand he termed “New Realist logicism (xin weishi lun lunli zhuyi 新唯實論理主義),” and its interconnectedness with Einstein’s Theory of Relativity. Consequently, as early as 1922, Zhang commenced publishing comprehensive treatises that critically analyzed and dismantled Russell’s logicism. In doing so, he aimed to unveil what he perceived as a tenuous link between Russell’s conception of relations and his understanding of the objective nature of the physical world. What is of utmost significance is that Zhang’s critical exploration of Russell’s philosophy was shaped by the same paradigmatic framework of “scientific philosophy” as discussed in the preceding section of this paper.

In his study on logicism, Zhang aimed to establish a concise and effective form of “Neo-Kantian” logicism or epistemology of logic. This effort was tied to his broader goal of synthesizing Bergson’s philosophy of life with Neo-Kantian epistemology, creating what became known as the “philosophy of life.” Zhang sought to balance what he understood to be a perfected Western philosophy of thought with a philosophy of life. In his view, Russell’s logicism represented an imperfect version of a philosophy of thought, which could only be improved through a Neo-Kantian turn, while in the latter he saw elements of Chinese Song dynasty Neo-Confucian epistemology and Bergsonian vitalism. Thus, he viewed philosophy through binary oppositions: logicism versus psychologism, philosophy of thought versus philosophy of life, universal versus particular forms, transcendentalism versus empiricism, and rational knowledge versus its opposition. While his vision was rooted in a vision of human thought as consisting of two main currents described by these oppositions, his primary goal was to integrate these into a unified epistemological framework (see further Zhang 1923a, 1923b, 1923c).

In 1923, the Chinese intellectual world was shaken by a nationwide polemic on the nature of science and its role in human life, correspondingly titled the “Science and the View on Life” debate. In this debate, the above-mentioned paradigm featured (positively or negatively), on both sides. Naturally, a negative paradigmatic influence of Russell’s philosophy, expressed as antagonism, was particularly pronounced among those affiliated with the “view on life” camp in the “Science and the View on Life” debate sparked in 1923 by Zhang Junmai 張君勱. It is not a stretch to assert that Zhang’s articles during this period likely preceded and possibly directly influenced the gradual emergence of a new wave of “Chinese humanist philosophy” that emerged in opposition to materialism and scientific realism during the 1920s. Moreover, in 1923, Zhang Dongsun and Zhang Junmai were both united in a joint endeavour to provide a solid case against “scientisation” of Chinese thought and for a syncretic alternative, which would be able to bridge science and life into a cohesive philosophical system. While Zhang Dongsun’s endeavour was focused on the epistemological aspect, Zhang Junmai aimed to introduce the “life” side, which he found represented in the contemporary German neo-vitalism. Consequently, one of the main focal points of his intellectual campaign, which started in 1923 in China, was to introduce a “novel” vitalist conception of human psychology. This “neo-vitalist” wave, which in the 1920s was often associated with the key term “view on life” (rensheng guan 人生觀) or “philosophy of life” (rensheng zhexue 人生哲學), not only encompassed apparent conceptual parallels like “(neo-)vitalism” but also encompassed currents such as “modern humanistic Buddhism” (which, although partially inclined towards Russell’s realism), early Modern Confucianism, Feng Youlan’s synthetic metaphysics, and more.

Relating to this point, a very telling fact is that the first thing Junmai wrote about in the framework of introducing Hans Driesch to the Chinese, was Russell’s idea of human psychology (compare Zhang 1923). Evidently, this shows that both Zhangs considered Russell to be the main representative of the global “science” current. At the same time, their ultimate goal was not to completely refute philosophy represented by Russell, but to, as it were, deny its precedence over outlooks on human life. They were both firmly convinced that the autonomy of this current of thought focusing on human life is an integral condition for a comprehensive and truly objective worldview consisting of both a vitalistic and a scientist aspect. Nevertheless, they both offered different philosophical solutions as to how to attain this kind of balance. In this regard, Zhang Dongsun’s endeavours were more profoundly epistemological and more deeply involved both Neo-Kantian philosophy and “New Realist logicism” (see further Vrhovski 2024).

While Zhang’s 1922 article “Logicism of New Realism” primarily delved into the epistemological aspects of logicism and the nature of logic within Western modern realism, its impact reverberated significantly in the establishment of contemporary “view on life” philosophies, characterized by a focus on subjectivity and intuition. Specifically, the article scrutinized the intricate relationship between the human mind and the object of cognition. Within the context of logicism, this relationship is tied to the logocentric predicament and the concept of external existence rather than internal coexistence. Zhang’s early contributions held particular significance in laying the groundwork for semi-traditional modern epistemologies that began to gain prominence within the Chinese intellectual discourse from the mid-1920s onward.

The 1923 controversy is widely regarded as a significant event in Chinese intellectual history. But the specific role played by Russell’s philosophy in instigating and shaping the debate has received relatively limited scholarly attention (compare Vrhovski 2024). While Russellian-style scientific philosophy was indeed central to the core of the controversy, Russell’s name itself did not surface too often in the initial stages of the debate. It was only later, as the discourse evolved and more extensive discussions unfolded, that Russell’s name became intertwined with the arguments put forth by proponents of the “view on life.” These participants in the debate aimed to temper the creation of rigid antagonisms between “science” and other concepts such as “intuition” and “moral values.” Broadly speaking, the proponents of the “view on life” sought to challenge the perceived all-encompassing authority of scientific objectivity. Zhang Junmai, a prominent advocate of this perspective, endeavored to build a case for a form of neo-vitalism. This neo-vitalism was influenced by the philosophies of Bergson and Eucken, as well as by the embryology-based neo-vitalism presented by Hans Driesch.¹⁵ Zhang Junmai and those aligned with the pro-“view on life” stance (arguing for autonomy of human life and human intuition from scientific fact and logical method) aimed to introduce a counterbalance to the dominance of scientific objectivity, a counterbalance which would guarantee an equal part to a life based thought such as Chinese traditional philosophy. They sought to underscore the importance of elements such as intuition and moral values in understanding the complexity of human existence and consciousness. While the debate was characterized by its focus on the tension between scientific objectivity and other dimensions of human experience, the direct influence of Russell’s philosophy, although foundational, operated more as an underlying framework rather than a specific focal point in the early stages of the discourse. As such, the 1923 controversy not only represented a clash of philosophical ideas but also a broader societal and cultural reflection on the role and boundaries of scientific thought within the context of China’s evolving intellectual landscape.

By the same token, the “scientists” paradigm recognised in Russell’s system of philosophy would automatically fall into the science category, a category diametrically opposed to the so-called “philosophy of life”. From the objectivist point of view, both sides would end up using science to assert the objectiveness of their standpoints and the validity of their main propositions. While the pro-science side was resorting predominantly to physical sciences, logic, and mathematics, the pro-life side resorted almost exclusively to life sciences and pertinent topics in psychology. However, as noted above, since its introduction to China, Russell’s psychology was also closely associated with a most modern, scientific form of psychology.¹⁶ As early as 1920, Zhang Shenfu established a link between Russell’s psychology on the one side and modern behaviourist psychology and even psychoanalysis on the other. Strikingly, the later contributions to the debate also happen to corroborate the persistent existence of this paradigm. The subsequent papers by psychologists Tang Qian 唐錢 (1891–1987) and Lu Zhiwei 陸志韋 (1894–1970) had opened up an important discussion on the scientific character of modern scientific psychology and its relationship with what throughout the entire controversy was referred to as “metaphysics.”¹⁷ What the overall constellation of ideas and concepts within the debate reveals is, above all, the nature of understanding of Russellian scientific philosophy within the context of Chinese philosophical discourse of the early 1920s. Moreover, it is often that the antagonisms that formed within the general intellectual discourse, such as the “Science and the View on Life” debate, that can provide vital clues about the motivations behind major changes in teaching philosophy at Chinese universities. Thus, the outbreak of the controversy in 1923, which soon developed into a nation-wide discourse, can not only account for the seemingly universal inclusion of the “philosophy of life” into university curricula as well as the immense rise in monographs on the “view on life” (rensheng guan 人生觀, coined after German Lebensanschauung), but also for the above-mentioned temporal dissolution of Russellian influence at Peking University in 1924. In contemporary research of the history of Russell’s philosophy in China, such reasoning is necessary mostly due to a general lack of other evidence and documents, which would be able to attest for its development in Chinese philosophical circles in the period between 1922/23 and 1929.

It follows from what was said above that the presence of Russell’s scientific philosophy in Chinese philosophical circles was not only crucial for the development of an affirmative “Russellian” current. Moreover, as an antagonistic set of ideas, it partook amongst intellectual causes indirectly influencing the formation of alternative currents that eventually branched out into a wide variety of schools, including modern Confucianism, modern “humanistic Buddhism,” and the ideology of “vitalism” advanced by the Guomindang government in the 1930s. In this sense, the influence of Russell’s ideas was both direct—exerting content-related influence on Chinese philosophy—and indirect—exerting a paradigmatic influence on the entire philosophical discourse.

In the penultimate section of this historical overview, we shall take a closer look at the more and less well-known aspects of the positive development or presence of Russell’s “New Realism” (also referred to as neorealism) in the period between the mid-1920s and the early 1930s. In doing so, we shall focus on the relatively lesser-known presence of what was termed as “New Realism” at universities in Beijing around the years 1924 and 1928. Less emphasis shall be given to the more widely known establishment of Russell’s mathematical logic and philosophy in the form of the “Tsinghua School” in the 1930s.¹⁸

5 The Rise of New Realism in Beijing

If the first instance of establishment of Russell’s philosophy in Chinese academic circles took form in a “scientization” of philosophy at Peking University, its positive advancement within broader Chinese philosophical community took form in an adherence to the school of philosophy referred generally to as “New Realism”. Unfortunately, the early presence of New Realism in Chinese philosophical circles is less well attested for—if compared against the situation following the late 1920s. These later developments were, however, very much in continuity and even catalyzed by the intellectual circumstances in the early 1920s, which thus ought to arguably be referred to as the seminal period of New Realism in China. For our discussion, the presence and development of the notion of New Realism in the 1920s is even more important. It is namely that, besides mathematical logic, New Realism is probably the most important term associated with Russell’s philosophy in the remaining three decades of the Republican Era.

While the exact state of “New Realism” amongst its Chinese proponents both at and beyond Peking University remains a conundrum, its important presence in Chinese philosophy at the time was significantly reflected upon by its self-professed philosophical adversaries and other occasional critics. As a concept, in the period between 1921 and 1924 it was most clearly attested in the work of its more influential critics, in particular philosophers with strong propensities towards (Neo-)Kantian philosophy, Deweyan pragmatism, Bergson’s vitalism, and so on. Moreover, its presence in Chinese intellectual discourse was initially prolonged by translations or general introductions to Russell’s philosophical works on the one hand, and, strikingly, by criticisms and histories of philosophy advanced by Chinese proponents of pragmatism on the other. In 1923, Zhang’s text on New Realist logicism was thus included in the book An Anthology of Modern Philosophy (Xiandai zhexue yiluan yice 現代哲學一臠一冊), compiled by the Eastern Miscellany Society as a collection advocating Dewey’s philosophy. Similarly, New Realism remained present in Hu Shi’s philosophical treatises and certain instances of upgraded histories of Western philosophy and logic (e.g., Hu 1924, 48–51).

Another important milestone, which reflected the same process of gradual ascension of New Realism in China, was the 1925 debate about Russell’s Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy and the notion of infinitesimal in modern philosophy of mathematics. In this debate which developed predominantly in Chenbao fukan 晨報副刊 and Xiandai pinglun 現代評論, scholars like Zhang Shenfu and Wang Dianji featured as the advocates of Russell’s ideas and the ideas advanced in contemporary Western mathematical logic. While this debate did not produce any original results, its significance consisted in its affirmation of the paradigmatic boundaries between the New Realism and pragmatism in Chinese public discourse—in the “Science and the View on Life” debate both featured as contenders for primacy over “objective science.” More importantly, the 1925 debate was one of the first intellectual public events, which featured mathematical logic and Russell’s philosophy of mathematics as its central subject of discussion. This second rise of Russell’s philosophy in Chinese public discourse coincided with the rise of yet another name, which gained a key role in forthcoming Chinese philosophical discourse, namely, “New Realism”. This rise came from within Peking University and was an indirect result of Russell’s presence there a few years earlier.

One of the immediate outcomes of the rise in interest in Russell’s philosophy at Peking University between 1924 and 1925, was the inclusion of New Realism into new textbooks on the history of philosophy. A representative example of is Fan Shoukang’s 範壽康 (1896–1983) Primer of Philosophy from 1924. Fan was a graduate of philosophy from Tokyo Imperial University, who in the year of publication of his Primer served as an editor at the renowned Commercial Press (Shangwu yinshuguan 商務印書館). Although Fan was rather openly unimpressed by Russell’s philosophy, he devoted a long chapter to the introduction of it as representative of the “school” of New Realism (i.e., Xin shizailun 新實在論). In the conclusion of the chapter, Fan called Russell’s philosophy excessively abstract in theory and in its practical regard possessing a “proclivity towards ideas, which is why it has not got any greater influence” (Fan 1924, 100). Interestingly, Fan was also aware that Russell’s philosophy differed to some degree from American New Realism, yet he rather mistakenly attributed the cause of these distinctions exclusively to his observation that the latter “developed from pragmatism”. At the same time, however, he saw the common ground between the two in their countering subjectivism and pragmatism (Fan 1924). In the final chapter, which Fan devoted to the “future development of philosophy”, he reiterated his view of the insignificance of New Realism for future philosophy, whilst stressing the key role of the so-called “realist current” (xianshi sichao 現實思潮) and the New Idealist current (xin lixiang sichao 心理想思潮; Fan 1924). Albeit not profoundly reflective of the potential New Realist current in the contemporary China, textbooks like the one composed by Fan are particularly revealing of the significant presence of New Realism within the contemporary philosophical discourse (see also Huang 1923).

Aside from the senior figures like Zhang Shenfu and Wang Dianji, due to the presence of “New Realism” at Peking University, Russell’s philosophical ideas had also gained traction amongst the students. Among these notable figures, two students from Peking University would soon start publicly propagating Russell’s and American “New Realism.” Their names were Yu Wenwei 余文偉 and Peng Jixiang 彭基相. Despite his near-total obscurity in Chinese scholarship, Yu and Peng’s contributions to the dissemination and establishment of New Realism in China held significant importance. During the time, their passionate advocacy was likely rivaled only by Zhang Shenfu. In fact, Yu and Peng had known each other since 1916,¹⁹ and wrote together from as early as 1924. In 1927, they published an anthology of their essays and translations entitled Collected Philosophical Essays (Zhexue lunwen ji 哲學論文集). A closer contextual reading of the introduction to this anthology casts additional light on the background of their, so to say, “conversion” to New Realism. They attributed their views to their education at the department of philosophy at Peking University, yet at the same time confessed that prior to 1924, under the influence of Hu Shi and others, they were still immersed in pragmatist philosophy and experimentalist logic. Their realization of the non-scientific nature of pragmatism and its psychology came in late 1924, when due to the spread of Russell’s philosophy in Beijing they became more familiar with “New Realism” and behaviourism (Yu and Peng [1926] 1927, 1–3).

Yu embarked on an extensive series of articles on Western philosophy while he was still an undergraduate student majoring in English language and philosophy (Guoli Beijing daxue 1924, 1). The overall content of his numerous articles spanning from 1925 to 1930 follows a pattern akin to that identified in Zhang Shenfu’s early work. His topics ranged from mathematical logic to analytical and behaviorist psychology, as well as modern physical sciences, and naturally, New Realism. Although Yu would later establish himself as a scholar of behaviorist psychology, his student years were characterized by a pronounced inclination towards New Realist epistemology and a critique of its philosophical adversaries. Nonetheless, his own publications, which appeared in mostly the same periodicals as the debate, were not on an entirely unrelated topic. In 1924, Yu published his first series of articles on “Modern Chinese Thought” (Xiandai Zhongguo sixiang 現代中國思想), in which he aimed at advancing a New Realist view on what he considered to be the prevalent currents in contemporary Chinese philosophy (Yu 1924a, 1924b, 1924c). His three essays, which were issued in December in the Literary Supplement to the Morning Post, were prompted by Hu Shi’s article with the same name, which appeared earlier in December, and later also Zhang Xinhai’s 張歆海 (Chang Hsin-hai, 1900–1972) “Farther Observation on Contemporary Chinese Thought” published in the Daobao 導報 journal.²⁰

Conversely to Yu, Peng, who in contemporary scholarship is known mostly for his later work on the history of French philosophy and his translation of Descartes’ Discourse de La Méthode (1935), invested a significant amount of effort into translating Russell’s work in the 1920s. Similar to Yu, in the mid-1920s Peng was still one of the students at the department of philosophy who seems to have been rather close to Zhang Shenfu. From 1925 on, Peng created a series of translations of Russell’s works related to the concept of mind and psychology, including Analysis of Mind (Peng 1926a), “Free Thought and Official Propaganda” (Peng 1925b), and An Outline of Philosophy (Peng 1929), among others. In addition to translating Russell, in the mid-1920s Peng also translated Western works on logic²¹ and later also authored a book entitled About Truth (Tan zhen 談真) and published extensively on the history of French philosophy (resulting in Peng 1928), including the thought of Comte.

6 Tsinghua School of New Realism and the Forgotten Role of the Private Yenching University

The preceding section has amply broadened the scope of our insight into the life of New Realism in the mid-1920s. But we are still unaware how, in just a few years, it came to be established at Tsinghua University. How did it rise to prominence so suddenly? And, most importantly, who were its supporters at significant positions, who enabled it to become the hallmark of philosophy at Tsinghua? Although answering these questions appears to be vital for a complete historical narrative, the material at hand does not yet allow us to do so. Nevertheless, some crucial information may allow us to connect the dots between at least a few key figures, who contributed to the formation of the so-called Tsinghua school of New Realism.

When in 1936 the second edition of Guo Zhanbo’s 郭湛波 Chinese intellectual history was published, in the new preface Guo tells the readers that the history was written in cooperation with Feng Youlan and Zhang Shenfu, who both contributed to the entries on their thought as well as revised the mistakes in the former draft (Guo 1936, “Preface” 2–3). In Guo’s chapter on Feng, we learn that in the mid-1930s Feng happened to divide his own thought into three main stages: (1) pragmatism, (2) New Realism and (3) materialism. While in the early 1930s Feng was in his “materialist” phase, which also explains his proximity to Zhang Shenfu and Guo Zhanbo as well—both were proponents of dialectical materialism—he dated his New Realist phase back into the mid-1920s, after he returned from his doctoral studies at Columbia University (the Bergson-pragmatism phase) and when he wrote the book Philosophy of Human Life (Rensheng zhexue 人生哲學; 1926a). The mid-1920s were the time that Feng spent at the (private) Yenching University in Beijing.

Before we proceed with taking a closer look at the Yenching University, we shall first take a brief look at Sun Daosheng’s 孫道昇 (1908–1955) text, which was attached as a supplement to Guo’s 1936 history. In the text “The Anatomy of Modern Chinese Philosophical World” (Xiandai Zhongguo zhexuejie zhi jiepou 現代中國哲學界之解剖),²² Sun divided the then current Chinese philosophy into purely Western and synthetic Chinese-Western schools. Although, as one can expect, New Realism was listed under the pure Western schools, Sun nevertheless remarked that:

The New Realist school in Chinese philosophical circles is, of course, also a branch of British-American New Realism. This philosophical current has been transmitted to China by the shared efforts of Chen Daqi, Feng Youlan, Zhang Shenfu, Deng Yizhe, Fu Peiqing, Huang Zitong and Jin Yuelin, while those who subsequently became the torchbearers of this school include Shen Youding, Wang Xianjun, Ren Hua and others. Currently, the Tsinghua department of philosophy represents the sphere of influence of this school of philosophy. (Guo 1936, 401)

While Chen Daqi’s bent for New Realism might have well been an issue of more recent years, related to his time at Peking University after 1928 (see Vrhovski 2021a), scholars like the aesthetician Deng Yizhe and Fu Peiqing are connected either to Tsinghua or the early years of Russellian philosophy at Peking University. The person who has been quite significantly forgotten by the contemporary historians of New Realism and “early analytic philosophy” in China is Huang Zitong 黃子通 (courtesy name Lizhong 理中, Lechung Tsetung Hwang, 1887–1979). Huang is another key figure who leads us back to the intriguing years of “scientific” philosophy and modern logic at Yenching.

The department of philosophy at Yenching University was formally a part of the institute of social sciences. As the documents from the year 1926 reveal, under Xu Shilian 許仕廉 the entire institute embarked upon an ambitious path towards full-scale scientization (referred to as the “scientific research of society”), in which research of intellectual history was allotted a central place (Xu 1926, 6–9). It was probably in the spirit of this very same endeavour that Feng was invited to teach Chinese philosophy in late 1925 (Yanjing daxue 1925, 16). The next year, the same institute also hired Huang Zitong to serve as a professor at the department of “Chinese Studies” (Guoxue 國學; Yanjing daxue 1926, 34). Huang was a member of the older generation, who had studied economics at the London School of Economics and had earned a doctoral degree in philosophy at the University of Toronto in Canada. A superficial overview of Huang’s publications from the 1920s reveals that, after he returned to China, his research revolved mostly around the history of Chinese logic and philosophy on the one hand, and on the other the method of induction, the Western concept of substance, Kant’s philosophy, philosophy of science and British empiricism (see Huang 1927a, 1927b, 1928).

Another important fact about Huang’s early work and activities is that in 1927 he was one of the three founders of the Philosophical Review (Zhexue pinglun 哲學評論), China’s first periodical specialized in philosophy (He 1947, 27). But how was Huang connected to the growing presence of New Realism in Beijing? A part of the answer to this question can be found in the “Announcement of Courses for the Undergraduate College” for the school year 1928–1929, the year in which Feng was supposed to have left the university. Upon taking a first glimpse at the past and current curriculum things become a bit clearer. In the year 1928–1929, the department of philosophy offered the following courses connected to our topics/schools of interest (Yanjing daxue 1928, 64–69): Aside from two specialised and one general course on modern logic taught by Huang, Feng Youlan taught a course on epistemology and metaphysics, and philosophy of human life, both of which included Russell’s “New Realism” or his “philosophy of life” (rensheng zhexue).

When comparing the aforementioned selection of courses with the curriculum at Tsinghua University’s philosophy department in 1928, which encompassed only Jin Yuelin 金岳霖 and partially Feng (who was concurrently engaged at Yenching University), and had only a limited number of undergraduate students, Yenching University had a clear advantage. The curriculum composed in 1930 reveals even more significant enhancements to the offerings of Yenching University’s philosophical department (compare Vrhovski 2021c). Notably, Huang Zitong, who had assumed the position of department head, Feng, Jin, Zhang Shenfu, and Deng Yizhe were all engaged as lecturers there (Yanjing daxue 1930, 73). Furthermore, the graduate and senior undergraduate years at the department were divided into various modules, with two major ones being general philosophy and logic and metaphysics (luoji ji xingshangxue 邏輯及形上學). The latter, named after the course taught by Feng Youlan, encompassed the following subjects: introduction to logic, logic, symbolic logic, epistemology and metaphysics, logical problems in modern philosophy, and the logic of meaning. Additionally, modules such as the history of philosophy and modern philosophy were present, both heavily influenced by modern logic and New Realism. Notably, the most distinct module was titled “mathematical philosophy,” which was instructed by Zhang Shenfu (Yanjing daxue 1930, 77–80). In contrast, courses related to logic and epistemology were taught by Huang Zitong. A notable observation from the 1930 curriculum is the absence of courses like mathematical logic and the law of probability (Yanjing daxue 1930, 84). However, it remains uncertain whether their absence in this curriculum suggests their potential inclusion in the previous year (1929).

Because, according to Feng Youlan (see Lin 2012) the situation at Yenching became unfavorable to “their” cause, philosophers like Zhang Shenfu, Jin Yuelin, and himself would soon have to find another venue for their novel philosophical studies and their advanced curriculum. Such opportunity arose in 1928, when a new philosophical department was established at Tsinghua University. Having already taught “New Realist” philosophy of life and modern philosophy at Yenching, Feng was one of the first professors hired by Jin Yuelin, the first head of the newly founded department. They were soon joined by the unformal “leader” of the popular current of Russellian philosophy in Chinese intellectual circles and the first translator of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (1927–28) into Chinese, Zhang Shenfu. Thus, the codification of Russell’s philosophy into Chinese academia took entered the second and most important phase.

7 Russell’s Epistemology and Mathematical Logic in the Context of the Tsinghua School

In terms of theoretical engagement, Russell’s scientific philosophy reached its peak at Tsinghua University, almost immediately following its reorganization into a “national university” in 1928. Following the above-described developments, the philosophers gathered at the newly established department of philosophy shared a common interest in modern “scientific philosophy”, which was perceived as synonymous to “New Realism”. Aside from realist ontology and empiricist epistemology, the newly established “Tsinghua School” lay special emphasis on the study of modern logic. In the so-called “golden era” of modern philosophy at Tsinghua, which spanned between 1928 and 1936, mathematical logic and Russell’s philosophy were taught and even researched as the very essence of modern philosophical thought.²³

Concurrently, however, in the circle of Tsinghua philosophers and logicians, two main currents started to form around the year 1934. Interestingly, the differences between two camps of philosophers arose on the basis of their attitude towards Russell’s system of mathematical logic and his epistemological positions. The first group, which was represented by the brothers Zhang Shenfu and Zhang Dainian, spoke absolutely in favor of Russell’s philosophy on the one hand, disseminating recent developments in logic and philosophy in Europe, including the Vienna Circle and the Lvov-Warsaw school. Aside from teaching classes on Russell’s epistemology and mathematical logic, Zhang Shenfu was regularly showcasing his ideas in the weekly World Currents of Thought supplement to the Dagong bao (L’Impartial) newspaper, which he was also editing.

The alternative faction, however, was shaped by recent critiques of Russell’s system of mathematical logic, particularly by American scholars like the Harvard logicians (C. I. Lewis, Henry Sheffer, W. V. Quine). These criticisms prompted a more cautious approach among this group towards teaching and incorporating Russell’s philosophy into their work. At the forefront of this perspective stood Jin Yuelin, whose research direction began to pivot in the early 1930s. While his focus shifted from deductive logic and Russell’s epistemology towards inductive logic, exploring alternative systems of logic, and formulating a novel framework for modern Chinese philosophy, Jin’s grounding in epistemology still found its roots in Russell’s philosophy. Extensive research by Chen Bo sheds light on the significant influence of Russell, especially his logical atomism, on Jin’s epistemological thinking as outlined in his quintessential work The Theory of Knowledge (Zhishilun 知識論). Russell and Jin traversed analogous philosophical terrains and subscribed to comparable stances, encompassing ontological realism, epistemological empiricism, and the correspondence theory of truth. Nevertheless, Jin’s conception of truth extended beyond mere emulation of Russell’s ideas, boasting its distinct innovations and attributes. Jin accentuated several overarching features of truth. These encompassed the perception of truth as a relational quality, its intrinsic absence of gradation, and its autonomy from temporal, spatial, and categorical variations of knowledge. He underscored the objectivity, reliability, and transcendence of truthful propositions. Jin championed the role of common sense in both philosophy and science, contending that while it cannot be entirely discarded, any modification should be anchored in another facet of common sense. It is notable that both Russell and Jin shared similar philosophical tenets—realism in ontology, empiricism in epistemology, and adherence to the correspondence theory of truth. Their common interests led them to explore analogous subjects. Jin’s characterization of truth as a relational value devoid of gradation and relativism, and his emphasis on the objective, reliable, and transcendent nature of true propositions illuminated his unique perspective. Jin additionally responded to the gap between subjective and objective truth by introducing a cognitive perspective on facts. He defined facts as “the given” (suoyu 所與, translated by Jin from the English/Latin plural term “data”) received and organized by cognitive agents, encompassing both subjective and objective dimensions, the internal and the external reality.²⁴ Briefly, in Jin’s views facts are concurrently subjective and objective. Comparatively speaking, a wider gap existed between Russell’s and Jin’s idea of the nature of inductive logic on the one hand and the general value of Russell’s and Whitehead’s system of mathematical logic on the other.

In broad terms, Jin’s divergence from an exclusive adherence to Russellian philosophy wielded a profound impact on the prevailing trends in teaching and research within the department, particularly in the realms of logic and epistemology. Expanding upon the preceding discourse, it can be postulated that the paradigmatic conception of Russellian “scientific philosophy” endured through the intellectual circle centered around Zhang Shenfu. Consequently, this group exhibited a lesser ability to transcend mere emulation yet retained a vital role in introducing fresh Western knowledge. In contrast, Jin’s scholarly pursuits paved new avenues for Chinese exploration and interpretation of Russell’s philosophy, fostering a more discerning application of Russell’s ideas within their own philosophical endeavors. In this context, the confluence of Russell’s “New Realism” and mathematical logic eventually interwove with China’s native modern academic philosophy in the making. For example, Russell’s ideas became a significant but not exclusive component of Jin’s and Feng’s philosophical systems, signifying a pioneering achievement within contemporary Chinese philosophical discourse. Despite Zhang Shenfu’s philosophical contributions not yielding an abundance of prominent theoretical research, his steadfast propagation of Russell’s philosophy during the 1930s, coupled with his theory of “larger objectivity” (da keguan 大客觀)—which implied the potential harmonious integration of Russell’s mathematical logic and materialist dialectics—substantially contributed to Russell’s popularity and the dissemination of mathematical logic within the circles of Chinese Communism in the Republican Era. In this light, Zhang deserves recognition for his substantial efforts in promoting what we can term the Russellian paradigm of “scientific philosophy.” This interconnectedness between, for instance, the concept of mathematical logic and dialectical materialism during the 1930s and 1940s also played a pivotal role in ensuring the enduring vitality of mathematical logic within the ideological framework of socialist rule. As a result, this proximity between concepts such as mathematical logic and dialectical materialism during that era not only facilitated a more promising trajectory for mathematical logic but also helped secure its place within the ideological landscape of socialism.

8 Conclusion

The transmission and establishment of Russell’s scientific philosophy to China was shaped through two different aspects: intellectual context and philosophical interpretation. As a historical overview, our survey was concerned mostly with the general contextual features of the establishment of Russell’s thought within the institutionalized Chinese academic philosophy and its positioning within general Chinese philosophical discourse. Some of the main outcomes of the introduction of Russell’s philosophy were its numerous distinctive discursive conceptualizations, including a stern attention to what we have referred to as the “paradigmatic” cluster of ideas related to Russell’s philosophy. What we mean by Russell’s scientific philosophy as a “paradigm” within the Chinese intellectual world was definitely not completely isolated from the developments in the West, where the opposition between physical science and biological outlooks would often be at the forefront of contentions over the denomination of “objective science” (e.g., Huxley 1936, vii). The main difference consisted rather in the nature of the very intellectual context in which seemingly identical discussions were conducted. It was thus China’s own intellectual context that determined both the meanings of discursive boundaries and the actual implications of ideas. Consequently, one of the quintessential tasks in reevaluating the role of Russellian philosophy in Chinese modernity consists in the—less historical and more philosophical—research of the intertwining of Chinese tradition and early analytic philosophy in the work of philosophers like Feng Youlan, Jin Yuelin, Shen Youding, and numerous others. Importantly, the task before us is not to judge upon the correctness of their understanding of allegedly hermeneutically universal ideas in Russell, but rather to decipher the potentially universal hermeneutics of Russell’s ideas in the Chinese context. By the same token, this philosophical rediscovery ought to be accompanied by meticulous historical and philological research.

When it came to major intellectual change, in particular after the 1923 debate, there was a growing need to classify Russell’s philosophy as reflective of a distinctive worldview, that is, the scientific outlook on life and cosmos. Moreover, one of the key ingredients of the Chinese history of Russell’s philosophy resided in its strong association with the so-called “New Realism” on one side and mathematical logic on the other. As we have seen in the above overview, the term “New Realism” served as an earliest means of discursive “mobilization,” an umbrella term for a cluster of ideas juxtaposed against other groups dominating the Chinese intellectual world, such as the American pragmatists and the Bergsonian “neo-vitalists”. However, in contrast to the original role the term played in the US, Chinese “New Realism” actually became associated with an institutionalized school of academic philosophy, which was manifested both in curricular clusters as well as in conceptual shifts in the manner in which modern philosophy was advanced in China. Important milestones of Russellian “scientific philosophy” transitioning from the intellectual discourse into Chinese academia were marked by the Yenching and Tsinghua periods. At the same time, it must be emphasized that, albeit less successful, the Peking University period was quintessential for the eventual introduction of Russell’s thought into Chinese intellectual discourse. Undoubtedly, it was due to the double life of Russell’s ideas within Chinese universities and the public intellectual discourse, which guaranteed the arising Chinese “New Realism” and mathematical logic their ultimate codification within Chinese academic philosophy.

Acknowledgements

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to the editors of this special issue, the reviewers, proofreaders and the copy-editors, whose knowledge, work, and insights have significantly improved this paper. This research was supported by the SIGMA (Situating International and Global Mathematics) research grant, funded under Horizon Europe Guarantee scheme by UKRI, project no. EP/X033961/1.