1 Introduction: The Varieties of Goodness (1963)

Georg Henrik von Wright’s The Varieties of Goodness (1963b, abbr. VoG or The Varieties) is a contribution to a non-formal theory of value.¹ Though the book may naturally be viewed as a sister volume to Norm and Action (1963a),² in which a logical treatment of norms is developed, the philosophical approach adopted in The Varieties makes no appeal to formal or axiomatic methods. Even though technical terms are introduced here and there, the first half of the book focuses on the concept of goodness, investigated via examining different uses of the word “good” in language. Von Wright distinguishes instrumental goodness of tools and artefacts (chap. II, secs. 1–8), technical goodness exhibited in skills, arts and professional excellence (chap. II, secs. 9–12), utilitarian goodness (the useful) and its sub-form the beneficial (chap. III, secs. 1–5), medical goodness (chap. III, secs. 7–12) of organs and mental faculties, the hedonic good of various pleasures (chap. IV), and the good of a being (chap. III, sec. 6) along with its important sub-category, the good of man (chap. V). Most of the uses discussed in the book concern the use of “good” as an adjective in compounds of the type “good X” or “x is a good K”, while good of a being is an example of “good” as a noun.³

Von Wright’s book has been somewhat neglected and its position in the context of the twentieth-century analytical ethics and value theory remains practically uncharted.⁴ The purpose of this article is to mend the situation by providing an overview of von Wright’s philosophical method and by highlighting hitherto neglected connections between von Wright and some of his contemporaries. Section 2 revisits von Wright’s general view of conceptual analysis as investigation of conceptual fields. I point out that, while von Wright’s general conception of analysis comes close to P. F. Strawson’s idea of connective analysis (Strawson 1992), his more particular suggestion of “moulding analysis” is paralleled—and probably influenced—by Rudolf Carnap’s idea of explication (Carnap 1947, 1950). Section 3 focuses on the details of the methodology of Chapters I–V of VoG by enumerating what I call the analytical topoi of goodness, i.e., the philosophical techniques that are systematically used in charting the logical features of the different uses of “good”. Indeed, a striking feature of von Wright’s analysis of goodness is that it is non-reductive and adheres to a pluralist methodology. Instead of building on or endorsing any general theory of meaning, he favours an approach which charts the meaning of “good” via several aspects of meaning.

My final proposal for the historical contextualisation of von Wright’s work is provided in Section 4. I suggest that von Wright’s non-reductive connective analysis of goodness may be viewed as a post-Wittgensteinian contribution in the philosophy of goodness. Besides making use of several analytical tools and topoi familiar from Wittgenstein’s later philosophy (some identified in Section 3), von Wright is indebted to Wittgenstein’s insistence on the descriptive and non-reductive philosophical methodology.

2 A Connective Analysis of Goodness

2.1 Questioning the autonomy of morals

Even though the focus of this article is on the methodology of G. H. von Wright’s analysis of goodness, it is no surprise that methodological issues tend to intertwine with substantial philosophical proposals. Accordingly, I shall begin from a substantial proposal, which is central for von Wright’s overall position in ethics. This is the rejection of what von Wright calls the “the idea of the conceptual autonomy of morals”. Von Wright associates this idea primarily with the view that, in addition to having various non-moral uses, words such as “good”, “evil” or “duty” have “a peculiar moral sense … which is the proper object of ethical study” (von Wright 1963b, 1). This idea, however, is not meant to capture any “well-defined position” in ethics. Instead, it refers to a “certain climate of thought” (1963b, 1). In other words, the idea is presented as a heuristic device, which captures certain philosophical presuppositions which, allegedly, may get different expressions on various levels concerning, e.g., ontological, epistemological, and methodological aspects of ethics.⁵ Von Wright’s own philosophical approach is articulated in polemical contrast with this view:

I … object strongly against the view, which I called that of the conceptual autonomy of morals. As I shall try to argue presently, moral goodness is not a form of the good on a level with certain other basic forms of it, which we are going to distinguish. The so-called moral sense of ‘good’ is a derivative or secondary sense, which must be explained in the terms of non-moral uses of the word. (von Wright 1963b, 1)

Despite the promise given in this passage, von Wright does not provide any single knock-down argument against the idea of the conceptual autonomy of morals. The contestation of the view emerges rather as a result of various interlocking observations. We may break von Wright’s objection into two different aspects. The first concerns philosophical content, the second philosophical method. Regarding content, von Wright simply denies a particular philosophical view and replaces it with a suggestion of his own, in which moral goodness is viewed as a conceptually heteronomous, non-basic form of goodness, which is to be explicated in terms of non-moral varieties of goodness. I shall not focus on this aspect of the criticism here.⁶

On the methodological level, the idea of the conceptual autonomy of morals implies that moral philosophy can be pursued in relative isolation from the examination of other (non-moral) values and normative concepts. The methodological side of von Wright’s criticism surfaces a few pages later, as he argues that a “philosopher seldom deals with a single concept” but rather

moves in a field of concepts. This makes him on the whole more interested in logical distinctions and connexions between parts of the field than in the ‘definitions’ of local spots in it. (von Wright 1963b, 6)⁷

This view of conceptual analysis may, indeed, be taken to question not only the particular claim concerning the autonomy of (moral) goodness, but all attempts at making concepts (absolutely) autonomous in relation to other concepts.⁸ In The Varieties of Goodness, a denial of a particular philosophical position thus goes hand-in hand with a certain view on the nature of conceptual analysis. In the above passage, some choices of words are particularly revealing. First, von Wright implies that the method of definition forms only one method in philosophical analysis. While von Wright does not mention any philosopher by name, this claim is surely targeted to methods of some earlier twentieth century thinkers such as G. E. Moore, whose main device of philosophical analysis was, indeed, that of (reductive) definition.⁹ Second, von Wright stresses the importance of conceptual distinctions and connections, implying that there may well be both similarities and differences between different concepts or conceptual groups, and suggesting that concepts are best illuminated in relation to other concepts.¹⁰ Thus, von Wright’s methodological convictions and the abandonment of the idea of autonomy of morals set the scene for the investigation of the conceptual varieties of goodness. And, as shall be shown in Section 3 below, von Wright’s analytical work in Chapters I–V of VoG consists of a series of careful identifications and discussions of such distinctions and connections within the conceptual field of the varieties of goodness.

2.2 Descriptive and explicative levels of analysis

In agreement with many philosophers working in the mid-twentieth century, von Wright associates conceptual investigation closely with the investigation of language and language-use. As he introduces the preliminary classification of the varieties of goodness in Chapter I, sec. 5 of VoG, he announces that by “varieties of goodness” he understands “the multiplicity of uses of the word ‘good’” (von Wright 1963b, 8). Even though this is not stated explicitly, in referring to multiplicity of uses, von Wright has mainly in mind the regular and rule-governed uses of the word “good” in language. Furthermore, von Wright’s contention seems to be that these rule-governed uses in language constitute the conceptual varieties of goodness. Even though it is the philosopher’s task to systematically distinguish, articulate and classify them—sometimes using technical terminology and taxonomies not in use in ordinary language—the varieties themselves are already known to competent language-users from everyday life:

Conceptual observations may lead a logician or philosopher to distinguish between the uses of ‘good’, which had before been classified together, and regard them as separate forms or sub-forms of goodness. But the forms or sub-forms, thus distinguished, would not be new inventions but familiar phenomena, among which a new difference was noted. (von Wright 1963b, 17)

This passage may be taken as definite statement that the basic varieties of goodness, as articulated in the book, are not philosophers’ “inventions” but are already there, forming an integral part of our conceptual scheme. Thus, von Wright’s view of the philosopher’s task may be characterized as that of making explicit what we are implicitly familiar with from our everyday life as linguistically competent agents. This characterization, however, prima facie appears to stand in contradiction with another passage in Chapter I of VoG. In Section 3, as von Wright discusses moral philosophy as reflection concerning the uses of words, he points out that

[t]he aim of the type of investigation, of which I am speaking, is not to ‘uncover’ the existing meaning (or aspect of meaning) of some word or expression, veiled as it were behind the bewildering complexities of common usage. The idea of the philosopher as a searcher of meanings should not be coupled with an idea or postulate that the searched entities actually are there—awaiting the vision of the philosopher. (von Wright 1963b, 5)

While the two passages seem to contradict each other, the contradiction is, I believe, only apparent. It may be explained by separating two levels of philosophical activity: the descriptive analysis of existing linguistic practices, and moulding analysis, which aims at revising or establishing such practices. The first passage concerns the descriptive activity, whereas the latter concerns the concept-moulding activity.¹¹ If we read the latter passage in its context, it is associated with cases where there are, in the existing usage, no definite standards for the use of a given expression. In such cases, to use von Wright’s terminology, the concept corresponding to the expression is “in search of a meaning” (von Wright 1963b, 5). In relation to such concepts, the philosopher may, accordingly, adopt the role of a “moulder” of concepts by suggesting more definite criteria of use.

Even though the distinction between the two levels of philosophical activity is not spelled out in detail in The Varieties of Goodness, it is of pivotal importance in any serious attempt at interpreting von Wright’s approach to ethics.¹² Luckily, the author returned to the distinction in his Intellectual Autobiography (von Wright 1989). Returning to his notion of conceptual moulding in ethics, von Wright observed that factual or correct linguistic usage may not always serve as a “touchstone of success” of philosophical analysis since “[i]n the area, where the philosopher moves, these touchstones are simply lacking.” In von Wright’s view, “what the philosopher does in relation to language could, with due caution, be described as filling out gaps, or lacunas, in existing usage” (von Wright 1989, 49). But gaps may be filled only where there are gaps to fill. And these gaps, in turn, are delineated by the regular uses of language. “[W]hat the language community, by and large, accepts or regards as correct usage,” von Wright suggests, “the philosopher has no right to change.” On the contrary, the regular usage

defines, so to say, the borders of the gap which [the philosopher] tries to fill. Thereby it determines his very problem. The violation of usage would mean a distortion of the conceptual situation and be a sign that the philosopher, not language, has gone wrong. (von Wright 1989, 49)

If we reformulate this view using the terminology of The Varieties, the outcome is that moulding analysis is directed exclusively to the concepts in search of a meaning, but not to concepts that have a fairly determined regular use in language. This is perfectly compatible with the view, endorsed by von Wright, that the basic varieties of goodness are “familiar phenomena” known to us from everyday life (compare above)—given that they, by and large, are not concepts in search of a meaning. Thus, von Wright’s two prima facie contradictory views on the nature of conceptual analysis turn out to be compatible. All we need to do is to distinguish, more clearly than von Wright does in the VoG, the two distinct levels of philosophical activity: descriptive analysis of the basic varieties of goodness, and the moulding analysis of concepts in search of a meaning.¹³

2.3 The Varieties of Goodness in context

For the purposes of contextualizing von Wright’s work historically, I pinpoint two contemporary philosophers—P. F. Strawson and R. Carnap—whose views of analysis serve as illuminating points of reference to Wright’s methodological proposals. These parallels help us to see how von Wright’s analysis of goodness combines elements from two different branches of twentieth century analytical philosophy.

2.3.1 Von Wright and Strawson’s connective analysis

In his book Analysis and Metaphysics, Peter Strawson (1919–2006) introduced the concept connective analysis in contrast to reductive analysis. The latter approach strives—in analogy with chemical analysis—for reductive definitions by analyzing complex concepts into more simple and basic units. Often, the reductive approach presupposes that concepts have a clear internal structure and that there is some ultimate basic level at which the analysis terminates. Dissatisfied with the reductive model and its presuppositions, Strawson suggests that we “abandon the notion of perfect simplicity in concepts” and

even the notion that analysis must always be in the direction of greater simplicity. Let us imagine, instead, the model of an elaborate network, a system, of connected items, concepts, such that the function of each item, each concept, could, from the philosophical point of view, be properly understood only by grasping its connections with the others, its place in the system—perhaps better still, the picture of a set of interlocking systems of such a kind. (Strawson 1992, 19)

This is, in a nutshell, Strawson’s proposal of connective analysis—a model, which he deems “more realistic and more fertile” (Strawson 1992, 19) than the reductive one. The way Strawson introduces the model of connective analysis has many parallels with von Wright’s account of the analytical procedure in VoG: Both approaches are (i) articulated in contrast to reductive (Strawson) or definitional approaches (von Wright) and (ii) are either implicitly (von Wright) or explicitly (Strawson) targeted against early-twentieth-century conceptions of philosophical analysis. Furthermore, (iii) both stress the importance of conceptual connections within “an elaborate network of concepts” (Strawson) or “a field of concepts” (von Wright). In addition, (iv) Strawson’s final reference to a “set of interlocking systems” resonates well with the picture von Wright draws of the complex web of the different but related uses of “good” in language. And finally, (v) von Wright himself acknowledged, in a late interview, the parallels between VoG and Strawson’s approach in philosophy, as he remarked that his way of investigating “good and bad and their relations to other concepts” is related to “what … Strawson called descriptive metaphysics” (von Wright 1998, 10).¹⁴ Because of these similarities and von Wright’s own acknowledgement, I should like to view von Wright’s analysis of goodness as a specimen of the approach Strawson later called “connective analysis.”¹⁵ Therefore, as the title of the article indicates, I shall refer to von Wright’s account as a connective analysis of goodness.

2.3.2 Von Wright and Carnap’s explication

As was shown above, von Wright assumes that some important concepts studied in VoG are concepts in search of a meaning and do not have straightforward criteria of application. Von Wright’s suggestion is that, in moral philosophy, the philosopher may shape or mould such concepts by suggesting more definite criteria for their use.

Von Wright’s idea of moulding analysis corresponds roughly to the procedure of explication, as introduced by Rudolf Carnap in his work in the mid-1940s and described in most detail in the first chapter of Logical Foundations of Probability (1950).¹⁶ Carnap characterizes the procedure of explication as “the transformation of an inexact, prescientific concept, the explicandum, into a new exact concept, the explicatum.” In his view, explication may consist in either “transforming a given more or less inexact concept into an exact one” or in “replacing the first by the second” (1950, sec. 2). In contrast to the inexact or vague explicandum, the “explicatum must be given by explicit rules for its use,” (1950, sec. 2) preferably “so as to introduce the explicatum into a well-connected system of scientific concepts” (1950, sec. 3). The correspondence between the concept taken as the explicandum, and the transformed or new concept, the explicatum, need not be that of logical equivalence, sameness of extension or identity of meaning. Rather, Carnap suggests that it is enough if the explicatum is relatively “similar” to the explicandum in the sense that “in most cases in which the explicandum has so far been used, the explicatum can be used,” adding that “[c]lose similarity is not required, and considerable differences are permitted” (1950, sec. 3).¹⁷

The analogies between Carnapian explication and von Wright’s moulding analysis of the ethical terms are numerous: (i) Both procedures involve replacing a vague (or otherwise problematic) everyday concept with a new one, which is (ii) given by means of more explicit rules for the term’s use. This (iii) gives the new concept a definite position within a broader field of concepts (von Wright) or system of concepts (Carnap). Still, (iv) there is a rough correspondence or similarity between the unmoulded concept (explicandum) and the moulded concept (explicatum). And (v) both philosophers agree that supplying the explicatum is essentially a creative move, and is not aptly characterized as unearthing a hidden meaning of the explicandum.¹⁸ Thus, it seems, von Wright is ready to admit the method of conceptual explication—which he calls “shaping” or “moulding” of concepts—an important role in moral philosophy. In some passages he even uses the verb “to explicate” in characterizing his own procedure (e.g., 1963b, 119). Since he certainly knew Carnap’s work,¹⁹ it seems that we may here even speak of direct influence.

There are, however, differences. The most important one concerns the philosophical context. With his preference of introducing the explicatum as part of a well-formed system of scientific concepts, the broader context of Carnap’s method is that of developing an exact scientific framework that is to replace the vague and inexact everyday concepts. Even though von Wright, too, in his moulding analysis, seeks to determine the criteria of application for some evaluative concepts, this takes place in the context of our ordinary conceptual scheme. As was pointed out above, von Wright is not interested in introducing new, more exact varieties of goodness, but in articulating the varieties as they are in the regular use of language—in all their inexactitude and vagueness.²⁰ On the basis of this, predominately descriptive enterprise, he then seeks to provide explicative proposals for the concepts such as moral goodness, virtue, or duty, which may be taken as representative examples of von Wright’s explicative aspirations.²¹ Thus, von Wright does not aim at explicating a scientific conceptual framework for ethics at large. It is only the local “lacunas”—the concepts “in search of a meaning”—which admit being explicated or moulded. A framework of ethical concepts consisting of exact concepts only would, arguably, be irrelevant for everyday life and, eventually, inapt to deal with our practical moral concerns.²²

2.3.3 Von Wright and mid-century analytic philosophy

The two methodological points of reference for von Wright’s Varieties—Strawson’s connective analysis and Carnap’s explication—stem from two different traditions of mid-twentieth-century analytic philosophy. While Strawson is associated with the post-war Oxford-philosophy, often referred to with the label “ordinary language philosophy,” whose representatives seldom used formal methods in philosophy, Carnap was one of the main representatives of the Vienna Circle. His work focused on the philosophy of science, formal logic and its application to traditional philosophical problems. Interestingly, Strawson and Carnap debated the usefulness of explicative and formal methods in philosophy in a critical but friendly exchange of articles published in 1963—the very same year von Wright’s Varieties was published.²³

As a philosopher, von Wright had a foothold in both traditions. Having gained international fame with his treatises on the problem of induction (1941, 1951a) and with his articles on modal and deontic logic (1951b, 1951d), he was firmly rooted in the logico-constructivist tradition. He did not shun applying tools of formal logic to traditional philosophical problems. But having frequented Wittgenstein’s lectures in 1939 and 1947, and acted as his successor as professor at Cambridge between 1948 and 1951, von Wright was also a household name in the post-war British philosophical circles. Indeed, as one of the literary executors of Wittgenstein’s Nachlass, he also valued highly Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, which constituted a source of inspiration for the Oxonian philosophy of the time. Von Wright also maintained close relations to many Oxford philosophers, such as Gilbert Ryle, Elizabeth Anscombe and Peter Geach.

One of the intriguing features of The Varieties of Goodness is that the book combines methodological ideas from two different branches of analytic philosophy. However, of these two traditions, the Oxford movement seems to form the more immediate intellectual context.²⁴ Von Wright’s book is non-formal and stresses the importance of studying the forms of goodness as they are exhibited in the ordinary, non-technical use of language. The fact that von Wright stresses the connection between conceptual investigations and the use of language, sets his work firmly in the tradition inspired by Ludwig Wittgenstein’s methodological suggestion that, at least for “a large class of cases of the employment of the word ‘meaning’,” the “meaning of a word is its use in language” (Wittgenstein [1953] 2009, §43). In contrast, the explicative analysis finds only limited application in von Wright’s project, and, besides, presupposes the descriptive connective study of the varieties of goodness. Because of this balance, I propose that the general method of The Varieties has more affinities with the Strawsonian connective model of analysis than with Carnap’s revisionist method of explication.²⁵ I shall return to von Wright’s relation to Wittgenstein’s heritage in Section 4, below.

As far as the methodology of ethics is concerned, von Wright is, broadly speaking, in agreement with many well-known mid-twentieth century Anglo-Saxon ethicists—such as C. I. Stevenson, R. M. Hare, S. Hampshire, or P. H. Nowell-Smith—in seeing a close association between philosophical ethics, conceptual analysis, and the study of language-use. Such general similarities may, however, too easily conceal important differences in these philosophers’ respective approaches.²⁶ To illuminate one such significant difference, I shall introduce von Wright’s arsenal of analytical techniques—the main topic of the following section—by contrasting his views on the relation between meaning and criteria with the position adapted by R. M. Hare in his much-read book The Language of Morals (1952b). That von Wright, though indirectly, addresses Hare’s proposals, is further testimony for my suggestion that Oxford philosophy formed an important point of reference for von Wright’s book.

3 Von Wright at Work: The Analytical Topoi of Goodness

Having described von Wright’s analytical approach in general terms, I shall now move on to examine von Wright’s connective analysis of goodness at work. In this section, I present and discuss von Wright’s Analytical Topoi of Goodness: the analytical techniques, which are put into systematic use in the analysis of the six basic varieties of goodness in Chapters II–V of VoG. These interlocking techniques are used in charting differences and similarities between the different uses of “good” within the broad conceptual field of the varieties of goodness. Among these techniques, the investigation of the criteria of goodness stands out as the most important single philosophical topos.

3.1 Topos 1: The criteria of goodness

A point stressed again and again by von Wright in The Varieties of Goodness is that the criteria of goodness are logically different in each variety—and thus, the differences in the criteria of goodness mark differences between the forms of goodness. Unfortunately, the concept of criteria is not given a definite characterization in VoG. Some earlier writings testify that von Wright took the concept from Wittgenstein,²⁷ who introduced it in the Blue Book as follows:

To the question “How do you know that so-and-so is the case?”, we sometimes answer by giving ‘criteria’ and sometimes by giving ‘symptoms’. If medical science calls angina an inflammation caused by a particular bacillus, and we ask in a particular case “why do you say that this man has got angina?” then the answer “I have found the bacillus so-and-so in his blood” gives us the criterion, or what we may call the defining criterion of angina. If on the other hand the answer was, “His throat is inflamed”, this might give us a symptom of angina. (Wittgenstein 1972, 24–25)

The relation between a thing (here: angina) and its symptoms is empirical and based on a certain observed regularity or probability, whereas the relation between a thing and its criteria is conceptual. A criterial relation is at once both epistemic and logical: like symptoms, criteria are used in giving reasons for the claim that some X is Y. But unlike symptoms, criteria are also referred to in giving explanations of the meaning of Y, and they may be taken to be partly constitutive of the meaning of Y. A criterion for Y may still be less than a necessary condition of Y: only in rare cases the criteria amount to an analytic definition, as may arguably be the case in the above example of angina. In Wittgenstein’s use, criteria may be defeasible, i.e., they apply primarily to typical cases, and contextual considerations may cancel out the criterion.²⁸ The essential point is that a criterial relation is part of grammar, a conceptual relation.²⁹ And for the later Wittgenstein, the discussion of criteria is first and foremost a philosophical tool by means of which our employment of some philosophically puzzling words may be investigated. The notion of criterion directs our attention to how we, as agents, operate with given words: what kind of features we refer to in our activities of identifying things and in attributing features to them.

In VoG, the term “criterion” is introduced in Chapter I, as von Wright discusses his approach to the analysis of meaning:

An urge to do conceptual investigations …, I think, is bewilderment concerning the meaning of some words. With the words in question we are usually familiar. We know on the whole, how and when to use them. But sometimes we are at a loss as to whether a thing should be called by some such word ‘x’. … We are challenged to reflect on the grounds. Instead of grounds for calling things ‘x’, I could also have said criteria or standards for deciding, whether a thing is x or not. (von Wright 1963b, 4)

This passage occurs in a context in which von Wright discusses the idea of moulding analysis (compare Section 2.2, above). However, in the two-level analytical framework of the Varieties, the reflection on the criteria has an important task in the descriptive enterprise of charting the varieties of goodness, too. On this level, the investigation of the criteria takes the form of mapping and classifying the standards we make use of in attributing goodness and badness to various things in the regular use of language. The importance of criteria is accentuated by von Wright’s claim that the study of the criteria forms an integral part of the study of meaning:

How are grounds or criteria or standards for calling things by words related to meaning? This is a complicated problem, on which I shall here only say this much: The meaning of a word has many aspects—and the grounds for calling something by a word I shall call an aspect of the meaning of this word. (von Wright 1963b, 4–5)

Though exceedingly cautiously phrased, this passage is highly revealing. Positively, the passage states that the criteria constitute one “aspect of the meaning” of a given term. This implies that von Wright follows Wittgenstein in viewing a criterial relation as conceptual or grammatical relation, and that naming the criterion of goodness provides a (partial) explanation of the meaning of “good.”³⁰ But negatively, the passage implies that meaning has other philosophically relevant aspects, too. Together these points make up the more general warning that, in philosophy, we had better not talk about the meaning of something, as if meaning were some single thing we may easily identify and pinpoint. A von Wrightian approach to analysis of meaning consists of the systematic application of various interlocking observations of different kinds (see Section 3.2 and Section 4 below). But before proceeding to an overview of them, von Wright’s discussion of the criteria of goodness needs to be scrutinized in more detail.

Right after the passage on criteria as an aspect of meaning, quoted above, von Wright remarks in parenthesis: “(If someone wants to distinguish here between criteria and meaning, I need not quarrel with him about the meaning of ‘meaning’.)” (von Wright 1963b, 5). This is a peculiar remark, as if the question whether the criteria of use form a part of a term’s meaning were only a terminological question. I shall return to this point shortly. Even though, again, no philosopher is mentioned by name, it seems to me that the remark is almost certainly directed to the conception, defended by R. M. Hare in his book The Language of Morals (1952b), that the meaning of “good” may be distinguished from the criteria of goodness.³¹ In Chapter 6, Hare argues that “the word ‘good’ has a constant meaning which, once learnt, can be understood no matter what class of objects is being discussed” (Hare 1952b, 102).³² Hare’s suggestion is that this constant meaning is the word’s use in commending things. Hare thus explains the meaning of “good” by referring to one of the central (illocutionary) functions the word has in language. And consequently, he takes the criteria of goodness to be secondary to the word’s meaning: criteria are simply the features of things which function as reasons to prefer and to commend them. Thus, Hare ends up defending a prescriptivist, non-cognitivist account of the meaning of “good.” The approach favoured by Hare differs interestingly from von Wright’s perspective. And while the passage, quoted above, suggests that the difference may, in von Wright’s view, be partly terminological, the following passage, buried in the section devoted to instrumental goodness, implies that the issue is substantial. Von Wright suggests that the overt stress put on the word’s illocutionary functions may yield an unbalanced account of the meaning of “good.” In von Wright’s view,

[t]he account of the sense [i.e., the descriptive content, L. J.] of value-sentences should, … be separated from the account of the use of such sentences. The idea that to give an account of the meaning is to give an account of the use, in combination with the important observation that instrumental and other value-sentences are not ordinarily used for purposes of describing, has encouraged an one-sided view of the semantics and logic of evaluative discourse—one-sided chiefly because it underrates the role of truth in connexion with valuations. (von Wright 1963b, 33)³³

Note that von Wright does not deny the value of investigating the purposes the word “good” is used for (i.e., its illocutionary functions; compare Topos 10, below). He simply wants to make room for the descriptive content (sense) of value judgments, studied via the examination of criteria. This perspective also articulates, pace non-cognitivists, judgments of goodness as judgments that may have a cognitive content and a truth value via their descriptive sense: “This is a good knife—it cuts smoothly” (instrumental goodness); “This is a good Riesling—it has a balanced taste with nice acidity with hints of citrus and butter” (hedonic goodness); “That person over there is a good pianist—pay attention to his phrasing and stresses in that movement” (technical goodness); or “That pupil has good memory—he always gets the best marks from examinations after having just glanced through the book” (medical goodness). The examples are mine, but I think they capture the spirit of von Wright’s suggestions. The examples contain judgments of goodness that concern individual cases, and they state criterial grounds for each judgment. The fulfilment of these criteria makes the judgment true in relation to the criteria. Note that, in von Wright’s view, this does not imply that the meaning of the judgment could simply be reduced to the judgment’s descriptive content. The criteria, after all, constitute just one, albeit important, aspect of such judgments’ meaning.³⁴ (See Section 4, below.)

In addition to mentioning such token-examples of judgments of goodness from different varieties, it is possible to characterise von Wright’s view of the criteria typical of each variety of goodness in general terms. These may be called type-criteria, in contrast to token-criteria, which are specific to each individual case of evaluation.³⁵ The instrumental goodness of thing (say, a tool, a hammer) consists in the thing fulfilling well a particular purpose as an instrument used in some activity; the technical goodness of an agent (say, a tool user, a carpenter) consists in being (relatively) excellent in (good at) a particular activity. Furthermore, the utilitarian goodness (say, of a plan) is evaluated in terms of its usefulness in the light of its causal consequences in relation to some end; an organ or a mental faculty (medical goodness) is good if it fills its essential function in serving the good of some being. For the hedonic goodness, the criteria are constituted by the pleasant qualities experienced with sensations, experiences and activities.³⁶

3.2 The analytical topoi 2–12

In addition to the examination of the criteria of goodness, von Wright systematically considers a broad range of features, which all contribute to his analysis of the varieties of goodness. In his fine article “The Meaning of Good,” Carl Wellman (1976, 411–13) has identified no less than 15 analytical techniques used in The Varieties of Goodness. While my 12-point list is based on Wellman’s work, there are some differences. First, I prefer to reformulate the techniques as questions. In that way, the techniques may be viewed as analytical topoi by means of which relevant features of a given use of “good” are identified.³⁷ And second, I include only such observations that von Wright systematically uses in his discussions of most (in most cases: all) varieties. I focus especially on how each topos contributes to establishing differences and connections among the varieties of goodness, in line with von Wright’s connective model of analysis. A perspicuous overview of von Wright’s topoi, with page references, is given in the Appendix.

2. The topos of synonyms. What sort of (partial) synonyms, idioms and possibilities of paraphrasing are related to the given use of “good”?

Von Wright gives examples of partial synonyms and idioms related to almost all six varieties of goodness, often at the beginning of his account. Concerning technical goodness, he observes that the expressions “able so-and-so,” “capable so-and-so” and “skillful so-and-so” may be replaced by “good so-and-so” without change of meaning. He also suggests that the logic of this variety may be viewed as “the logical grammar of the phrase ‘good at’.” (1963b, 33). And in the discussion of the utilitarian goodness, he argues that “useful,” “advantageous,” “favourable” are sister-categories that may all be classified under the common header ‘utilitarian goodness’ (1963b, 41). Often, von Wright also examines the possibilities of paraphrasing judgments of goodness without using the word “good”: concerning instrumental goodness, he points out that attributing instrumental goodness to a thing is to say that the thing “serves its purpose well” (1963b, 20). And in individual cases, he argues, one may give a partial account of the meaning of an instrumental judgment of goodness by referring to criteria of goodness: “A better knife,” is (in some contexts) partially synonymous with “a smoother cutting knife” (1963b, 25).

While von Wright may not have been primarily interested in charting the nuances of partial synonyms, such observations are occasionally used in demarcating the conceptual varieties. Concerning the difference of instrumental and utilitarian goodness, von Wright points out,

[i]t is important to realize that ‘good’ in ‘a good knife’ or ‘a good watch’ or ‘a good car’ does not ordinarily mean the same as ‘useful’. Even a poor knife can, under circumstances, be useful. … But this usefulness of the knife does not mean that it is a good knife. (von Wright 1963b, 43, compare topos 5, below)

3. The topos of subject. What sort of things count as possible subjects of a given form of goodness?

In von Wright’s view, the varieties of goodness impose restrictions to the range of subjects the conceptual variety applies to. The most restrictive is von Wright’s medical goodness, which applies only to organs and mental faculties of living beings. While ‘the good of a being’ is something only living creatures have, and instrumental goodness applies mainly to tools and artefacts that have a clear function, utilitarian goodness is an open category, which imposes only little restrictions to its subjects. Almost anything, which may be considered useful or advantageous may be viewed as good in the utilitarian sense. Thus, there is a connection between the conceptual varieties of goodness and between the range of possible subjects. Note, however, that von Wright does not think that the variety of goodness could be explained simply by recourse to the variety of good things (1963b, 13).

4. The topos of sub-forms. Does the variety have sub-forms, or is the variety itself a sub-form of another form of goodness?

In Chapter I, sec. 6, von Wright argues that the six conceptual varieties of goodness are not sub-forms of one, general form of goodness. Some of the varieties, however, may be divided further into sub-categories by means of providing a differentia specifica: Beneficial is a sub-form of the utilitarian goodness (the useful), since to be beneficial is to promote some being’s good: a judgment of beneficiality presupposes a reference to a subject to whom something is favourable, whereas a judgment of usefulness does not (1963b, 42). And the category of the hedonic good is divided into passive pleasure (attributed to sensations and states of consciousness), active pleasure (related to doing and acting), and pleasure of satisfaction (related to getting what is needed or wanted) (1963b, 64–65). But these categories are not sub-categories of the more general term “pleasure”: the three different forms of pleasure together constitute von Wright’s hedonic goodness. And concerning technical goodness, von Wright notes that the variety may be taken to divide into three sub-forms: excellence in game-like activities, the excellence of a skilled professional, and excellence in creative arts. They differ in the ways the goodness is measured or evaluated (1963b, 39).

5. The topos of a kind. Is the form of goodness an instance of goodness of a kind?

The topos of a kind is one of the major analytic tools used in The Varieties, and it is closely related to the examination of the criteria of goodness. If the judgment “A is a good K” expresses a judgment of goodness of a kind, then it is presupposed that A belongs to some generic kind, K, with which a given standard of excellence is associated: “[A] good knife is, as a knife, good. A good general is somebody who, as a general is good” (1963b, 19). This logical feature divides the varieties of goodness into two groups: while instrumental, technical and medical goodness are cases of goodness of a kind (1963b, 19, 33, and 52), the feature does not, in von Wright’s view, characterize utilitarian goodness (1963b, 43–44):³⁸

When ‘good’ in a phrase ‘a good K’ means useful or beneficial, then, for all I can see, we are not attributing a goodness of its kind to the K. A good habit, for example, is not good as habit. Habits have no special excellence of their kind, as knives or watches or cars have. (von Wright 1963b, 44, compare 20)

Concerning this topos, a contextualizing remark is due. Even though, again, no exact reference is given, it is evident that von Wright adopted this topos from Peter Geach’s article “Good and Evil” (1956) and, using different terminology, adapted it to his own purposes.³⁹ Von Wright’s goodness of a kind corresponds to Geach’s analysis of “good” as an attributive adjective. In his article, Geach introduces the distinction between logically predicative and logically attributive adjectives. An adjective A is logically predicative, if a judgment of the form ‘X is A B,’ (where X is a given thing and B a noun), may be split into two separates parts “X is A” and “X is B,” otherwise the adjective is logically attributive. “Red” is a predicative adjective, since “This item is a red book” may be divided into two logically independent parts, namely “This item is red” and “This item is a book”; “This item is red” follows logically from “This item is a red book.” “Remarkable,” in contrast, is an attributive adjective, since “This item is a remarkable book” cannot be divided into “This item is remarkable” and “This item is a book”; “This item is remarkable” does not follow logically from “This item is a remarkable book.” Rather, the adjective “remarkable” is logically bound to the noun “book” it is attached to. Similarly, “This man is a good pianist” does not break into “This man is good” and “This man is a pianist”; “This is a good man” does not follow from “This man is a good pianist.” Rather, “good” is logically tied to the noun “pianist.” Geach’s proposal is that “good” is always an attributive adjective. From von Wright’s perspective, Geach made an important observation on the logic of some uses of “good” but was mistaken in generalizing this feature to all forms of goodness.⁴⁰

6. The topos of opposites. What is the opposite of “good,” and what is the logical type of this opposition?

The use of this topos may be divided into three movements. Typically, von Wright first examines the opposite terms of “good” for a given use of the term. Second, he moves on to consider whether the opposition in question is of the contradictory or contrary nature, i.e., whether there is a neutral zone between the opposites. And third, he seeks to establish whether one of the opposites is logically primary and whether the other is privative in relation to it. The use of this topos yields much variation in the results: von Wright observes that whereas “pleasure” vs “pain” (hedonic goodness) and “beneficial” vs “harmful” (a sub-form of utilitarian goodness) are typically contraries between which there is a neutral zone, “good” and “bad”/“poor” in instrumental or technical sense are rather contradictory opposites, where goodness is logically primary to badness. Furthermore, von Wright notes that “good” and “bad”/“poor,” when used in the category of medical goodness, are contradictory opposites, but with badness now being the primary and goodness the privative term (1963b, 54–55). (Badness of a carpenter is an absence of skill in his profession, whereas goodness of my sense of hearing is the absence of defects in its functioning.) Even though some of these proposals may well be contested, von Wright’s observations concerning the various opposites to “good” form a major argument for his thesis that goodness comes in varieties.

7. The topos of translation. What is the word corresponding to the given use of “good” (and to its opposite) in other languages?

Even though von Wright points out that the phenomenon of the varieties of goodness is shared by many languages (1963b, 14), he never systematically discusses how value-words in different languages correspond to each other. His references to expressions in other languages—the examples are often taken from German—are usually preparatory to in-depth analyses by means of other topoi. In some cases, however, von Wright points out interesting differences between languages, and argues that such differences may help us “realize the heterogeneity of the conceptual field,” with which we are dealing. In his introductory remarks on hedonic goodness, he notes that

[i]n English, one is used to speaking of pleasure and pain as a pair of contraries or opposites. In other languages, this contrast is not so clearly marked. In German, for example, the nearest parallel to the pair ‘pleasure-pain’ in ordinary parlance is ‘Lust-Unlust’. But the German word for ‘pain’ is not ‘Unlust’. It is ‘Schmerz’. The German pair of substantives ‘Lust-Unlust’ answers in meaning more closely to the English pair of adjectives ‘pleasant-unpleasant’ than to the substantive-pair ‘pleasure-pain’. But this correspondence too is not perfect. The words ‘pleasant’ and ‘unpleasant’ in English would most naturally be translated by ‘angenehm’ and ‘unangenehm’ in German. (von Wright 1963b, 63)

8. The topos of truth. Is the judgment of goodness a cognitive statement with a truth-value?

This topos was already addressed in Section 3.1, above. As pointed out, with his proposal that the criteria of goodness constitute an aspect of the meaning of “good,” von Wright develops an account, in which judgments of goodness in four varieties are viewed as true or false statements, either so in relation to criteria of goodness (instrumental, technical and medical goodness) or in relation to given purposes or ends (utilitarian goodness). Of the basic varieties of goodness, only hedonic goodness is, in von Wright’s view, aptly analysed in non-cognitivist terms: in his view, first person present judgments of hedonic goodness are not “true or false statements of feeling” but “neither true nor false expressions of feeling” (1963b, 74). In von Wright’s discussion concerning the good of a man, the question of truth surfaces on another level: there, the central question is whether human welfare is an objective or a subjective notion, i.e., whether it is based on some universally valid facts or whether every individual defines his or her own good.⁴¹

9. The topos of logical form. What is the logical form of the judgment of goodness?

Von Wright sometimes uses the term “logical form” in the Varieties. In many discussions, he strives to rephrase the generic subject-predicate form of a judgment of goodness “X is good / X is a good K” in a way that would, in his view, better bring out the logical characteristics of the variety in question. In cases where the goodness represents goodness of a kind (compare topos 5 above), we may rephrase the judgment in the form “X is, as a K, a good K.” And, since von Wright stresses the subjective elements of hedonic judgments, he points out that hedonic judgments are of a relational logical form and contain a reference to the valuing subject:

As the logically most satisfactory formulations of such judgments in language I should regard their formulation with the aid of the verb ‘to like’, as for example in the sentence ‘I like the taste of this apple’. But this, needless to say, does not make the subject-predicate form either useless or incorrect … . The sentences ‘this is a good apple’ or ‘this is a good taste’ are all right as they stand. But they are apt to mislead the philosopher by concealing a logical form. (von Wright 1963b, 77)

10. The topos of function. What sort of illocutionary function does the word “good” have in the use of language?

This topos is used to chart the various functions and uses the word “good” has in language. Such functions had been variously discussed in Anglo-American moral philosophy from the 1930s until the turn of the 1960s, when VoG was published, and they were often coupled with non-cognitivist analyses of goodness (compare Section 3.1, above). In the Varieties, von Wright suggests that such functions differ according to the variety of goodness: while both instrumental and technical uses of “good” relate to our activities of comparative grading and ranking, the instrumental use typically has the function of commending (compare Hare) (1963b, 30–31, 44) whereas laudatory or praising functions characterize the technical uses (1963b, 39). By contrast, judgments of utilitarian goodness are, in von Wright’s view, not primarily comparative or grading uses at all (1963b, 44). Besides commendation and praising, a third major function is expressive: this characterizes especially the first person statements of hedonic goodness (1963b, 74). And besides, as pointed out in Section 3.1 above, von Wright strives to rehabilitate the descriptive uses of “good.”

11. The topos of presuppositions. What sort of presuppositions are related to the use of “good” in a given situation?

The topos of presuppositions takes many different forms: von Wright does not use it in as systematic a manner as some of the other topoi, and the uses are often related to other topoi. Related to topos (4), von Wright suggests that an attribution of instrumental goodness of its kind to some X presupposes a purpose, which is associated with the kind, and which X is taken to serve well (1963b, 20). In a similar fashion, judgments of technical goodness in K presuppose that the membership in the kind K is tied to “ability to perform a certain activity” (1963b, 33). And related to hedonic goodness, it is pointed out that hedonic judgments of goodness presuppose a reference to an experiencing agent, in relation to whom something is hedonically good (compare topos 8).

Despite the non-systematic use, I propose listing the topos of presuppositions separately, since it seems that much more could be fleshed out of it. Its major merit is that it directs our attention to the context of evaluation. For example, it is an important facet of many uses of “good” that the judgments of goodness typically presuppose a comparative frame of reference, which may vary depending on context: the criteria used in evaluating whether somebody is a good singer depend very much on whether the evaluation takes place in elementary school, as a part of a singing competition or in a final examination of a degree in musical academy. That is, it is simply not enough to take into account the kind K, in which goodness is evaluated, but also the comparative frame of reference within the given kind. And it seems to me that a discussion of the various pragmatic presuppositions, e.g., those discussed by Nowell-Smith in his Ethics (1954), could shed more light on the uses of ‘good.’⁴²

12. The topos of connection. What are the variety’s connections to other forms of goodness (and other conceptual fields)?

Von Wright’s discussions of each variety are interspersed with observations on the conceptual connections and analogies to other varieties: frequently, the closest conceptual relatives for each variety are named. In many cases, the observations are based on, or may be backed up by, the use of the other topoi. Thus, besides naming instrumental goodness and technical goodness as sister-varieties of goodness, it is pointed out that active hedonic goodness—an enjoyment brought about by performing activities which we like and excel in—has a natural connection to abilities and thus to technical goodness (1963b, 78). And it is argued that the judgments of the beneficial—a sub-category of the utilitarian goodness—are made in reference to the good of some being. The same applies also to judgments of medical goodness, as organs and psychological capacities of living beings have functional roles in relation to preserving the life and the good of living beings (1963b, 54, 61). In many cases, conceptual connections that go beyond the field of the varieties of goodness are established: instrumental goodness, von Wright argues, is connected with the notion of preferential choice (1963b, 31–32). Such examples of conceptual connections are, I believe, essential to von Wright’s approach, as they testify of the author’s general connective interest of identifying both similarities and differences in the conceptual field constituted by the varieties of goodness.

4 Meaning Through Aspects of Meaning: von Wright and Wittgenstein Reconsidered

In this article, I have presented and discussed von Wright’s connective analysis of goodness both on general level Section 2 and on the level of detail Section 3. In both sections, I have also identified some methodological parallels, points of agreement and influence, and issues of direct or indirect polemics between von Wright and some of his contemporaries. I should now like to proceed to the question of how von Wright’s analytical topoi are related to his general approach to the analysis of meaning. The upshot of this section is, on the one hand, to bring forth the special characteristics of von Wright’s version of connective analysis of goodness, and, on the other hand, to illustrate how The Varieties of Goodness may be viewed as an original contribution to value theory building on some methodological lessons and insights drawn from the later Wittgenstein.

In Section 3.1 above, I suggested that von Wright’s account of goodness provides an alternative to the non-cognitivist theories of the evaluative discourse in vogue in the decades immediately preceding the publication of VoG in 1963. It seems that von Wright put much emphasis on the criteria and the descriptive content of value-judgments in order to offer, with his account, a balancing corrective to the non-cognitivist accounts of value-judgments.⁴³ If by “cognitivism” we understand a position according to which judgments of goodness are statements that may be either true or false,⁴⁴ von Wright presents a cognitivist account of four varieties of goodness, namely: instrumental, technical, medical and utilitarian goodness. But still, this is in no way in contradiction with the view, stressed by non-cognitivist analyses of the term, that “good” is also used for purposes other than description.

Throughout Section 3, I stressed that von Wright hesitates in identifying the meaning of “good” with any single feature, e.g., with the criteria of the word’s application or with the word’s illocutionary function. Regarding criteria, he suggests that they constitute an aspect of meaning (1963b, 5 and Section 3.1 above). Even though von Wright does not enumerate further “aspects” of meaning, it seems to me that we may well view (some of) von Wright’s analytical topoi as providing means for investigating further aspects of meaning of “good.” The topos of function (10), concerning the illocutionary functions of “good,” is a case in point. Though this is never said explicitly, the fact that von Wright discusses the topos as part of his analysis implies that the trait may legitimately be taken to constitute another aspect of meaning of “good.” Von Wright’s point against the non-cognitivists is that it would simply be a mistake to overemphasize this conceptual trait by neglecting others.

Does the proposal that at least the criteria of use (topos 1) and the illocutionary functions (topos 10) constitute aspects of meaning of “good” admit generalization to the rest of von Wright’s analytical topoi? While this proposal would certainly be in line with von Wright’s general, connective approach, I hesitate whether this could be said of all the topoi. It seems that at least topoi 1, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9 and 10 could reasonably be taken as devices that reveal conceptually significant features of the uses of “good.” But some others, such as topoi 2, 4, 7, 11 and 12, are clearly better viewed as devices more at home in providing either preliminary or summary overviews of the conceptual landscape. To draw a definite line as to which traits constitute aspects of meaning and on what grounds, is not possible in this essay. Besides, this is a question which von Wright does not directly address in his book. As has been shown above, his comments upon the meaning of “meaning” are characteristically cautious.

All in all, it seems that von Wright’s approach to analysis of meaning in The Varieties is intentionally non-reductive in spirit. Charting aspects of meaning is preferred over proposing a general account of the meaning of “good” and identifying conceptual similarities and differences is given predominance over reductive explanations. These characteristic features enable us to view von Wright’s work’s historical context from yet another perspective. Let us, then, return to an important background figure of the mid-twentieth century Anglo-Saxon philosophy, who was mentioned already at the end of Section 2, above—Ludwig Wittgenstein.

I have already mentioned, in Section 2.3.3, von Wright’s personal connection to Wittgenstein and his thorough knowledge of Wittgenstein’s literary estate. I have also made plain that von Wright adhered to Wittgenstein’s idea that concepts are best studied in relation to the rule-governed uses of words in language, and highlighted (in Section 3.1) that von Wright’s frequent discussion of the criteria of goodness is indebted to Wittgenstein’s distinction between the criteria and symptoms. These features do not exhaust the pool of methodological influences from Wittgenstein, however. For it seems that, in addition to such local philosophical lessons, the general spirit of von Wright’s philosophy is in tune with many central insights of Wittgenstein’s later thought.⁴⁵

In his later philosophy, Wittgenstein constantly emphasized the descriptive and non-reductive character of philosophical analysis. Concerning the descriptive methodology, he stressed, in Philosophical Investigations (PI, §109), that in philosophy, “[a]ll explanation must disappear, and description alone must take its place”—a description, which gets its light and purpose “from the philosophical problems.” In PI §123 he added that “[p]hilosophy must not interfere in any way with the actual use of language” and that “it can in the end only describe it.” And in PI §133 he elaborated that there “is not a single philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, different therapies, as it were.” A well-known late-Wittgensteinian methodological ideal is that of supplying perspicuous (re)presentations—or overviews—of our uses of words ([1953] 2009, §122); the concept of a “surveyable representation” (German, Übersichtliche Darstellung), Wittgenstein noted, “is of fundamental significance for us,” as it “characterizes the way we represent things, how we look at matters.”

All these methodological proposals resonate well with von Wright’s general philosophical outlook in the Varieties. As has been shown in Sections 2 and 3, in the first five chapters of his book, von Wright uses a plurality of analytical methods, or topoi (compare PI, §133), in order to gain a descriptive overview (a perspicuous representation, PI, §§122–123) of the ways the word “good” is used in language. And, in the broader framework of The Varieties, this descriptive work gets is “light and purpose” (PI, §109) from von Wright’s abandonment of the idea of autonomy of morals (see Section 2, above): as moral goodness is not a sui-generis form of the good, an overview of the whole field of goodness is needed in order to make sense of morality.

Thus, in addition to the adherence of individual philosophical tools or arguments, von Wright also draws from Wittgenstein’s general conception of philosophy and of philosophical activity. With this proposal I do not wish to claim that The Varieties of Goodness should straightforwardly be designated as a piece of Wittgensteinian wisdom, applied to the theory of value, as it were. This would be misleading, as it would conceal many important differences in von Wright’s and Wittgenstein’s philosophical outlooks, significant differences of opinion, and the sheer originality of von Wright’s work. A more fitting characterization of The Varieties’ relation to Wittgenstein’s heritage is to view it as a post-Wittgensteinian treatise in the theory of value. For like for many other philosophers working in the early second half of the twentieth century, for von Wright, too, Wittgenstein’s later philosophy was a rich pool of methodological tools, ideas and insights to draw from in original philosophical work; in this sense, Wittgenstein is a figure sine qua non for much of the mid-twentieth century philosophy in the Anglo-Saxon tradition. Indeed, it seems to me that von Wright’s aspectual and non-reductive analysis of meaning, too, was developed in reference to certain lessons learned from the later Wittgenstein. For in an earlier paper from 1954, von Wright acknowledged that it was Wittgenstein who revealed the futility of approaching meaning armed, as it were, with ready-made theories and clear-cut conceptions:

It seems that it was one of Wittgenstein’s greatest contributions to have, in his later thought, so convincingly shown how futile any attempt of drawing boundaries around the concept of meaningfulness is bound to be.⁴⁶

As we have seen, in The Varieties of Goodness, von Wright certainly stayed true to this lesson from Wittgenstein. For his aspectual analysis of meaning, put into action within the broader framework of his connective analysis of goodness, may be viewed as an attempt to discuss the meaning of “good” descriptively, and non-dogmatically, without presupposing that certain traits need to capture the meaning of this multifaceted concept. Here von Wright’s path certainly departed from those probed by many of his mid-century colleagues.

5 Summary

In this article, I have revisited and discussed the philosophical methodology of G. H. von Wright’s 1963 The Varieties of Goodness and clarified the work’s position within the mid-century analytical philosophy. In Section 2, I distinguished two levels of analytic work: the descriptive analysis of the conceptual field of the varieties of goodness, and the moulding or explicative analysis of certain evaluative concepts ‘in search of a meaning.’ While the former level is paralleled by Strawson’s connective analysis, the latter shows affinities with Carnap’s method of explication. In Section 3, I focused on the various analytic techniques that are systematically used in von Wright’s connective analysis of goodness and that make up von Wright’s aspectual approach to analysis of meaning. I also identified points of agreement and influence, and issues of direct or indirect polemics between von Wright and his contemporaries such as Wittgenstein, Hare or Geach. And finally, I suggested that von Wright’s non-reductive and descriptive take on goodness may be seen as a post-Wittgensteinian work which, despite its philosophical originality and acumen, is still best seen against the historical backdrop of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, which insists on descriptive methodology.

Appendix: Von Wright’s Analytical Topoi in VoG II–V